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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 This study examines post-conflict reconstruction in the Nicaraguan localities of Jinotega 
and Boaco since the end of the Contra conflict.  Reconstruction has become a formal political 
project guided by international organizations, Northern donor states, and non-governmental 
organizations to bind post-war states and societies into a global capitalist-democratic political 
structure in the past two decades.  Critical scholars suggest that reconstruction is a normative 
international project to promote a blend of liberal and neoliberal reforms as the foundations for a 
stable post-war peace.  From this perspective, reconstruction imposes liberal/neoliberal political-
economic norms that do not adequately take into account the needs, interests, and cultural mores 
of post-conflict populations.  For some scholars, reconstruction is part of an effort to maintain 
Northern hegemony through the introduction of liberal and particularly neoliberal modes of 
regulation. 
 Recent research in geography and other disciplines has adopted a relational perspective to 
see reconstruction as a political process to negotiate the terms of post-conflict peace and its 
discontents.  These works complement notions of reconstruction from above with a post-
structural perspective that examines the contested production of post-conflict order within 
particular places and scales.  Reconstruction reflects the unequal structural position that permits 
international actors considerable influence over the reconstruction process.  Yet, reconstruction 
also takes hybrid, contingent forms through the different articulations of political institutions and 
relations that come together in time and space.   
 The current study blends theories on contingent neoliberalism, political economy,  and 
geographic place to examine the mutual relationship between reconstruction and place-specific 
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political, economic, social, and cultural relations through which reconstruction is defined and put 
into practice.  The study examines three related questions: 1) How reconstruction norms translate 
into place-specific patterns of transnational governance; 2) How place-based political actors 
renegotiate international norms to produce contingent neoliberal modes of political economy in 
place; 3) Whether dominant reconstruction patterns undermine the putative reconstruction goal 
of building a positive and just peace in war-torn states and societies?  I conducted ethnographic 
field research in two Nicaraguan localities, Jinotega and Boaco, during visits in July-August 
2008 and July-September 2009.  I further supplemented these field visits with long-distance 
correspondence with Nicaraguan informants.   
 The results of this study confirm that international organizations, donor states, and 
transnational non-governmental organizations maintain a powerful influence over the neoliberal 
content of reconstruction through their financial and material control.  However, the study also 
demonstrates that reconstruction has taken complicated, place-specific paths in both field sites. 
Reconstruction outcomes reflect the place-specific articulation of international norms and the 
grounded institutions, governance patterns, and political practices that define and constitute the 
political economy of post-conflict peace in time and space.  The results of this study call into 
question the efficacy of both top-down and bottom-up perspectives that fail to recognize that 
reconstruction forms within particular places through the hybrid connections between actors 
from across political scales and sites.  Finally, the results support the contention that the 
normative reconstruction of neoliberal peace may be fostering post-conflict political-economic 
conditions that reinforce a state of dependency on international donors in ways that undermine 
the putative reconstruction goals of advancing a positive sense of liberal or neoliberal peace in 
war-torn states and societies. 
 iv 
DEDICATION 
 I dedicate this dissertation to my father, Larry A. Nicley (1944-2011).  Larry embodied 
the personal qualities that have seen me through the long, winding road towards completion of 
my graduate education.  From my earliest memories of his leaving before sunrise for a hard day 
in the scorched, dusty industrial factories that defined his professional life to the last words he 
spoke to me, the life Larry led gave me the force of spirit to pursue and complete my academic 
education with this study.  The respect he showed for the inherent dignity and humanity of the 
people he encountered gave me a deep interest in the people and the world around me.  The 
adventurous spirit Larry brought to his life granted me a passion for the world around me.  The 
commitment he brought to all his endeavors taught me to work hard to improve the world around 
me.  The dignity he granted to the humble and the meek taught me that I have a responsibility to 
the world around me.  Without knowing it, my dad taught me to be a geographer.  The dedication 
to his family and friends taught me a sense of perspective that has helped me through the 
challenges of academic life with a reminder that I am more than the sum of my dissertation.  His 
life and his absence remind me that what matters most at the end of the day are the people with 
whom I share this journey.  When I lower my head to receive my doctoral hood, his hands will 
be resting above the hands holding the cloth.   
 v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
 
 My 2006 decision to leave my career in the U.S. Foreign Service in order to pursue my 
dream of earning a Ph.D. in geography came with considerable professional and personal 
challenges.  I offer heartfelt thanks for the support from countless colleagues, friends, and family 
that has sustained me.   
 I offer a special thanks to my advisor, Colin Flint, for his patience and commitment to my 
success for the past five years.  Colin has demonstrated the professionalism and moral support 
that sets him apart as a role model, scholar, and friend.  I thank committee members David 
Wilson, Ellen Moodie, and Ashwini Chhatre for the time, intellectual rigor, and friendship they 
have dedicated throughout my graduate career.  The University of Illinois Department of 
Geography faculty and staff have helped meet my long-distance bureaucratic needs.  The 
University of Illinois Department of Geography and the Center for Latin American and 
Caribbean Studies provided financial support for this study.  Further thanks go to the University 
of Illinois geography graduate students and particularly Richelle Bernazzoli, Erin Demuynck, 
Frank Engel, and Andy Lohman for enriching the graduate experience in too many ways to 
count. 
 In Ohio, I want to thank the Ohio Wesleyan University Department of Geology and 
Geography and the Department of Zoology for providing access to their facilities, free coffee, 
open doors, and moral support for the past three years.  My lifelong mentor Dr. Conrad Kent 
provided me with excellent advice during a difficult period.  Mel Corroto at Beehive Books and 
Al and Shelley Myers at Choffey’s Coffee and Chocolates showed great hospitality as I passed 
too many hours at their tables among my computer and books.   
 vi 
 This study would be impossible without the warm hospitality I received throughout the 
100+ interviews I conducted with Nicaraguan citizens in Managua, Jinotega, and Boaco.  I hope 
that this study can help bring Nicaragua a step closer to the peace and justice that they and their 
families so deserve.  I want to thank Justiniano Monzón, Heilym Gutierrez, and Karla Portillo in 
particular for their friendship and continued support.  
 My parents, brother, and relatives have provided indefatigable support for my career 
goals.  I reserve a special thanks for my wife Dr. Shala Hankison and my son, Tristan Galt 
Nicley. It takes an amazing person to start a new academic career, raise a small child, and 
support a 38-year-old, angst-ridden graduate student materially and emotionally.  You have done 
it with style. I would not have reached this point without the love and support you and Tristan 
have shown. 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................1 
   
 
 
CHAPTER 2: PEACE IN OUR TIME: THEORIES OF POST-CONFLICT 
RECONSTRUCTION............................................................................................................41 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: RECONSTRUCTION GEOGRAPHIES: NEOLIBERAL  
REGULATION AND PLACE IN POST-CONFLICT NICARAGUA....................................62 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: THE ETHNOGRAPHIC EXTENDED CASE METHOD  
AS A MEANS TO STUDY PLACE-BASED RECONSTRUCTION IN NICARAGUA........91 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: RECONSTRUCTING NEOLIBERAL POLITICAL-ECONOMIC  
PEACE FROM ABOVE IN JINOTEGA AND BOACO........................................................113 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: RECONSTRUCTING CONTINGENT POLITICAL ECONOMIES   
FROM BELOW IN JINOTEGA AND BOACO ..................................................................158 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7: IS RECONSTRUCTION DOING MORE HARM THAN  
GOOD? SOME FINAL THOUGHTS..................................................................................209 
 
 
 
REFERENCES....................................................................................................................234
 
 
 
 1 
CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1  THE ROAD TO RECONSTRUCTION  
 
 In 2009, Eduardo Galeano published the latest edition of his seminal book titled Open 
Veins of Latin America.  In his account of 500 years of capitalism in Latin America, Galeano 
offered a moving summary of Latin American political history that speaks to this current study 
and its focus on post-conflict reconstruction.  Galeano wrote:    
 Poverty is not written in the stars; underdevelopment is not one of God’s mysterious 
 designs.  Redemptive  years of revolution pass; the ruling classes wait and meanwhile 
 pronounce hellfire anathema on everybody.   In a sense the right wing is correct in 
 identifying itself with tranquility and order: it is an order of daily humiliation for the 
 majority, but an order  nonetheless; it is a tranquility in which injustice continues to be 
 unjust and hunger to be hungry. ... [P]erpetuation of the existing order of things is 
 perpetuation of the crime” (Galeano  2009, 17-18). 
 
 This study on Nicaraguan post-conflict reconstruction from 1990-present begins with 
recognition that reconstruction is part of the five centuries-long political struggle to define the 
terms of political-economic stability and peace in the Latin American region.  From a 
geohistorical perspective, Latin America has occupied a longstanding subordinate position 
within the global capitalist structure that compels us to question the nature of the capitalist-
democratic regime that privileges the few and subordinates the majority (Skidmore and Smith 
2001).  Too often, Latin American dreams for stability and peace have been defined and 
controlled from beyond its borders.  
 The Nicaraguan history of colonial rule, revolutions, counter-revolutions, 
authoritarianism, war, and peace reflects the political struggles for control of the state and the 
means to define competing political-economic regimes for the past two centuries – more often 
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than not involving the United States (Gobat 2005; Pastor 2002; Robinson 1992, 1997).  
Nicaraguan reconstruction is a reminder that there is nothing inevitable about the global 
political-economic structure.  Rather, Nicaraguan reconstruction in a political process that both 
responds to and produces the terms of political economy and post-conflict peace within the 
broader structure of the global capitalist political economy.  Reconstruction provides a window 
into the transnational connections and international actors driving a globalization of neoliberal 
political economy and the ways that such macro-level processes have engendered place-specific 
forms of political accommodation and resistance.    
 
1.2  RECONSTRUCTION AND THE NEOLIBERAL PEACE 
 The term post-conflict reconstruction broadly refers to a political effort to establish a 
stable, sovereign state in which conflict and tensions are replaced by a general state of peace and 
reconciliation (Dahlman 2009).  However, a more comprehensive definition reveals 
reconstruction to be a complex, political, economic, and social process that combines multiple 
political and economic philosophies, institutions, political relations, and actors (Kirsch and Flint 
2011a).  Reconstruction processes occur at multiple geographic scales and bring political actors 
from multiple geographic locations both within and outside post-conflict states together into 
place-specific (i.e., grounded) reconstruction programs and practices.  The multiple themes 
covered by reconstruction speak to the complex nature of the issue.  Reconstruction involves 
efforts to build (or rebuild) and support state institutions, political, economic, and social 
institutions, governance systems, civil society, citizen participation, military and security forces, 
demobilization programs, physical infrastructure in urban and rural landscapes, and social 
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reconciliation mechanisms in the aftermath of armed conflict (Dahlman 2009; Kirsch and Flint 
2011a; Paris 2004).  
 Given the comprehensive scope of reconstruction, practitioners and scholars have had 
fertile space to critically reconsider the stated goals, norms, programs, and intended targets of 
reconstruction.  Recent contributions have redefined reconstruction as a social process that 
renegotiates political power relations and the allocation of resources in post-war societies (Kirsch 
and Flint 2011a).  The production of post-conflict political-economic spaces thus may be 
conducive to post-war stability, but equally may reinforce of generate new forms of political 
conflict (Flint 2011).  If the putative goal of reconstruction is to build peace, we must raise the 
question: from whom is reconstruction conceived, for whom is reconstruction enacted, through 
what institutional and governance mechanisms does reconstruction occur, and what does 
reconstruction mean in daily life?  Despite two decades of formal policy attention to rebuilding 
war-torn states and societies, practitioners and scholars continue to struggle with these questions. 
  From the outset, I want to recognize that reconstruction is not a static concept, but rather 
has developed and continues to change over time and as it operates across space.  We can place 
reconstruction in particular historical and geographic context as a means to understanding what 
reconstruction means in particular post-conflict settings and also to understand how 
reconstruction may be received in particular post-conflict contexts.  The formal development of 
reconstruction on an international scale dates to the World War II period from 1944 to 1949.  
The roots of reconstruction, of course, extend much further back to the French revolution and the 
rise of classic liberalism (Kirsch and Flint 2011b).  Indeed, for most of the past 200 years 
reconstruction efforts have been shaped by the late 18th century liberal philosophies on 
constitutional democracy, capitalist political economy, and the rational, bureaucratic state. 
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However, reconstruction continued to be only a tentative political and poorly defined political 
concept for most of the century following the French revolution.  The formal Reconstruction Era 
(1863-1877) accompanying and following the U.S. Civil War first established reconstruction as a 
comprehensive political project to reorganize economic, political, and social conditions in a post-
war state (Cox Richardson 2007; Kirsch and Flint 2011b).  The U.S. Reconstruction period 
became a watershed moment that simultaneously transformed the political, economic, and social 
structure of the entire United States, set the stage for the 20th century rise of U.S. liberalism 
worldwide, and laid the intellectual foundations for reconstruction as a political concept (Cox 
Richardson 2007).   
The contentious period following World War I provided the political conditions that 
transformed the U.S. Reconstruction experience into a nascent international framework for 
rebuilding post-conflict states and societies.  The rise of U.S. liberal internationalism and the 
reaction to the punitive terms of the post-war peace called attention to the need for a more 
coherent international reconstruction effort to more equitably define and establish the conditions 
for a just post-war peace that would foster international order, constitutional government, and 
market economies in Europe and beyond (Keynes 1920).  Writing in 1920, John Maynard 
Keynes presciently brought together liberal internationalism, liberal development theories, and 
reconstruction as a distinct approach for building conditions of liberal peace through the 
political-economic and social redevelopment of allies and enemies in the aftermath of conflict.  
A quarter century after World War I ended, the nascent vision of international reconstruction 
came to fruition as World War II propelled the U.S. into the globally dominant position to build 
a liberal international system centered on national welfare states and market-democratic political 
economy to replace the defunct European imperial and colonial order (Huxley 1942; St. Louis 
 5 
Star-Times 1944; Quinn and Cox 2007; Kirsch and Flint 2011b).  Reconstruction programs like 
the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan) became the first steps of a comprehensive 
program to project U.S. political-economic and social norms as the global standard for rebuilding 
post-conflict states and societies (Quinn and Cox 2007; LeFeber, Polenberg, and Woloch 2008).   
 Nicaraguan reconstruction from 1990 has been a negotiated process to redefine the nature 
of the post-socialist state, political economy, institutions, and relations in a dynamic, unsettled 
political climate at the end of the Contra war.  The strong connections between reconstruction, 
neoliberal development, and post-socialist transition have challenged and complicated efforts to 
build Nicaraguan peace.  The post-socialist transition literature casts additional light on the 
comprehensive nature of the reforms to both the political-economic structure and the regime of 
subjection that took place in the name of Nicaraguan reconstruction in the past two decades 
(Burawoy and Verdery 1999; Verdery 1996, 1991; Bunce 1995).  The path to neoliberal 
political-economic reform has required profound changes to the state role in providing financial 
and material support, the political-economic structure, and a decoupling of the unity of political 
and civil society with the move away from socialist mass organizations (Verdery 1991).  
 In particular, three conditions mentioned in the post-socialist transition literature hold 
direct relevance to the Nicaraguan reconstruction process.  First, Nicaraguan reconstruction, as 
with the contemporary post-socialist transitions in East-Central Europe at the beginning of the 
1990s, must be placed in the broader historical context of the global reorganization towards a 
neoliberal regime of accumulation (Burawoy and Verdery 1999).  Second, Nicaraguan 
reconstruction can be viewed as a comprehensive re-regulation of the Nicaraguan political 
economy, state and societal institutions, and governance systems as sweeping in scope as the 
original socialist revolution that brought the FSLN to power in 1979 (Burawoy and Verdery 
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1999).  Third, Nicaraguan reconstruction requires a new set of everyday practices and the 
construction of new post-socialist political subjects centered on neoliberal modes of discipline in 
line with post-socialist political-economic reform (Verdery 1991).  
 Similarly, Nicaraguan reconstruction can draw from the critical development literature to 
better examine the combined political-economic and social transformation that was set in motion 
with the 1990 FSLN defeat (Bebbington and Kotahri 2006: Junne and Verkoren 2005; Hart 
2004, 2001; Bebbington 2003, 2002; Saldaña-Portilla 2003a; Esteva 1992; Sachs 1992; Cardoso 
1972; Frank 1966).1  Reconstruction and development both may be implicated in the production 
of new political-economic regimes and ‘modes of subjection’ that construct new political 
subjects (Saldaña-Portilla 2003a).  Development discourses incorporate a normative perspective 
on liberalism as the intellectual foundation that permits the realization of a rational political, 
economic, and social order in which individual actors may maximize well-being (Esteva 1992; 
Saldaña-Portilla 2003a).  This normative vision creates a hierarchical view of the world that 
defines states, regions, and individual actors at different stages of socio-economic and political 
under-development as compared to an ideal, developed liberal standard (Esteva 1992; Sachs 
1992).  Liberal development generates the categories of developed and underdeveloped that then 
                                                
1 The 20th century history of development theories from the late 1940s to the present 
demonstrate a complex genealogy from the original concepts of macro-economic development in 
the post-World War II period.  Recent general works by Saldaña-Portilla (2003a), Esteva (1992),  
and Sachs (1992) and critical geographic works by Bebbington and Kothari (2006), Junne and 
Verkoren (2005); Hart (2004, 2001); and Bebbington (2003, 2002) provide insightful historical 
perspectives on the development of development.  In particular, Esteva (1992) and Sachs (1992) 
provide helpful accounts of the historical progression of development discourses from Harry 
Truman’s 1949 inaugural speech, the 1950s (macro-economic development), 1960s (integrated 
structural development), 1970s (human needs, endogenous development), 1980s (the ‘lost 
development decade’ and the 1990s (redevelopment, sustainable development).  More 
theoretically, The Saldaña-Portilla (2003a) argument that development concurrently operates 
through political-economic reform and human subject construction (‘regimes of subjection’) is 
particularly useful for my approach to reconstruction.   
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justify international development policies introduced from above and from within particular 
states to reproduce the conditions of underdevelopment and dependent development that have 
been a central part of the critical development critique for the past forty years (Cardoso 1972; 
Frank 1966). 
Recent work examining the complex transnational networks of institutions, relations, 
practices, and processes that have attempted to normalize neoliberal modes of development 
provide particular insight into the Nicaraguan reconstruction process (Junne and Verkoren 2005; 
Bebbington and Kothari 2006; Hart 2004; Bebbington 2003, 2002).  These contributions suggest 
that we may see the reconstruction as a neoliberal development project that regulates and 
disciplines political-economic conditions and political subjects through diverse spatial patterns 
no longer confined to classic tropes of national development.  In particular, reconstruction can be 
probed to see how it may reproduce or adapt transnational development discourses in the 1990s 
and 2000s that appear to shift both the responsibility for development and the blame for 
continued underdevelopment onto the actions and behaviors of the most vulnerable actors in the 
global South (Saldaña-Portilla 2003a). 
 
We can approach Nicaraguan reconstruction from 1990 as a normative process to 
establish a comprehensive political-economic and social regime through the convergence of 
post-conflict, post-socialist, and development discourses around the production of what scholars 
recently have called the ‘neoliberal peace’ (Lidén, Mac Ginty, and Richmond 2009; Lipschutz 
1998).  The reconstruction of neoliberal peace centers on a shift within the traditional liberal 
commitment to capitalist democracy, rule of law, and civil society development.  As Richmond 
(2010: 667) notes, reconstruction increasingly has become orchestrated by an international elite 
set of multilateral organizations, Western donor states, and development NGOs as its principal 
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architects.  These international elite actors and their proxy clients within post-war states have 
centered their attention on producing formal institutions and a governance structure that supports 
market-based principles as the principal guide for post-war economic, but also political and 
social development.  Reconstruction thus has become a normative effort to promote the formal 
trappings of a highly liberalized market-democratic state structure designed to bind post-conflict 
societies into a global capitalist regime (Lipschutz 1998).  The resulting reconstruction of 
neoliberal political economy simultaneously de-centers the state and promotes more inclusive 
governance practices including private and civil society actors as principal guarantors for social 
and political development (Brinkerhoff 2007; Caplan 2005; Coyne 2005; Guilhot 2005). 
 The post-Cold War moment of (neo)liberal triumph during the 1990s provided impetus 
for efforts to establish a normative model for post-conflict reconstruction that began with the 
presumption that global peace and neoliberal economic development were mutually reinforcing 
processes (Barnett 1995, 1997; Jakobsen 2002; Lipschutz 1998).  The seminal United Nations 
reports on peace, development, and security laid the epistemological foundations for a broadly 
held perspective that sees reconstruction as peacebuilding through neoliberal economic and 
political globalization (United Nations 1992, 1994, 2004, 2007).  The United Nations, the 
Bretton Woods institutions, most Western governments, and Northern-based development NGOs 
have adhered to this normative commitment to neoliberal political-economic reconstruction 
throughout the intervening years (see Chapter Two).     
 Yet, we may continue to ask how the post-war states and societies that are the putative 
targets of this normative reconstruction effort have been transformed through that reform process 
(Lipschutz 1998).  One prominent line of scholarly critique has centered on the practical 
limitations and lacunae that accompany the neoliberal best practice standards for reconstruction 
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(Paris 2002a; Richmond 2004).  These contributions examine the efficacy of institutional and 
governance reforms (Barakat and Chard 2002; Cousens and Kumar 2001; Coyne 2005; de 
Zeeuw 2005; Jeong 2005; Orr 2004; Ottaway 2003b, 2003a; Paris 2004; Stanley and Peceny 
2001) and the political connections between international donors, transnational development 
NGOs, and civil society actors in post-war states (Brinkerhoff 2005, 2007; Caplan 2005; 
Megoran 2005; Mertus and Sajjad 2005; Richmond 2005b, 2005a; Richmond and Carey 2005; 
Romeo 2002).   While these contributions have fruitfully demonstrated the limits of the post-
Cold War international reconstruction model, the pragmatic nature of this literature generally 
leaves aside critical questions about the broader effect of reconstruction in producing the 
neoliberal conditions of political-economic life in practice in war-torn countries.  
 A second line of scholarly critique interrogates how the normative reconstruction model 
introduced from above penetrates into particular places to build neoliberal political-economic 
structure.  The recent critical International Relations literature has taken a macro-scale approach 
that sees reconstruction as bound into hegemonic processes from above (Jacoby 2007; Robinson 
2003).2   These contributions broadly consider the role of reconstruction in the development of 
global governance (Barnes and Farish 2006; Barnett 1995, 1997; Jacoby 2007; Jakobsen 2002; 
Jeong 2005; Paris 1997, 2002a, 2004), the role reconstruction plays in reproducing post-colonial 
structures of liberal/neoliberal domination by Western states (Barkawi and Laffey 1999; Quinn 
and Cox 2007; Richmond 2010a; Williams 2007), and the reconstruction role in reproducing 
                                                
2 The terms scholars use to describe the critical political economy of reconstruction vary by 
discipline. Political scientists often phrase their discussion in terms of liberalization of post-
conflict political economy.  In contrast, geographers, sociologists, and anthropologists often use 
neoliberalism or neoliberalization to highlight the contemporary variation from classic liberal 
thought. This study applies the neoliberal perspective on reconstruction, while recognizing that 
classic liberal and social-progressive discourses do influence the reconstruction process as well 
(Hindess 2004). 
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structural and social inequalities conducive to fragile peace and the potential for a return to 
conflict (de Zeeuw 2005; Ottaway 2002b, 2003b; Sampson 2003). 
 These recent works have advanced a critical reconstruction perspective that valuably 
highlights the theoretical foundations and political implications of reconstruction on target post-
war states.  Nevertheless, most of the contributions ultimately falter with the tired theme that 
reconstruction is merely the latest form of U.S. and/or Western neo-imperialist domination (e.g., 
Jacoby 2007; Williams 2007).  To understand reconstruction, we must first recognize the 
transnational elite governance connections that produce post-conflict political economy and the 
‘neoliberal peace’.  At the same time, we must recognize that reconstruction develops within 
these overarching conditions as a relational, piecemeal process through the mutual connections 
between neoliberal discourse, political economy, institutions, governance relations, and practice 
in particular places. 
 The attention to reconstruction from geographers has opened new avenues for research on 
the spatial processes through which neoliberal political-economic reconstruction is produced, 
adapted, and challenged on the ground.  For many geographers, reconstruction is a relational 
process that binds international, regional, and local actors into complex political power relations 
that come together as place-specific patterns of political-economic organization (Dahlman and Ó 
Tuathail 2005b, 2005a; Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 2006; Jeffrey 2006; Junne and Verkoren 2005b; 
Kirsch and Flint 2011b; Nakaya 2005, 2009).  Reconstruction incorporates a combination of 
global governance, interstate geopolitics, and the more subtle transnational connections that 
normalize the post-Cold War liberal/neoliberal discourse guiding efforts to rebuild war-torn 
states (Paris 2002a; Richmond 2010a). 
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 Moreover, recent studies have thrown into question the hard analytical distinction 
between conflict and post-conflict periods with the suggestion that reconstruction is a 
continuation of ‘war by other means’ (Dahlman 2009; Kirsch and Flint 2011b).  Reconstruction 
is a political process that often involves the concurrent experiences of conflict, peacebuilding, 
continuation of political tensions and violence inherited from a period of conflict.  We can adopt 
a comprehensive view of conflict and peace that includes political, economic, and social forms of 
both phenomena grounded in place.  The place-specific patterns of conflict and peace suggest 
that the persistence of different forms of conflict into the post-conflict period often will define 
the terms of reconstruction that might be imagined and implemented on the ground (Herb 2005). 
  This research indicates that post-conflict reconstruction involves an historical and 
geographic ‘path dependence’ that blurs the discursive lines between conflict and post-conflict 
periods, with important implications for how we approach reconstruction as both practitioners 
and scholars.  Reconstruction is part of a political continuum that connects pre-conflict, conflict, 
and post-conflict periods through a host of institutional and relational conditions specific to 
particular conflicts and particular places within a post-conflict state.   
 If reconstruction is foremost a process that produces neoliberal political economy, then 
the geography of reconstruction reflects a process that produces a complex mosaic of neoliberal 
political-economic spaces through the contingent, grounded articulations of political power 
realized in particular places.  A one-size-fits-all reconstruction policy model fails to capture the 
role of historical political-economic conditions, cultural identity politics, and place-specific 
practices that influence the reconstruction process on the ground.  
 The geographic concept of place is at the heart of this study (Agnew 1987; Creswell 
1996; Johnston 1991; Massey 1994; Merrifield 1993; Pred 1984; Sheppard 2002 ; Taylor 1999).  
 12 
These conceptions of place share as a starting point the idea that places are not simply containers 
for human relations (Agnew 1987).  Rather, places are socially produced concentrations of 
societal institutions, relations, practices, and meanings clustered in time and space (Merrifield 
1993; Taylor 1999).  In this study I approach place from a post-structural capitalist perspective  
 that sees places as constituent sites within a capitalist political economy (Johnston 1991; Massey 
1994; Pred 1984).  That is, the historical articulations of political power define what a place is, 
what makes it distinct, and yet binds place within a global web of interconnected capitalist 
processes and relations (Johnston 1991; Massey 1994; Pred 1984).   
      This place ontology calls attention to the contested nature of place as part of the 
negotiation of capitalist political economy.  Recent contributions highlight the globalization of 
place through the articulation of diverse social relations from multiple sites to establish place-
specific relations of domination and resistance mutually bound to broader global processes (Hart 
2002; Sheppard 2002 ).  From a capitalist perspective, different modes of capital accumulation 
produce accompanying spatial patterns of economic, political, and social life (Merrifield 1993). 
Places here are seen as parts of a structured totality, each distinct, yet part of a global capitalist 
structure (Hart 2002).  These capitalist places are sites of political friction and contestation in a 
perennial state of motion, heterotopic sites of hybrid meanings, practices, and relations that 
fleetingly define and condition what places become in time and space (Cairo 2004; Creswell 
1996; MacLeod 1998; Routledge 1997).    
 The recent geographic literature on reconstruction focuses on how international 
reconstruction efforts are introduced, resisted, and adapted within particular places, where place 
is understood as a contested, social process (Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 2005a; Waizenegger and 
Hyndman 2011).  Places become simultaneously spaces of domination, accommodation, 
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subversion, and resistance to the dominant neoliberal discourses through which the contingent 
terms of neoliberal political-economic reconstruction emerge on the ground (Allen 2003; Sharp 
et al. 2000).  It is the resolution of these tensions between normative neoliberal discourses from 
above and grounded discourses from below that result in the hybrid, contingent forms of 
neoliberal political economy, political-economic regulation, and political-economic space that 
constitute the post-conflict reconstruction process. 
 This study approaches the reconstruction-place connections from two directions.  From 
one side, reconstruction has produced a predominant pattern of neoliberal political economy that 
works through place-specific institutions and governance relations.  Reconstruction has produced 
neoliberal modes of regulation and discipline through transnational connections dominated by 
international reconstruction actors (e.g., multilateral organizations, external donor states, NGOs) 
and their place-based partners.   
 International actors’ control over reconstruction finance and policy development have 
allowed them to maintain considerable influence over the promotion of neoliberal institutions 
and governance relations, daily practices and political subjectivities developed through the 
reconstruction process (Richmond 2010a).  This spatial reorientation has produced a host of 
vertical post-conflict institutions that focus the attention of grounded state actors, non-state 
actors, and the general population towards the political interests of the international 
reconstruction community, often to the detriment of post-conflict domestic political institutions 
capable of constructing a state-centered national vision of a post-conflict future (Coyne 2005).   
 Recent research suggests that the reconstruction of neoliberal peace effectively pushes 
aside counter-discourses rooted in place, local spaces, and traditional communities (Megoran 
2011; Richmond 2010b; Williams and McConnell 2011).  From another angle, we can argue that 
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the normative neoliberal reconstruction model disciplines daily practices and subject self-
understandings towards integration into a global neoliberal project guided from above. The 
mutual reorientation of the social and spatial structure compels people within post-conflict states 
– and particularly the most marginalized members of society – to orient their actions to meet the 
demands, political tendencies, and neoliberal discourse being advanced by the international 
reconstruction community and their place-based allies.   
 From the other side, the penetration of neoliberal capitalist political economy through 
reconstruction from above does not sufficiently capture the complex spatiality of the post-
conflict reconstruction process.  Rather, neoliberal reconstruction takes varied, place-specific 
forms through the political articulation of international, state, regional, and local institutions, 
social relations, practices, and actors that come together within particular localities (Dahlman 
and Ó Tuathail 2005a; Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 2006; Flint and Kirsch 2011; Jeffrey 2006; 
Pickering 2007).   
 From this perspective, the international reconstruction framework that is applied to war-
torn states necessarily operates through place-based organizations and institutions that also play 
an influential role in shaping how reconstruction is received and put into practice from below.  
The focus on reconstruction as a place-specific, relational process opens the door for the 
development of multiple, contingent reconstructions of neoliberal political-economic peace.  
Reconstruction has not merely come down onto places as a complete package of political-
economic reforms.  Rather, reconstruction has involved a range of contingent, place-specific 
processes and outcomes that both reflect the predominant neoliberal thought, yet also reflect 
historically and culturally embedded institutions, relations, and practices through which 
reconstruction from above is received and put into practice (Kirsch and Flint 2011a). 
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 Recent research centered on place-based reconstructions of neoliberal political economy 
highlight the hybrid reconstruction patterns that may be observed at the reconstruction-place 
interface (Dahlman 2009; Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 2005b; Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 2006; Flint 
2011; Grundy-Warr and Dean 2011; Kirsch and Flint 2011a; Megoran 2011; Richmond 2010b; 
Waizenegger and Hyndman 2011; Williams and McConnell 2011).  These works collectively 
recognize that reconstruction takes hybrid, contingent forms through the everyday practices of 
power that take shape in particular places (Flint and Kirsch 2011). 
 A place-based reconstruction compels us to focus on how political subjects negotiate the 
meanings and terms of neoliberal reconstruction efforts from above through their daily practices 
and subjectivities.  These place-specific reconstructions of contingent neoliberal structure draw 
from historical place context and the complicated connections between war and post-war 
peacebuilding that condition how people receive, interpret and make reconstruction meaningful 
in their daily lives.  This complex geography of reconstruction quickly move us beyond bland 
descriptions of reconstruction as liberal/neoliberal peace towards an exploration of the place-
specific struggles to construct what has alternatively been called ‘post-liberal peace (Richmond 
2010b: 668), ‘contextualized peace’ (Williams and McConnell 2011: 929), and ‘the spaces of 
everyday peace’ (Megoran 2011: 178).   
 The current research on post-conflict reconstruction does not always explicitly address 
the question of neoliberal political-economic discourse and the theoretical foundations 
supporting reconstruction policy.  However, the greater complexity that these studies grant to our 
understanding of transnational connections between international and community-level 
reconstruction processes suggest further opportunities for research into the geographic scales, 
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grounded political practices and relationships through which neoliberal political-economic 
reconstruction takes distinct forms in particular localities.       
 
1.3  THE 20TH CENTURY POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF NICARAGUA  
One of the principal challenges when discussing reconstruction is the recognition that 
reconstruction does not take place in a political vacuum.  In the case of Nicaraguan 
reconstruction, the set of post-conflict reforms established in the past two decades have 
articulated with both the longer-term patterns of political and economic development and the 
post-socialist transition from FSLN rule in the 1980s.  Accordingly, we must place Nicaraguan 
reconstruction in proper historical context in order to better understand the contingent patterns of 
international reconstruction from above and from below that have shaped the everyday spaces of 
post-war peace.   
Many historians have written detailed works that provide powerful insights into 
Nicaraguan political-economic and social history (inter alios, Pastor 1987; Gobat 2005; Walker 
2003, 1997, 1991; Robinson 1992; Diederich 1989; Paige 1997; Whisnant 1995; Close 1999; 
Dodson and O’Shaughnessy 2010; Cabezas 1986; Lacayo Oyanguren 2006; Pérez-Baltodano 
2008). I do not attempt in the following pages to recreate these rich historical sources in their 
entirety.  The limited thoughts I pen here attempt to highlight particular historical and geographic 
aspects that may help guide our understanding of Nicaraguan revolution, war, and reconstruction 
in the past two decades. 
  Cultural studies scholar David Whisnant (1995) notes that Nicaragua for the past century 
has been in a constant state of becoming as contested cultural visions of a Nicaraguan state, 
political economy, and regime of subjection have struggled to become hegemonic.  As Whisnant 
(1995: 443) describes it, “...Nicaragua has never had an extended period of cultural tranquility or 
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unity.”  Indeed, Nicaraguan history from 1838 independence has been shaped indelibly by two 
concurrent phenomena.  First, Nicaragua has been the imperial playground for U.S. military, 
political, and economic interests, most notably during the 1860s, 1920s, and 1980s.  Second, 
Nicaragua has been torn throughout its history by political and economic divisions between 
Conservatives and Liberals, oligarchs and agro-export elites, capitalist elites and the nationalist 
masses that have divided Nicaraguan state and society. 
Reconstruction draws on Nicaraguan political-economic and social history that may be 
divided into two distinct periods: The U.S. protectorate and Somoza regime (1910-1978), the 
FSLN Revolutionary Period (1979-1990).  This 100-year period has combined U.S. intervention, 
oligarchic rule, liberal and radical development, agro-export production, and resistance into a 
complicated Nicaraguan political-economic pattern that still shapes Nicaraguan political 
conditions. 
The U.S. protectorate regime that controlled Nicaragua from 1910-1933 provided a 23-
year interregnum characterized by a U.S.-dominated High Commission that controlled the 
Nicaraguan financial and international trade system as Liberal and Conservative political elites 
fought for political power at the ballot box and on the battlefield.  The U.S. protectorate 
developed from the initial decision to end its long-time support for Liberal dictator José Santos 
Zelaya (1893-1909) and his hand-picked successor José Madriz (1910). Two U.S. military 
invasions in 1912 and 1926 were punctuation marks on a far more robust U.S. political and 
financial intervention designed to secure U.S. control over trans-isthmus trade routes, protect 
U.S. financial interests from Nicaraguan debt default, and to ward off European influence in 
Central American affairs (Gobat 2005; Walker 2003). 
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U.S. involvement in Nicaragua principally centered on the protection of U.S. political and 
economic interests with little concern for the domestic Nicaraguan political tensions that divided 
the country.  Thus, the U.S. forged the Dawson Pact (1910) that replaced the longstanding 
Liberal administration with an oligarchic quartet of mostly traditional Conservative elite (there 
was one Liberal) whose subordination to U.S. interests included opposition to European and 
Japanese efforts to build a Nicaraguan trans-isthmus canal and a commitment to the repayment 
of Nicaraguan sovereign debt held by U.S. banks.  Once in place, the Conservative elites 
approved the Knox-Castrillo Loan Treaty (1911) that granted the U.S. overwhelming control 
over Nicaraguan political and economic conditions.3  These resulting Conservative rule proved 
to be highly regressive in overturning many of the Liberal state and social development from the 
prior two decades, from the democratization and secularization of state institutions, greater 
investment in agro-export development, and a social emphasis on women’s rights and the general 
welfare of the poor (Whisnant 1995).       
The 1912 U.S. military occupation became a defining moment for both the U.S. 
protectorate period and for the entire twentieth century history of Nicaragua.  Historian Michel 
Gobat (2005: 120) describes the 1912 war as both a ‘bourgeois revolution’ and a ‘social war’ by 
the Nicaraguan masses.  First, he notes that the political contests during the 1910s and 1920s 
went beyond the binary Liberal-Conservative dimension to include a generational political-
economic struggle between traditional Conservative elites and an emerging set of Liberal and 
                                                
3 The 1911 Knox-Castrillo Loan Treaty was a signed U.S.-Nicaraguan treaty to provide US$15 
million to the Nicaraguan government in exchange for U.S. control over the Nicaraguan national 
bank, customs revenues, and U.S. banks’ being awarded controlling interest in the Nicaraguan 
national railroad company and national steamship company.  The U.S. Senate refused to ratify 
the treaty in 1911. In response, the U.S. Taft administration secured $1.5 million in direct U.S. 
bank loans to the Nicaraguan government in exchange for all terms of the original treaty (Gobat 
2005; Whisnant 1995). 
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Conservative agro-export elite centered on the booming cattle, cotton, sugar, and coffee 
production sectors.  
Formally, the U.S. sent 2,300 Marines to Nicaragua to quell a Liberal elite rebellion 
against U.S. supported Conservative president Adolfo Diaz.  However, the U.S. military 
occupation intruded into and helped consolidate an historical moment of profound political-
economic transformation in Nicaragua.  On one hand, the U.S. military occupation that permitted 
the traditional Conservative elites to hold onto their traditional power and maintain a ‘politics of 
exclusion’ in the face of the growing political-economic power of the agro-export sector. Many 
Liberals and reform-minded Conservatives saw the U.S. protectorate as an inherently illiberal, 
clientelistic Conserative regime as a U.S. betrayal of its core liberal market-democratic principles 
(Gobat 2005: 76; Whisnant 1995). 
The Dawson Pact, the U.S. High Commission, and the military occupation pitted 
traditional Nicaraguan political elites against this emerging agro-export elite from their 
respective regional centers in the Liberal coffee production regions of the northwestern 
Nicaraguan mountains and the Conservative cattle production regions of the central Nicaraguan 
highlands.  The resulting period of conflict most notable during the 1912 war, but extending 
throughout the 1910-1933 U.S. protectorate period, recast the historic Conservative-Liberal split 
in terms of both Liberal and moderate Conservative nationalist resistance to U.S. intervention 
and Conservative oligarchic rule  (Gobat 2005; Paige 1997).  Ultimately, the U.S. occupation and 
Conservative Dawson Pact regime began to generate considerable animosity among agro-export 
elites who resented the reduction of Nicaraguan sovereignty and the reversal of liberal state and 
social reforms realized during the 1893-1909 Liberal administration of José Santos Zelaya (Paige 
1997; Walter 1993).  As Gobat (2005) and Walter (2003) assert, however, the U.S. protectorate 
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quite effectively suppressed the nascent development of a broad-based bourgeois development 
through its control over Nicaraguan sovereignty, finance, and commerce during the period.     
Second, the 1912 U.S. military occupation in part became a response to a mass social 
mobilization that developed partly independent from and perhaps at odds with the agro-export 
elite rebellion against Conservative oligarchic rule in Nicaragua.  The Central American region 
suffered a severe drought during the early winter months of 2012.  Rising food prices, food 
shortages, and the U.S.-dominated High Commission’s refusal to release funds for food imports 
proved to be an explosive social mix. While Liberal and Conservative agro-export elites 
attempted to overthrow the Diaz administration, a savage mass revolution swept through 
Granada, León, Managua, and major Nicaraguan cities as people rebelled against the U.S. and 
Conservative domination.  When the mass rebellion threatened to spiral out of control and 
threaten agro-export elite interests, the bourgeois revolutionary leaders turned their backs on 
popular forces and surrendered.  As Gobat (2005) notes, this elite betrayal set in motion an 
increasing radicalization of the urban and rural poor who came to see themselves as the only 
defenders of Nicaraguan sovereignty against U.S.-dominated Conservative and Liberal elite 
interests.   
Following the U.S.-Conservative oligarch victory in 1912, the Nicaraguan political 
economy gradually consolidated around the Conservative and Liberal agro-export elites, despite 
their initial defeat (Gobat 2005).  The U.S. protectorate regime continued alongside continued 
political tensions between Conservatives and Liberals, traditional elites and agro-export elites, 
and elites and the popular masses.  At the national level, Nicaragua endured repeated 
constitutional and extra-constitutional alternations in power as Conservatives and Liberals 
wrestled for political position.  Constitutional elections in 1916, 1920, and 1924 suggested that 
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Nicaraguan politics, if not stable, had at least settled into a predictable pattern.  However, a new 
civil war in 1926 shattered the calm, prompting a U.S. military intervention and a Nicaraguan 
political crisis that indelibly shaped the next several decades.  The 1926 crisis began when 
Conservative Emiliano Chamorro initiated a coup against Nicaraguan elected president (in 1924) 
Carlos José Solórzano (Walker 2003).  When U.S. military forces demanded that Chamorro 
relinquish power to rival Conservative Adolfo Diaz and then returned in force to Nicaragua, 
Liberal generals Juan Bautista Sacasa, José María Moncada, and Augusto César Sandino 
launched a counter-rebellion that quickly threatened the U.S.-backed Conservative government.  
Under U.S. military pressure, Liberal and Conservative forces soon negotiated the Tipitapa 
Accords that ended hostilities and guaranteed U.S.-administered national elections for 1928.  The 
lone holdout, General Augusto César Sandino, moved his forces towards northern Nicaragua and 
continued to fight for the end of the U.S. protectorate.  From this point until Sandino’s final 1933 
surrender and retirement to a small region along the northern Río Coco, and his 1934 
assassination by the National Guard, the image and idea of Augusto Sandino and his Sandinista 
rebel army cemented a deep-seated anti-U.S., anti-oligarchic tradition within the popular culture 
(Walker 2003; Whisnant 1995; Walter 1997).   
The U.S. protectorate came to an end in 1933.  Nicaragua had come through two decades 
of U.S. domination and a political-economic transition that had reshaped the political landscape 
in a profound manner.  The U.S.-dominated Conservative regime had left indelible regional 
political-economic patterns and cultural patterns in both northern and central Nicaragua.  For the 
northern coffee production regions (i.e., Matagalpa, Jinotega, Nueva Segovia, Estelí, and Madriz 
departments), The terms of the U.S. protectorate did little to mediate the peripheral position and 
low levels of production that defined the political economy of coffee production.  Jeffrey Paige 
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(1997) notes that Nicaraguan coffee production, contrary to most Central American states, never 
produced a powerful landed elite capable of wielding power at the national scale.  Independent, 
small-landholding peasant producers dominated in the regional political-economic structure at 
the start of the twentieth century (Gobat 2005; Saldaña-Portilla 2003b; Paige 1997).  For most 
peasant producers, the lack of modern production technologies and limited U.S. and 
Conservative financial support for modernization heavily outweighed the limited number of 
more technologically advanced medium and large-scale producers (Paige 1997).  The growing 
population of itinerant, landless agricultural laborers grew during the period as the export 
commodity boom pressured smaller producers off their land, but this class remained relatively 
low in number during the period.  For example, rural employment data for the Jinotega 
department in 1920 indicates that 62.9 per cent of rural employment involved people who owned 
or rented their own land, while only 29.4 per cent of employment involved landless laborers 
(Walter 1991: 25). 
For the central Nicaraguan highlands region (i.e., Boaco and Chontales departments), the 
U.S. protectorate had intensified Conservative internecine conflicts between traditional and agro-
export elites for control of the state and the financial means necessary to maintain the capital-
intensive cattle production political economy (Gobat 2005; Walter 1991). The high concentration 
of land and wealth in the region reinforced the longstanding Conservative social structure of 
patriarchal, clientelist relations between wealthy traditional and agro-export elites and the rural 
proletariat.  For example, in the Boaco-Chontales department in 1920 independent landholders 
and renters comprised only 34.9 per cent of rural employment, while the rural laboring class 
comprised 53.9 percent of total rural employment (Walter 1993: 25).  If northern Nicaragua 
deepened its Liberal commitment to peasant-driven economic development, the central 
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Nicaraguan region centered on Boaco and Chontales came to reflect the deeper cultural tensions 
between the patriarchal, independent cattle production traditions and interest in securing capital 
from the state. 
It is perhaps ironic that the U.S. departure from Nicaragua and the full return of 
Nicaraguan sovereignty under the Liberal Juan Bautista Sacasa administration in 1933 ultimately 
deepened the regional political-economic tensions set in motion during the tumultuous decades 
of Conservative rule, revolution, and occupation.  The National Guard created by the departing 
U.S. administration in 1933 under the hand-picked leadership of Liberal Anastasio Somoza 
García provided a powerful U.S. foil against the independence-minded Sacasa administration 
(Walker 2003).  When the 1936 Somoza García coup d’etat transformed into three generations of 
dynastic authoritarian rule with his sons Luis Somoza Debayle and Anastasio Somoza Debayle, 
the historic Nicaraguan patterns of centralized oligarchic rule extended for another 43 years.  The 
historically dominant political position of the central Nicaraguan agro-export cattle (and cotton 
and sugar) production sector and the peripheral position of most northern coffee production took 
on new life under the new veneer of liberal development (Walker 2003; Walter 1991).  The 
central cattle regions benefitted from Somoza-administrations liberal development programs 
oriented towards large-scale agro-export cattle (and cotton and sugar) production during the 
1950s.  This regional pattern of political preferences and political-economic development 
continued well into the late 1960s and the corrupt, profligate administration of Anastasio Somoza 
Debayle, deepening with each year the collective underdevelopment of northern coffee and 
agricultural peasant farmers and the swelling number of itinerant rural labor who began to look 
for homegrown solutions to their political-economic subordination.   
*  *  *  *  * 
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 I was present on July 19, 2009 in the central square of León for the 30-year anniversary 
celebration of the Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN) victory over the Somoza 
regime.  President Daniel Ortega enflamed the Sandinista supporters with his excoriating 
denouncement of Yankee imperialists, elite oligarchs, and dissident leftist ‘traitors to the 
revolution.’  More than political rhetoric, Ortega’s words drew on the long history of U.S. 
domination, elite-popular divisions, and national betrayal that has defined Nicaraguan history 
from the U.S. protectorate period and the pacification of Liberal elites, 43 years of authoritarian 
Somoza family rule, and the radicalization of resistance during the 1920s and 1960s-1970s.  We 
can briefly turn to the short history of the FSLN revolutionary government that controlled 
Nicaragua in the 1980s as the second and more direct influence on post-1990 reconstruction. 
 I do not intend to recount a detailed political and economic history of the 1980s FSLN 
revolutionary period.  Many scholars have written about the 1980s FSLN regime and counter-
revolution to examine the broad political, economic, and social transformations of the period 
(Cupples et al. 2007; Saldaña-Portilla 2003b; Walker 2003, 1997, 1991; Close 1999; Hoyt 1997; 
Whisnant 1995; Enriquez 1991; Pastor 1987, Spalding 1987).   My purpose rather is to examine 
how the FSLN period affected the political-economic regime and attendant regime of subjection 
that conditioned the patterns of reconstruction since 1990.   
 The FSLN revolution of 1978-1979 was the final victory of a prolonged, escalating 
political struggle in Nicaragua.  The FSLN formed in 1961 among the radical 1950s-1960s 
Nicaraguan university culture who saw themselves as the critical conscience of the Nicaraguan 
state and society (Whisnant 1995).  As a militant radical social movement, the FSLN developed 
through the 1960s and 1970s to gradually extend its influence into a broad-based cross-section of 
Nicaraguan society that had grown increasingly hostile to the debauched Somoza regime.  The 
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FSLN mass insurrection strategy adopted in the 1970s attempted to assemble a mass movement 
that incorporated not only radical intellectuals, but also urban and rural labor, agro-export 
bourgeois elites, urban capitalist elites, and peasant farmers into a collective rebellion (Walker 
2003).  In such a mass movement, a range of political interests came together (Paige 1997).  For 
most elites, FSLN support wanted a greater political voice in Nicaraguan governance.  For the 
urban and rural masses, FSLN support was the path of social justice, popular democracy, and 
economic opportunity following the long Nicaraguan history of elite oligarchic domination and 
disparity. 
 When the FSLN Revolution toppled Somoza Debayle from power in July 1979, 
Nicaragua embarked on what political scientist William Walker (2003) has called a 
comprehensive political, economic, and social revolution that transformed the Nicaraguan 
political-economic and cultural regime.  The FSLN period was never a simple socialist system of 
command economy and mass one-party rule, however.  What we can say is that the 1980s 
revolutionary period brought to the forefront the tensions between competing Nicaraguan visions 
of liberal capitalist democracy and radical socialist democracy in which the FSLN stood as a 
vanguard party for radical transformation of the political-economic structure.  On one hand, the 
FSLN-dominated administration after 1984 operated within a liberal constitutional framework of 
democratic institutions and contested political elections.  Following the 1984 FSLN election 
victory certified by numerous international observer missions as free, fair, clean, and transparent, 
the FSLN and opposition parties continued even in the midst of the Contra war to develop a new 
constitution, protect to a large degree civil freedoms of the press, expression, and assembly, and 
ultimately accept electoral defeat in 1990 (Walker 1997; Pastor 1987).  On the other hand, the 
FSLN role as a vanguard mass political front afforded a different, more radical view of political 
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democracy and political economy that provoked profound tensions with Liberal and 
Conservative political opponents and a substantial portion of the general population in different 
Nicaraguan regions (Hoyt 1997; Paige 1997).   
 Foremost, the FSLN regime and its political project centered on a radical development 
discourse that attempted to provide for a distinct form of political-economic transformation to 
benefit the impoverished and disadvantaged masses as the foundation for the broader political-
economic and social development of the Nicaraguan state.  Saldaña-Portilla (2003a) suggests 
that liberal development and radical development theories ultimately draw from the same 
intellectual commitment that marries faith in modernist notions of political and economic 
progress with the potential to develop individual human potential.  The FSLN period in 
Nicaragua fits with the broad outlines of Saldaña-Portilla’s argument.  The political and 
economic patterns of reform that took shape during the decade can be seen as an attempt to 
introduce a radical political-economic and cultural vision from above onto a Nicaraguan 
population that proved to be far more complicated and in some cases resistant to the FSLN 
perspectives on radical development than the Frente had expected.      
 The radical development logic of FSLN political-economic reforms was put into motion 
through the political mass organizations and the introduction of a revolutionary political-
economic model (i.e., the mixed economy) throughout both urban and rural regions.  The FSLN 
economic program introduced at both a macro- and micro-economic level a radical political-
economic transformation to address the longstanding dependent position of agro-export elites 
and the urban and rural masses of peasant poor, itinerant labor, and indigent who struggled for 
the daily means of survival.  The FSLN program favored centralized control over strategic 
sectors to control both the production of basic material and agricultural needs and the allocation 
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of basic-needs production (Saldaña-Portilla 2003b).4  In practice, the FSLN strategies played out 
at a macro-economic level in the form of state control over key production sectors, industrial and 
agricultural land expropriations (particularly following the 1986 agrarian reform law) and the 
import, export, and the distribution of basic food products to guarantee that the human needs of 
the mass population was being met (Paige 1997; Enriquez 1991).  The FSLN-affiliated mass 
organizations that developed during the same period, such as the Sandinista Defense 
Committees, the Sandinista Youth, the Luisa Amanda Espinosa Nicaraguan Women’s Movement 
(AMNLAE), Sandinista Workers’ Union (CST), the Agricultural Workers’ Association (ATR), 
the Nicaraguan Union of Ranchers and Herders (UNAG), urban and rural production 
cooperatives, and FSLN-subsidized peasant stores became constituent elements for the 
realization of the heavily centralized FSLN development model (Reding 1991; Serra 1991).   
 This FSLN radical development model ultimately, as Josefina Saldaña-Portilla (2003b) 
suggests, missed the mark by not being able to translate its grand vision for Nicaraguan political-
economic and social development into terms that worked with the historical cultural relations 
inherited from the prior period of twentieth-century development and tensions.  Saldaña-Portilla 
argues that the FSLN radical development logic saw the construction of a revolutionary political-
economic structure as a necessary prerequisite within which the Nicaraguan population would 
naturally adapt and incorporate themselves as radical political subjects.  However, the FSLN 
erred with the assumption that rural workers, itinerant workers, and rural peasants had within 
them a revolutionary mind-set waiting to be channeled into the state-centered political economic 
structure, mass organizations, and modes of mass mobilization that developed during the FSLN 
                                                
4 Katherine Verdery (1996, 1991) discusses the socialist mode of political-economic control as a 
concentration of the means of allocation and distribution of production in her works on post-
socialist transition in East-Central Europe.   
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period (Saldaña-Portilla 2003b).  Notwithstanding FSLN political supporters, FSLN political and 
economic programs were equally viewed by many rural elites and peasants, laborers and itinerant 
workers in both northern and central Nicaragua through a cultural lens rooted in the long 20th 
century history of Conservative and Liberal control, liberal development discourse, and the 
chronic intrusions of U.S. and oligarchic state power from prior eras.  These actors saw the 
FSLN program of land confiscations and expropriations, state control over commodity prices, 
supply imports and product exports, and the mass organizations’ blurred lines between political 
and civil society as another step in a long historic line of political and economic ‘solutions’ 
imposed from above that interfered with local actors’ desire for grounded development and what 
Saldaña-Portilla (2003b) calls their own liberal sense of self-hood (cf. Jonakin 1997; Paige 
1997).  
 The rise of the Contra resistance – beyond being an instrument of U.S. Cold War 
geopolitics – from 1982 to 1988 is often painted in grandiloquent terms of Liberal and 
particularly rural peasant resistance to the FSLN vision of mass, participatory democracy and 
mixed socialist political economy largely directed from above (Walker 2003, 1997, 1991; Pastor 
1987; Berman 1986).  However, Paige (1997) notes that much of the Contra resistance (at least 
among northern coffee producers) was a far more practical response to the political and 
economic crisis provoked by the U.S. trade embargo, rural political violence committed by both 
FSLN troops and Contra rebels, Nicaraguan state price controls and supply shortages caused by a 
combination of economic mismanagement and the Contra war, itself.  The pervasive political 
and economic insecurity during the later FSLN period, in particular, generated a widespread 
unwillingness to invest and improve agro-export production (Saldaña-Portilla 2003b).  That the 
risk of land expropriation actually was quite limited during most of the FSLN period seemingly 
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did little to quell the collective imagination among many rural elites, peasants, and workers that 
forced confiscations, collectivization, and other coercive measures were predestined and could 
only be met with armed resistance (Paige 1997; Walker 1991).5  
 The February 25, 1990 Nicaraguan general election put an end to the FLSN revolutionary 
government period.  The U.S.-backed National Opposition Union led by Conservative Violeta 
Barrios de Chamorro won the presidential election with 55 per cent of the vote and the National 
Assembly with 54 per cent of the vote, or 51 seats (Robinson 1992; Close 1999).  FSLN 
president Daniel Ortega Saavedra on February 26 conceded defeat with the words: 
 Nicaragua was denied democracy, economic and social development, the right to speak, 
 to organize; peasants were denied the right to own land; the poor were denied the right to 
 aspire to a better life. All that the people had been denied was attained with the 
 Sandinista National Liberation Front triumph in 1979, which created the basis for the 
 development of an independent, dignified, sovereign Nicaragua, with economic and 
 social development, with full democracy (Ortega 1990). 
 
 Reconstruction after 1990 must take into account the historical and geographic legacy of 
FSLN rule and Contra resistance.  First, the FSLN administration for many Nicaraguans came to 
represent one more entry in the prolonged Nicaraguan history of paternal state interference from 
above that extends from the Spanish colonial period to the present.  This view of FSLN rule 
deepened throughout the decade under the combined political weight of U.S. intervention, 
Contra resistance, macro-economic collapse, and the FSLN response to these concurrent crises 
                                                
5 Saldaña-Portilla (2003b) notes implementation of the 1981 Agrarian Reform Law (Decree No. 782-81) 
actually enacted land redistribution and the generation of production cooperatives quite slowly through 
1985.  Ortega (1986: 22) notes than from 1981-85, 19% of farm land became state farms (mainly former 
Somoza family lands) and only 7% of farm land was awarded to cooperatives.  Paige (1997) adds that 
most redistribution of land went to production cooperatives, rather than individual peasant farmers.  
Saldaña-Portilla attributes the slow pace of reform to FSLN unwillingness to alienate the large agro-
export elite and peasant coffee, agriculture, and cattle producers that among key economic engines of the 
national economy.  The 1986 Agrarian Reform Law (Law No. 014-86) briefly accelerated land 
confiscation measures prior to the 1988 FSLN-private sector economic accord that halted all land 
confiscations and introduced a series of neoliberal structural adjustment reforms (see also Paige 1997; 
Reding 1991, Ortega 1986).   
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(e.g., the 1982 Nicaraguan state of emergency, the 1983 Law on Patriotic Military Service) 
(Serra 1991).  The FSLN moves to curtail constitutional rule of law, freedom of the press, 
speech, and assembly, the political manipulation of the mass organizations, and the incapacity to 
address rampant economic crisis – all in the context of the Contra conflict – ultimately 
undermined the legitimacy of FSLN rule for many Nicaraguan citizens (Walker 2003; Reding 
1991, Serra 1991).  Second, the FSLN/Contra period nevertheless brought unprecedented hope to 
the Nicaraguan masses through the combination of radical democracy, political-economic 
reforms, and the more intangible but powerful sense of social cohesion and mass national vision 
shared by FSLN militants (Whisnant 2005).  The FSLN defeat, the return of Liberal elite rule, 
and the 2006 FSLN return to power (viewed by many Nicaraguans as a corrupt shadow of its 
former power) have left a bitter legacy for many Nicaraguans from both the political left and 
right.  This is the political context for reconstruction.   
 
 
1.4  RESEARCH GOALS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
 The current study extends the recent post-conflict reconstruction research to reconsider 
Nicaraguan post-conflict reconstruction following the Contra war (1982-1990) and the political 
transition from FSLN revolutionary government rule with the 1990 general election.  On a 
conceptual level, Nicaraguan post-conflict reconstruction poses unique research challenges that 
must be addressed.  Unlike the formal peace accords signed in neighboring El Salvador and 
Guatemala, the Nicaraguan Contra conflict came to a prolonged conclusion through democratic 
elections and an extended demobilization process that struggled into the mid-1990s (Oliver 
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1999).6  Moreover, the FSLN government initiated limited neoliberal austerity reforms as early 
as 1985 to curb inflation through currency devaluation, government employment reductions, and 
privatization initiatives (Close 1999).  These blurred boundaries between the post-conflict period 
and neoliberalization measures highlight that reconstruction is not wholly synonymous with 
neoliberal reform. 
 What is more clear is that we can approach post-conflict reconstruction in Nicaragua as 
an international political project from 1990 onwards that introduced a normative and generally 
neoliberal framework for reforming the Nicaraguan state, society, and political economy 
(Everingham 1998).  The roots of Nicaraguan neoliberal political economy may rest in the late-
1980s revolutionary period, but the international attention brought to Nicaraguan post-conflict 
reconstruction following the 1990 electoral transition from FSLN rule – and subsequent National 
Opposition Union (UNO) and Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC) governments within 
Nicaragua (1990-2006) introduced a sweeping set of neoliberal societal reforms and accelerated 
neoliberal economic reforms already in progress (Close 1999; Robinson 1997; Walker 2003).  
Reconstruction provided the opportunity for the convergence of neoliberal discourse, widespread 
institutional and governance reform, and transnational reconstruction programs that continue to 
influence the Nicaraguan political-economic landscape today.  The reconstruction period has 
thus set the stage for the neoliberal reconstruction of the Nicaraguan political economy 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s, with macro-scale reductions in state sector employment (la 
compactación), privatization of public sector utilities, the educational system, and health care, 
                                                
6 Nicaragua was a signatory to the 1987 Esquipulas II Accords that codified the Central 
American Esquipulas Process in 1986-1987 to promote the peaceful resolution of armed 
conflicts in the region. However, the Esquipulas II Accords did not terminate the Contra conflict 
and was not accepted by the counter-revolutionary armed resistance (Envío 1987; Oliver 1999). 
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and the growth of micro-credit financial services for development programs (Babb 2001; Lacayo 
Oyanguren 2006; Walker 2003). 
 I approach the current study on Nicaraguan reconstruction from a place-based perspective 
that draws from the recent focus on neoliberal discourse, transnational spatialities, and the 
recursive relationship between conflict and post-conflict periods.  This study takes the arguments 
on neoliberal political-economic reconstruction one step further by investigating how neoliberal 
reconstruction has produced transnational connections of institutions and actors that converge to 
generate contingent, place-specific forms of neoliberal reconstruction.   
 At its root, this study centers on the central theme of whether Nicaraguan post-conflict 
reconstruction has achieved its self-evident goal of building a more just, politically stable society 
in which the root causes of the Nicaraguan revolution and subsequent Contra conflict have been 
addressed and resolved.  The eventual answer to this question compels us to ask whether the 
normative nature of post-conflict reconstruction could even be generating the very political 
tensions and instabilities that it nominally has endeavored to reduce and eliminate through the 
past two decades of post-conflict development.   
 The study is structured around three research questions to explore distinct facets of 
Nicaraguan reconstruction that together may provide tentative answers to the issue of whether 
reconstruction has successfully established a post-conflict state and society.  The first research 
question addresses the transnational governance structure put in place through the reconstruction 
process.  Namely, I ask what role dominant international organizations, capitalist donor state 
agencies, and transnational NGO networks have played in establishing a neoliberal political-
economic structure within distinct Nicaraguan localities.  This question brings together the 
predominant neoliberal discourse that has shaped these actors’ attitudes and policies, how formal 
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neoliberal reconstruction policies have translated into particular communities, and the 
mechanisms through which international reconstruction actors have been able to maintain the 
transnational governance connections at the heart of the post-conflict reconstruction process.  
 The second research question addresses the place-specific geographic patterns of 
Nicaraguan post-conflict reconstruction.  I ask whether reconstruction has produced distinct, 
place-specific institutions and governance relations, daily practices, and political subjectivities 
within particular localities that, in turn, redefine the terms of reconstruction from below.  The 
role of place in the definition and implementation of reconstruction compels us to look closely at 
the spatiality of reconstruction as a set of processes that take shape among different geographic 
scales and spaces.  This research question thus examines how the place-specific reconstruction of 
neoliberal political economy is a negotiated process among international, state, and local actors 
that builds place-specific definitions of what reconstruction means, of how reconstruction 
functions, and how reconstruction has affected daily life for the Nicaraguan population.  As part 
of this place-based reconstruction process, I also explore the local and regional spatial 
imaginations through which reconstruction processes are defined, put into practice, and 
consolidated in post-conflict localities. 
 The third research question addresses whether and to what extent the place-specific 
conditions of post-conflict reconstruction reflect the path dependence created through the on-the-
ground patterns of wartime political economy, wartime institutions and governance relations, and 
daily experiences of war that have translated into the post-conflict reconstruction period.  This 
research question draws heavily from recent work by Kirsch and Flint (2011b) questioning the 
hard lines between conflict and peace that have dominated most of the reconstruction literature.  
This line of inquiry examines how the place-specific patterns of conflict set in motion the 
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contingent forms of neoliberal political-economic reconstruction that define the broader 
reconstruction process.  
 
1.5  THE CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RECONSTRUCTION 
 To explore these contingent intersections of Nicaraguan reconstruction, neoliberal 
political economy, I examine reconstruction and neoliberalism as contingent, relational political 
processes rooted in culture.  In recent years, scholars have asserted that capitalist political 
economy can adopt varied forms through a blend of economic and political-cultural identity 
politics (Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008; Jessop and Sum 2007; Jones 2008; Sayer 2001; van Heur 
2010).  The culturally informed political economy perspective that I adopt organizes the political 
and economic structure around culturally specific identities and relations through an evolutionary 
process that defines the terms of economic and political organization.  These terms subsequently 
become part of daily practice and are consolidated through the development of political-
economic institutions and governance systems.  From this perspective, the contingent 
reconstruction of putatively neoliberal political-economic conditions is always a work in 
progress that takes distinct forms through the contingent mix of economic and cultural-political 
relations that go beyond classic categories of economic class. 
 This perspective provides a cogent theoretical framework for understanding post-conflict 
reconstruction through the place-specific, hybrid forms of neoliberal political economy (and 
resistance) that have taken hold in Nicaraguan localities (Cupples, Glynn, and Larios 2007).  The 
transnational structure of reconstruction takes shape through place-specific connections among 
economic, political, and social institutions and relations.  Reconstruction is inherently a process 
that defines and puts into practice the terms of neoliberal political economy and political-
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economic regulation through these grounded, place-specific conditions.  In this way, post-
conflict reconstruction produces the contingent neoliberal forms of political economy that take 
hold in particular localities and become part of the broader Nicaraguan political-economic 
reconstruction process.   
 Geographic scale is an important consideration.  Nicaraguan post-conflict reconstruction 
cannot be viewed as simply an amalgamation of place-specific processes that become the 
building blocks for what we call Nicaraguan reconstruction.  Rather, the contingent 
reconstructions of political economy in place equally can be seen as an integral part of the 
broader spatial reorganization of Nicaraguan the political-economic structure during the post-
conflict period (Agnew 2000).  Thus, reconstruction, neoliberalism, and place are bound into a 
single process through which place-specific reconstruction patterns both are a reflection of and 
become constituent elements within the overarching post-conflict reconstruction of contingent 
forms of neoliberal capitalist political economy at different geographic scales. 
 
1.6  THE ETHNOGRAPHIC EXTENDED CASE METHOD 
 The current study adopts an ethnographic extended case method to analyze the place-
specific patterns of neoliberal political economy and cultural identity politics that have emerged 
through post-conflict reconstruction in Nicaraguan localities (Burawoy 2009; Gille 2001).  The 
ethnographic extended case method provides a coherent research approach for studying how 
individuals live a grounded capitalist political economy on a daily basis (Burawoy et al. 2000; 
Hart 2002, 2004).  The extended case method is place-based field research into the political-
economic imaginations and daily practices that shape individual actors’ lives on the ground.  
This method thus aligns ethnography with mainstream social science practice, in a dual sense, 
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with its commitment to critical theory (Burawoy 2009; Gille 2001; Hart 2002, 2004; Megoran 
2006; Tsing 2004).  First, this research recognizes that all field research begins with theoretical 
assumptions and expectations that guide the development of research in the field (Burawoy 
2009; Gille 2001; Hart 2004).  Second, the extended case method is committed to situate field 
research within a broader historical and spatial context (Burawoy et al. 2000).  Thus, the 
extended case method is an extension in two senses: From daily life-worlds to the broader 
structures and processes within which those daily conditions are embedded; and from field 
research to a refined theoretical perspective that better fits with the observations and analysis 
realized through the research process (Burawoy et al. 2000). 
 The ethnographic extended case method complements the dominant transnational 
institutional and governance perspectives that approach reconstruction as a generally top-down 
process.  The extended case method allows us to better understand how the post-conflict 
reconstruction of contingent forms of neoliberal political economy and political-economic 
regulation are connected recursively to the daily practices and reconstruction experiences that 
have defined and set the terms of post-conflict reconstruction as part of everyday life.  This 
research attention on building direct and sustained relationships within different research field 
sites ultimately is one of the only ways to comprehend how reconstruction has produced a full-
spectrum reorganization of the political-economic structure all the way down to the development 
of neoliberal political subjectivities on the ground. 
 Field research for this study occurred in Jinotega, a municipal seat and administrative 
department in northern Nicaragua and in Boaco, a municipal seat and administrative department 
in central Nicaragua.  As described fully in Chapter 4, Jinotega and Boaco provide a strong 
comparative framework for studying post-conflict political-economic reconstruction in 
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Nicaragua since 1990.  The daily reconstruction experiences I encountered in Jinotega and Boaco 
highlight the complicated relationship between transnational governance connections, the place-
specific economic, political, and social conditions in each location, and the continuities between 
conflict and post-conflict periods that have conditioned the daily patterns of neoliberal political-
economic reconstruction in both localities.  
 The principal field research for this study took place from July-August 2008 and July-
September 2009.  I resided in Jinotega and Boaco throughout most of the research periods, with 
additional research conducted in Managua in September 2009.  Since my 2009 field research, I 
have maintained contact with many Nicaraguan research informants in both of my field sites.  
The discussions I have held over the past two years with these Nicaraguan people – business 
professionals, farmers, NGO representatives, political leaders, and the periodically unemployed – 
have painted a portrait of Nicaraguan post-conflict life in which the same political and economic 
tensions that I observed first-hand in 2006, 2008, and 2009 have merely deepened and intensified 
in the intervening years.  With the most recent 2011 elections crisis, it remains to be seen 
whether the downward spiral in the Nicaraguan post-conflict condition can be halted.    
 
1.7  THE STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
 The current study is arranged into seven chapters.  Taken together, the research included 
in this project contributes to post-conflict reconstruction as both an international affairs policy 
project involving policymakers and other practitioners, and an intellectual research project 
spearheaded by academic professionals.  The study provides an important bridge that combines 
the predominant international reconstruction perspectives ‘from above’ and the place-based 
reconstruction perspectives ‘from below’ into a transnational perspective portraying 
 38 
reconstruction as a political-economic reform process that emerges from within particular places 
to build the contingent patterns of post-conflict reconstruction that exist in daily life.  
 Chapter 2 reviews the current state of post-conflict reconstruction research, neoliberalism 
research, and concepts of place and place context in the academic literature.  Following an initial 
review of research on the normative international reconstruction model for establishing capitalist 
democracy in war-torn states, the chapter examines the critical view that reconstruction is a 
transnational political project to install neoliberal political economy in post-war states.  This 
critical perspective is married to recent research that urges greater attention to the historical and 
geographic conditions within which reconstruction has developed.  The chapter concludes with a 
review of recent research that challenges monolithic definitions of neoliberalism as a political 
concept.  The chapter briefly considers the idea of contingent neoliberalism and discusses the 
implications for post-conflict reconstruction research. 
 Chapter 3 describes the theoretical framework that I apply to Nicaraguan post-conflict 
reconstruction.  The chapter weaves together recent research on capitalist political-economic 
regulation, transnational governance, and place to provide a coherent vision of the role post-
conflict reconstruction plays in reconstituting new modes of neoliberal political economy in post-
conflict states. The chapter blends this political economy perspective with recent research on the 
nature of place-specific context and place as a heterotopic space of domination and resistance in 
a way that helps constitute the broader patterns of post-conflict neoliberal political economy on 
the ground. 
 Chapter 4 details the ethnographic extended case method that I use to conduct field 
research on place-based forms of political-economic reconstruction in two Nicaraguan localities.  
This chapter considers the advantages of using the extended case method as a preferred approach 
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that combines theoretical positions and ethnographic field research into a single research method.  
The recognition that field research provides partial, situated knowledge of broader capitalist 
political-economic processes lays the groundwork for adopting the extended case method in the 
current study.  The chapter continues with a brief discussion of the challenges that accompany 
the ethnographic extended case method.  Finally, the chapter concludes with an overview of the 
criteria for the selection of two Nicaraguan case studies in the Jinotega and Boaco, two 
municipal seats and administrative departments in Nicaragua.   
 Chapter 5 is the first of two chapters describing the results of the analysis.  The chapter 
addresses the transnational governance connections through which international organizations, 
powerful donor states, and internationally based development NGOs have promoted neoliberal 
institutional and governance reforms in Jinotega and Boaco from above.  The chapter describes 
how the transnational structure of post-conflict political economy has successfully established 
the broad neoliberal framework for reconstruction through international actors’ financial and 
political influence over the reconstruction process.  At the same time, the chapter considers the 
place-specific effects of this transnational structure from the perspective of the grounded 
political, economic, and civil society ‘reconstruction sector’ actors who have lived the 
reconstruction process on the ground in Jinotega and Boaco. 
 Chapter 6 takes a further look at the place-specific forms of neoliberal post-conflict 
reconstruction in Jinotega and Boaco through the conditioning role of culture on political-
economic reconstruction.  The chapter examines how individuals in both localities have 
negotiated the transnational structure of reconstruction through place-specific, culturally 
grounded institutions, relations, and practices. The lived practices of post-conflict reconstruction 
have simultaneously adhered to but also have redefined and adapted the dominant strands of 
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neoliberal thought to meet the place-specific imaginations about what political-economic 
reconstruction means, how it should be put into practice, and consolidated within the institutional 
fabric of post-war life.  The chapter reveals the contingent terms of neoliberal political economy 
that have emerged in Jinotega and Boaco.  From the regional political economy of coffee 
production in Jinotega to the localized political economy of cattle production in Boaco, the 
chapter focuses on the contingent, place-based relationship between institutions, governance, 
neoliberal practice and subjectivities that has produced the geography of neoliberal post-conflict 
reconstruction in Nicaragua.    
 Chapter 7 provides a summary of the current study and what the research suggests about 
both Nicaraguan post-conflict reconstruction and the international post-conflict reconstruction 
project, in general.  The chapter concludes that Nicaraguan reconstruction has a mixed record of 
building a more peaceful post-conflict society despite two decades of international attention to 
post-war development and reconciliation. The post-conflict reconstruction process has not yet 
created political space for a shared national project that can supersede the Nicaraguan past of 
conflict and mistrust among political organizations and actors.  I suggest that reconstruction is 
partly responsible for the continued political and economic divisions because of the reorientation 
of political, economic, and social life towards the international reconstruction community at the 
expense of horizontal connections among domestic organizations and actors necessary for post-
conflict state-building and social reconciliation.  However, the place-specific reconstruction 
experiences in Jinotega and Boaco give room for hope through the ways that some Nicaraguan 
citizens have redefined reconstruction in their efforts to make reconstruction more responsive to 
the grounded visions for a more just post-conflict future.    
 
 41 
CHAPTER 2  
PEACE IN OUR TIME: THEORIES OF POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION  
  
2.1  INTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
 This chapter reviews recent research trends on post-conflict reconstruction.  The common 
theme running throughout this chapter questions, in Paris’ (2000) words, whether post-conflict 
reconstruction is the same thing as post-conflict peace.  Multiple scholars have begun to 
critically examine reconstruction with attention to the normative political foundations and 
political actors that define the content of reconstruction.  In this chapter, I focus on three distinct 
sets of literature exploring reconstruction as a political process to rebuild capitalist-democratic 
political economy, institutions, and governance structure in post-conflict states and societies.  I 
grant particular attention to recent works by geographers, critical international relations scholars 
and anthropologists who have challenged the predominant reconstruction literature based on a 
state-centered, pragmatic policy perspective.  Recent geographic works call particular attention 
to a place-based research epistemology that can better integrate the normative nature of 
international reconstruction efforts with the contingent, grounded reconstruction conditions that 
constitute the daily, lived experience of reconstruction within particular states, regions, and 
localities.  
 The chapter organization follows this overarching focus.  The first section considers the 
normative conditions that inform international reconstruction as a framework for rebuilding 
capitalist-democratic political economy, institutions, and governance in post-war states. The 
second section critically reexamines how reconstruction efforts have become wedded to the 
discourse of neoliberal peace in the post-Cold War period.  The third section concludes the 
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chapter with critical reflection on the complex geographies of reconstruction as a contingent 
process that establishes new political-economic conditions of peace and conflict in the name of 
neoliberal peace. 
 Chapter 1 recounted the historical rise of an international post-conflict reconstruction 
regime in the two decades after the Cold War ended.  As I noted, reconstruction has become a 
central policy focus for the liberal international community (Barnett 1995, 1997; Jakobsen 2002; 
United Nations 1992, 1994, 2004, 2007).  The United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, 
Western capitalist states, and transnational development NGOs have all adopted, to varying 
degrees, a formal, institutional commitment to reconstructing war-torn states.  The historic 
development of this universal focus on reconstruction with the post-Cold War moment of liberal 
triumph cannot be ignored.  The reconstruction program that emerged in the 1990s took aboard 
the convergent discourses on globalization of a liberal order eighty years in the making 
(Jakobsen 2002; Latham 1997).  Moreover, major international policy centers and Northern 
donor states intensified their focus on specifically neoliberal political and economic reforms 
during the post-Cold War 1990s (Barnett 2005; Comaroff and Comaroff 2001; Hewitt de 
Alcántara 1998; Lipschutz 1998; Roy 2010).   
 Reconstruction studies arose largely in response to international policy attention to post-
conflict policies since 1990.  The scholarly literature roughly divides into two main camps.  First, 
there is a literature that works ‘within the system’ to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of 
contemporary reconstruction policy.  Second, there is a literature that critically evaluates the 
normative thought that has guided international reconstruction efforts in recent decades.  Both 
sets of literature have something valuable to offer for the development of geographic 
perspectives on reconstruction.  My principal interest with both of these literatures is to 
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understand how the normative international reconstruction efforts of the past two decades have 
become both a foundation for and a reflection of the complex reconstruction patterns that can be 
observed in practice.  Geographers, critical international relations scholars, and anthropologists 
have provided important insights into the predominant blend of liberal and neoliberal discourses, 
structures, processes, and relations that have influenced both international and community-based 
reconstruction efforts from above and from below. 
 The standard definition of reconstruction portrays it as a formal, technocratic project to 
establish and/or rebuild a sovereign, capitalist-democratic state that guarantees liberal political, 
economic, and civil rights, rule of law, and a stable peace for its citizens (Dahlman 2009; Paris 
2004).  Reconstruction commonly involves a comprehensive program of institutional reforms, 
governance reforms, infrastructure development, and civil society development as foundations 
for establishing post-conflict peace.  Within this general definition, however, reconstruction 
scholars have adopted a heterogeneous suite of definitions and concepts under the reconstruction 
concept.   
 For example, McGinty (2008; 2010) places reconstruction as part of a multi-pronged 
effort to bring security, reconstruction, and development to war-torn states.  Junne and Verkoren 
(2005b) similarly position reconstruction as a medium-term set of institutional, governance, and 
infrastructure-building processes nestled between short-term humanitarian relief and long-term 
development.  Jeong (2005) defines a four-fold reconstruction commitment to post-conflict 
security, infrastructure development, and liberal political and economic institutional reforms.  
Paris (2004) similarly examines the potential contradictions between state-building and 
liberalization efforts as a threat to reconstruction.  Meanwhile, Lederach (1997) centers 
reconstruction on subverting the root causes of conflict through social reconciliation. 
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 Many scholars have pursued a practical, policy-centered approach to reconstruction that 
generally works within these definitions (Bermeo 2003; Brinkerhoff 2005; Brown 2003a; Cahn 
2006; Call and Cook 2003; Cousens and Kumar 2001; Fox 2003; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; 
ICRW 1998; Jeong 2005; Labonte 2003; Lyons 2004; Mertus and Sajjad 2005; Orr 2004; 
Samuels 2006).  These contributions have focused principally on both policy analysis and 
recommendations for improving reconstruction ‘best practice’ standards for building capitalist-
democratic institutions and governance systems.  International reconstruction efforts commonly 
include programs to strengthen formal state, political, and economic institutions in order to 
provide a stable structure for capitalist-democratic political economy and governance reforms.  
Institutions and new governance relations thus set the ‘rules of the game’ for the liberal 
reconstruction of state and society deemed necessary for effective peacebuilding and social 
reconciliation.7  
 Recent institutional research has explored the connections between reconstruction and the 
various efforts to establish strong state, political, and economic institutions that can provide a 
stable framework for post-conflict governance.  For example, recent studies have centered on 
reconstruction and constitutional design, citizenship, and rule of law (Richmond 2005b; Samuels 
2006), political/electoral systems, political and civil rights regimes (Call and Cook 2003; 
Carothers 1999, 2002; Jeong 2005; Lyons 2004); international law and democratic entitlement 
(Barnett 1997; Fox 2003; Orend 2000b), and institutional structures for citizen participation 
(Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Mertus and Sajjad 2005).  Similarly, governance research has 
                                                
7 John Ikenberry (Ikenberry 2001: 16) provides a concise definition of institutions in his book 
After Victory, stating ‘[i]nstitutions are the formal and informal organizations, rules, routines, 
and practices that are embedded in the wider political order and define the “landscape” in which 
actors operate.’ Ikenberry adopts a ‘historical institutionalism’ perspective that recognizes 
institutions as socially constructed structures that both enable and constrain political relations.  
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explored the connections between reconstruction and the development of a broad-based 
governance structure that involves multiple private and non-state actors alongside the state 
apparatus as the foundations for a liberal, accountable capitalist-democratic state.  For example, 
recent studies have centered on reconstruction and governance reforms to promote state 
legitimacy, security, and effective government (Brinkerhoff 2005, 2007; Caplan 2005; Mertus 
and Sajjad 2005; Romeo 2002), the limits of international governance and the international/local 
tensions in the reconstruction process (Barakat and Chard 2002; Cousens and Kumar 2001; de 
Zeeuw 2005), and the importance of non-state and civil society governance participation in 
consolidating bottom-up reconstruction processes (Coyne 2005; Jeong 2005; Orr 2004).   
 This wide-ranging scholarly literature has examined the complex relationships between 
international organizations, external donor states, non-governmental development organizations, 
and civil society actors from multiple geographic scales and sites involved in the reconstruction 
process.  To a great extent, these contributions represent a conversation with the reconstruction 
practitioner community that merely reinforces the normative liberal approach to reconstruction 
(Richmond 2005b).  Nevertheless, these works are not devoid of critical analysis.  The insights 
they provide point us towards more robust critical perspectives that question the goals and effects 
of reconstruction. 
 Foremost, these works bring to light the limits of the international reconstruction model 
and its top-down approach to rebuilding liberal capitalist-democratic states.  The international 
rush to reconstruct has led international actors to adhere to the universal, once-size-fits-all model 
for liberal and neoliberal reforms with insufficient thought into its appropriateness (de Zeeuw 
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2005; McGinty 2010; Ottaway 2002a, 2003a; Ottaway and Chung 1999; Paris 2004).8  In 
response, recent works have called for reconstruction to grant greater attention to domestic 
political conditions and political relations in post-conflict states and localities.  For example, 
MacGuinty (2010, 2008) highlights a need for reconstruction to focus on traditional, indigenous, 
and customary practices as the basis for new modes of reconstruction from below.   
 Second, the dominant structural position of international reconstruction practitioners 
further exacerbates the limits of top-down reconstruction efforts.  Reconstruction has been 
criticized for establishing international norms for political and economic reconstruction that are 
largely unsustainable in post-conflict conditions of economic crisis and political tension (Nakaya 
2005, 2009; Ottaway 2002b, 2003a; Ottaway and Chung 1999; Paris 1997, 2002b).  For 
example, Marina Ottaway has argued in several articles that top-down reconstruction has 
introduced internationally financed democratic and market institutions (e.g., modern election 
practices, financial regimes) and programs (e.g., educational centers, health clinics) that remain 
politically and financially impossible to maintain without prolonged international technical and 
financial support (Ottaway 2002b, 2003b, 2003a; Ottaway and Chung 1999). 
 These challenges suggest that reconstruction programs initiated by multilateral, donor 
state, and transnational non-state actors have promoted a series of rapid and costly political and 
economic liberalization efforts that may actually do harm to the reconstruction process 
(Carothers 2006; Coyne 2005; de Zeeuw 2005; Paris 2004).  For example, Paris (2004) 
comments on the potential incompatibilities between rapid political and economic liberalization, 
given the tendency of economic reforms to promote social tensions that may complicate 
democratic reforms.  Moreover, de Zeeuw (2005) and Coyne (2005) have suggested that 
                                                
8 I examine recent geographic literature on place-based reconstruction and the need for greater 
attention to the everyday places of reconstruction and peace-building later in the chapter.  
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international reconstruction programs have largely failed to produce stable horizontal institutions 
within post-conflict states that can provide a stable structure for reconstruction in the absence of 
constant international supervision.        
 The recognition that the international reconstruction model has limitations produced by 
its own internal structure of top-down political-economic, institutional, and governance reforms 
has opened the study of reconstruction to a more robust critical perspective among geographers, 
critical IR scholars, and anthropologists in recent years.   
 
2.2  CRITICAL THEORIES OF RECONSTRUCTION 
 The limited success in high-profile reconstruction programs in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in the past twenty years highlights the urgent need for critical scholars to 
take a fresh look at the close connections between reconstruction, peace, and war.  The 
normative commitment to liberal capitalist democracy among both practitioners and scholars 
represents an intellectual failure to critically challenge the epistemological and theoretical 
foundations to what we are doing in the name of reconstruction (Flint and Kirsch 2011; 
Richmond 2010a).  The international reconstruction debate continues to center on technocratic 
‘best practice’ standards to be rolled out ‘at war’s end’ (Paris 2004).  These pragmatic 
conversations over the inclusiveness, timing, efficacy, and representativeness of the 
reconstruction process are necessary, but insufficient, from a scholarly point of view.  The 
deeper concerns over how reconstruction may be implicated in global structures of domination, 
inequality, and capitalist political economy have largely been met with silence among most 
practitioners and some scholars. 
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 Recent work by geographers, critical international relations scholars, and anthropologists 
has directed much needed attention to the theoretical foundations and norms that guide 
international reconstruction  (Dahlman 2009, 2011; Jeffrey 2006; Kirsch and Flint 2011b; Lidén, 
Mac Ginty, and Richmond 2009; Lipschutz 1998; McGinty 2008, 2010; Megoran 2011; Moodie 
2010; Paris 2000; Richmond 2010b, 2010a).  This literature recognizes that reconstruction is a 
complex political process guided by multiple normative concepts, political traditions, and actors 
(Kirsch and Flint 2011a).  For example, Paris (2000) highlights the need for reconstruction 
research to critically center on the globalization of norms, international governance, and culture 
supporting reconstruction. Flint (2011) calls for greater attention to the geography of 
reconstruction as a political process that produces new geopolitical landscapes and political 
power relations.  Together, these works lay the groundwork for critical explorations of 
reconstruction as a political process mutually bound to the globalization of capitalist discourses, 
processes, and political-economic structures.    
 These critical reconstruction studies evoke as many questions as they do answers 
(Megoran 2011; Paris 2000).  Exploring the normative ideas that have shaped international 
reconstruction begs a series of questions.  For example, how is reconstruction defined? What is 
the relationship between reconstruction and ‘post’-conflict? What is being reconstructed? From 
where does reconstruction originate? Who has the authority and ability to define the content of 
reconstruction? Who benefits from reconstruction? How does reconstruction produce new 
political-geographic patterns of domination, subordination, and resistance in the name of post-
conflict peace?  
 In chapter 1, I asserted that international reconstruction has developed within the post-
Cold War normative commitment to building liberal peace on a global scale (McGinty 2008; 
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McGinty and Richmond 2007; Richmond 2010b).  The liberal peace is a concept stretching from 
Kant to a host of contemporary scholars who adopt the constructivist view that a stable interstate 
system of liberal, democratic republics is a guarantor of peace and stability both internationally 
and domestically (Doyle 1983; Latham 1997; Risse 1995).  The liberal commitments to post-
conflict institution building and governance reform thus are seen as key conditions for 
reconstructing post-conflict states and societies within a global capitalist-democratic order.  
 The liberal norm has become a guiding principle for reconstruction efforts to rebuild 
political economy, institutions, and governance in war-torn states (Barkawi and Laffey 1999; 
Call and Cook 2003; McGinty 2008; Paris 2002a).  Liberal reconstruction can be seen as part of 
the broader international focus on conflict management in recent decades.  Conflict management 
is a broad concept that incorporates peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peace-building, and post-
war development within its mandate (Crocker, Osler Hampson, and Aall 2001).  Understanding 
where reconstruction fits within this broad conflict management trajectory highlights the 
challenges of defining more critically what reconstruction is, what it does, and for whom. 
 For one set of studies, reconstruction has become a geopolitical tool used by dominant 
international, state, and transnational actors to maintain their dominant position within the global 
capitalist political economy (Barkawi and Laffey 1999; Dahlman 2011; Guilhot 2005; Hewitt de 
Alcántara 1998; Jacoby 2007; Mawdsley 2007; Pugh, Cooper, and Turner 2009; Robinson 1996, 
2003; Williams 2007).  The reconstruction discourse on promoting liberal peace masks what 
Williams (Williams 2007) calls ‘occult imperialism’ advanced by global capitalist elites to 
subordinate post-war states and societies.  For example, recent contributions (including 
Williams) examine the geopolitical motives that guide U.S.-supported reconstruction efforts to 
promote political-economic reforms in post-conflict states (Dahlman 2011; Jacoby 2007; Kirsch 
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2011; Robinson 1996; Williams 2007; Yamazaki 2011).  Paris (2002a) suggests that post-
conflict reconstruction represents an occidental mission civilisatrice to bring liberal market 
democracy to conflict-torn states and societies.  These works parallel the recent scholarly and 
popular literature exposing wars and disasters as opportunities to impose capitalist political 
economy from above onto subordinate states and societies (Hyndman 2009; Klein 2007; 
Waizenegger and Hyndman 2011). 
 A second set of studies explores reconstruction through the post-Cold War globalization 
of liberal discourse, processes, and political economy (McGinty 2008; McGinty and Richmond 
2007; Paris 1997, 2002a; Richmond 2004, 2005a, 2010a).  These works examine how a liberal 
discourse has influenced the normative reconstruction policies pursued by international 
organizations, donor states, non-governmental organizations, and actors within post-conflict 
states.9  From this view, reconstruction is mutually bound to the global advance of liberal 
political economy, institutions, and governance (Lidén, Mac Ginty, and Richmond 2009; 
Ottaway and Chung 1999; Paris 2002a; Quinn and Cox 2007).  
 The dominant international actors that promote reconstruction pursue reforms to 
reproduce a vision of liberal universalism as a global standard for building the structure of liberal 
peace.  International actors’ dominant structural position grants them considerable influence over 
reconstruction.  However, they too are bound within the liberal discourse that conditions their 
thoughts, actions, and imaginations.  Moreover, reconstruction is seen as a technology of rule 
that translates top-down reforms into liberal modes of regulation and self-discipline over post-
                                                
9 I follow Müller (2008) in defining discourse comprehensively as a mutually connected set of 
narratives and related practices that constitute the general conditions for political thought and 
action.  For example, a liberal discourse involves a blend of narratives and practices that both 
reflect preexisting discourse, yet also reproduce material conditions that institutionalize the 
discourse in time and space.   
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conflict subjects’ practices, narratives, and self-understandings (McGinty 2010).  For example, 
Richmond (2004: 56) describes the globalization of liberal reconstruction norms as a process of 
‘pacification through political and economic liberalization’ and an ‘experiment in social 
engineering.’  Quinn and Cox (Quinn and Cox 2007: 512) similarly argue that international and 
U.S. reconstruction policies are mutually bound to the global advance of the liberal universalism 
discourse in which these actors operate.   
 Despite the broad focus on reconstruction and liberal peace, scholars have granted 
relatively little explicit attention to the connections between reconstruction and neo-liberalism 
despite its prominent position in international affairs for the past three decades.  The rise of 
neoliberal thought and certainly its influence on post-disaster, post-conflict, and development 
assistance certainly suggests that the reconstruction of liberal peace may be increasingly replaced 
with a neoliberal peace (Lipschutz 1998).  That said, a brief consideration of neoliberalism and 
reconstruction is needed. 
Neoliberalism has become such a broad concept in the past three decades as to render it 
omnipresent (Barnett 2005).  While a full discussion of neoliberalism is beyond the scope of this 
study, I highlight two aspects relevant to this study.  The neoliberal concept captures three 
decades of political-economic reforms centered on limits on the role for the state, support for 
relatively free market economic conditions, and the the introduction of market-based political 
and social development efforts to ensure the ‘rational’ use of resources at all geographic scales 
(Brenner and Theodore 2002; England and Ward 2007; Harvey 2005; Larner 2000, 2003; Ong 
2006; Peck and Tickell 2002).  That is, neoliberal political thought uses market rationality as the 
standard for determining the ‘proper’ political-economic structure and best organization of 
political and social life in time and space.  Watts (2000) defines neoliberalism as:  
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The overaching claim … that free markets maximize human welfare: economically, 
markets efficiently distribute knowledge and resources; socially, liberal individualism 
will maximize moral worth; and politically, liberalism maximizes political freedoms 
since its rests on the most efficient (pareto-optimal) distribution of resources and wealth 
(Watts 2000). 
 
Many scholars have discussed neoliberal political economy and the changing nature of 
the state (Dean 2007; Hewitt de Alcántara 1998; Hindess 2002; Larner 2000; Larner and 
LeHeron 2003; Larner and Walters 2004a; Staeheli 2010; Thaa 2001; Trouillot 2001).  These 
studies highlight the neoliberal structural, institutional, and governance reforms that redefine the 
relationship between international organizations, the state apparatus, market actors, and civil 
society actors.  Broadly, this structural change includes a shift from state-centered institutions 
and governance towards a greater political role for international, sub-state, and non-state actors 
(both private and civil) in the regulation and conduct of political-economic life.  As scholars 
have suggested, the shift from liberal to neoliberal political conditions has centered on this 
redefinition of the state and non-state actors and their respective roles in advancing a heavily 
market-oriented framework for the social and spatial reorganization of the political-economic 
structure (Gill 1995; Hindess 2004; Mawdsley 2007; Ong 2006; Trouillot 2001; Vercelli 2003).  
For example, neoliberal structural reforms have centered on state retrenchment, privatization and 
contracting of state-owned enterprises, market deregulation and greater market accessibility to 
international investment as part of the move from state-centered to global and transnational 
political-economic patterns.  This focus on neoliberal structural patterns has often translated into 
a hierarchical view that combines a top-down notion of neoliberal political economy with a 
grounded examination of the social and spatial effects of neoliberal reform (i.e., 
neoliberalization) in particular places – what Hart (2002) has called the ‘neoliberal impact 
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model’.  This approach has reinforced a dichotomous view between global neoliberal structure 
and place-specific efforts to negotiate the changed conditions of neoliberal political economy.   
In recent years, scholars have challenged neoliberalism as a reified concept that masks 
the complex political conditions that support its definition and implementation (Barnett 2005; 
England and Ward 2007; Larner 2000).  Neoliberalism has been recast as a relational process 
that develops through a combination of political power relations, political and economic 
processes and practices, and discourses rooted in time and space.  For example, the attention to 
neoliberal relations has driven some scholars to discursively shift towards the discussion of 
neoliberal processes as a way to emphasize the political construction of neoliberalism as both 
concept and praxis (Larner and LeHeron 2003).  The flexible content that falls within the 
neoliberal concept has compelled other scholars to redefine neoliberalism as a contingent 
concept with varied meanings, practices, and relations (Larner 2003; Wilson 2004).  This 
relational perspective defies efforts to talk of a universal, all-encompassing neoliberal political-
economic structure.   
The connections between reconstruction and the production of neoliberal political 
economy from above and from below highlight the heterogeneous, hybrid nature of 
reconstruction outcomes that fall within the broad framework of neoliberal reform (Coyne 2005; 
Hewitt de Alcántara 1998; Lidén, Mac Ginty, and Richmond 2009; Lipschutz 1998).  From a 
top-down perspective, the reconstruction of formal state, political, and economic institutions and 
governance patterns provide the architecture for neoliberal political-economic regulation to take 
hold (Dahlman 2009; Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 2006; Jacoby 2007; Quinn and Cox 2007; 
Richmond 2010b, 2010a; Williams 2007).  As recent contributions have suggested, the tensions 
between liberal capitalist-democratic reforms and the more truncated neoliberal drive to limit 
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state power and advance a transnational political-economic structure have generated 
contradictions that go far in defining what the reconstruction of a ‘neoliberal peace’ look like 
(Lipschutz 1998; Richmond 2010b).  For example, Richmond (Richmond 2005b) explores the 
inherent contradictions between liberal pressures to rebuild strong state institutions and 
neoliberal pressures to limit the role of the state ((i.e., state sector retrenchment, privatization, 
deregulation, and decentralization).  Townsend, Porter, and Mawdsley (2004) explore the role of 
development NGOs in producing relational spaces that are heavily influenced by neoliberal 
pressures, yet also open the door for counter-movements and alternative development visions.  
The neoliberal pressures on reconstruction have produced a transnational political-
economic structure that may be at odds with liberal concepts of reconstruction.  Recent works 
have questioned whether neoliberal reconstruction processes may prevent the development of 
horizontal institutional and governance connections within post-conflict societies capable of 
building post-conflict consensus – a shared ‘national vision’ of a post-conflict future rooted in 
peaceful relations (Coyne 2005; de Zeeuw 2005).  These critical views center on a new look at 
the dominant structural position that international reconstruction practitioners occupy in the 
reconstruction process.  As noted above, international reconstruction efforts have been 
dominated by a closely connected set of international organizations, (neo)liberal donor states, 
and transnational development NGOs rooted in both liberal and neoliberal political thought 
(Guilhot 2005).  These international actors constitute a top echelon of ‘norms entrepreneurs’ 
involved in defining, producing, and governing within post-conflict political economies heavily 
influenced by neoliberal thought (Wallace and Josselin 2001: 253).  
However, international actors’ political dominance does not exist in a vacuum.  Recent 
literature calls attention to the transnational structure of neoliberal political economy that binds 
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international actors into connections with post-conflict actors on the ground (Bebbington and 
Kotahri 2006; Robinson 2003).  Neoliberal reconstruction efforts take shape through 
transnational connections among international actors, post-conflict state and sub-state actors, 
private sector, civil society, and grassroots social movements arrayed at different scales and sites, 
both outside and within post-conflict states.   
The decentering of the state through these neoliberal reconstruction pressures grants 
dominant transnational actors even greater control over the normative content of reconstruction 
through the governance influence they exercise through these networks (Bebbington and Kotahri 
2006; Townsend 1999; Trouillot 2001).  For example, Richmond (Richmond 2004: 140) 
highlights the rise of a ‘multidimensional reconstruction’ discourse that promotes neoliberal 
reconstruction through a comprehensive set of public, private, and civil society actors at different 
sites and scales.  These transnational connections reveal the complex relationship between 
neoliberal state actors, international organizations, and transnational NGOs/civil society actors 
both from above and from below – a relationship that defies simple categorization.   
From this foundation, scholars have begun to reconceptualize reconstruction as a 
heterogeneous blend of liberal and neoliberal discourse, transnational connections, and material 
practices that come together on the ground to craft contingent, place-specific reconstruction 
outcomes.  Multiple scholars have studied neoliberal reconstruction through the lived 
experiences of political-economic reform in the everyday spaces of post-conflict life (Babb 2001; 
Hays-Mitchell 2005; Moodie 2002, 2006, 2010; Oglesby 2007; Oglesby and Ross 2009; 
Pickering 2007).  These studies examine the social consequences of reconstruction, with a focus 
on post-1990 neoliberal reforms and the renegotiation of political power relations between 
political winners and losers in post-conflict societies.  Collectively, these works contribute richly 
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to our understanding of how top-down reconstruction efforts have been negotiated, resisted, and 
given meaning in particular post-conflict settings.  The ethnographies, case studies, and 
empirical accounts share a common thread of recounting the post-war encounters with power 
that produce the everyday spaces and political subjects of reconstruction (Moodie 2006, 2010; 
Oglesby 2007).  These place-specific reconstruction experiences take shape through a complex 
blend of class, gender, race, and other identity politics that become inherent parts of what 
reconstruction means and how it is lived on the ground.  The recent focus on gender dimensions 
of reconstruction, for example, bring to light the heterogeneous political relations that both 
influence and are themselves shaped through post-conflict reconstruction processes (Alldén 
2007; Cahn 2006; Dowler 2011; Sørensen 1998). 
The key advance in the critical reconstruction literature is the recognition that 
reconstruction is a project that involves multiple actors bound together through transnational 
connections both outside and within post-conflict states.  The transnational connections shaping 
reconstruction still reflect uneven political relations that require us to pay particular attention to 
the international set of actors that guide reconstruction processes from above.  It is through these 
actors that reconstruction promotes what McGinty and Richmond (2007: 491-492) calls the 
‘heavily engineered governance institutions and frameworks’ that shape what reconstruction is 
and what it does on the ground.  However, we also must consider the capacity post-conflict 
actors have to experience, accommodate, adapt, and resist the internationally sanctioned 
liberal/neoliberal reconstruction efforts from above (McGinty 2010).  
 
2.3  RECONSTRUCTION AS A RELATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 
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 This chapter has emphasized the power that liberal/neoliberal norms have held over 
reconstruction through the structural power exercised by transnational private and NGO elites, 
international organizations, and capitalist donor states.  These reconstruction elites obviously 
control in great measure the definition and content of reconstruction (Call and Cook 2003; 
Caplan 2005).  They control the discourse, the material and financial resources, the dominant 
institutions, and the governance capacity to roll out reconstruction within the normative 
framework of neoliberal political economy and neoliberal regulation (Kirsch and Flint 2011a).   
 However, geographers recently have challenged the dominant reconstruction discourse 
and its Manichean divisions between war and peace to study how destruction and reconstruction 
are mutually implicated in the transformation of ‘post-conflict’ states and societies (Dahlman 
2009, 2011; Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 2005b, 2005a; Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 2006; Flint 2011; 
Herb 2005; Hyndman 2009; Jeffrey 2006; Kirsch and Flint 2011b; Megoran 2011; Soennecken 
2005; Waizenegger and Hyndman 2011; Williams and McConnell 2011).  From this view, 
reconstruction is a negotiated, relational process that connects diverse political actors within a 
struggle to define what reconstruction means and the socio-spatial structure of the post-war 
peace – in other words, reconstruction is ‘war by other means’ (Dahlman 2011; Kirsch and Flint 
2011b).  
These recent works have made clear that conflict and peace are both political processes 
that reorganize social order in ways that reallocate political power through the simultaneous acts 
of deconstruction and reconstruction (Dahlman 2011; Flint 2011).  War may lead to 
reconstruction, but reconstruction inherits and is influenced by political conditions carried over 
from war.  The reconstruction process may generate new socio-spatial inequalities that generate 
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new forms of conflict.  Moreover, reconstruction and war often operate in tandem, with war 
being part of the reconstruction process: what Dahlman (2011) calls ‘reconstruction as war’.        
This reconstruction view centers on a relational view of political power (Allen 2003; Pile 
and Keith 1997; Sharp et al. 2000).  Reconstruction is a political process that both draws from 
and produces complex socio-spatial patterns of domination and subordination that Sharp et al. 
(2000) describes as ‘entanglements of power’.  These geographic landscapes of reconstruction 
reflect the many modalities of political power (domination, coercion, seduction, consensus, etc.) 
that come together to define the contingent patterns of reconstruction in space and time (Allen 
2003; Flint 2011; Waizenegger and Hyndman 2011).  From this perspective, understanding 
reconstruction requires that we grant attention to the connections between institutions, actors, 
and practices that produce the everyday spaces of reconstruction.  
 The relational view of power opens new avenues to explore reconstruction through the 
hybrid patterns of domination, resistance, and other forms of political power that are manifest 
through the formal and informal connections between actors and processes that come together in 
place.  I draw inspiration from recent work Oliver Richmond.  Richmond (2010b; 2010a) talks of 
reconstruction and the production of a post-liberal peace.  For Richmond, the post-Cold War 
reconstruction model has been modestly successful at state-building (i.e., liberal state 
institutions), but generally has failed at peacebuilding (i.e., positive peace addressing the root 
causes of conflict).  Richmond points to an inherent gap between international norms and the 
specific cultural contexts of reconstruction (cf., Sampson 2003).  The problematic translation 
from these international norms to contingent reconstruction processes has produced post-colonial 
modes of resistance to the dominant liberal/neoliberal reconstruction discourse.  These Northern 
discourses have been met with counter-discourses that attempt to adapt international 
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reconstruction norms to the hybrid cultural spaces of actually lived reconstruction (Lidén, Mac 
Ginty, and Richmond 2009; McGinty 2008, 2010; Richmond 2010b).   
  These hybrid reconstructions of peace and non-peace make clear that reconstruction rests 
in particular places.  The edited Kirsch and Flint (Kirsch and Flint 2011b) volume 
Reconstructing Conflict: Integrating War and Post-War Geographies arguably has provided the 
most coherent critical geographic perspective on reconstruction to date (e.g., Dahlman 2011; 
Flint 2011; Flint and Kirsch 2011; Grundy-Warr and Dean 2011; Kirsch and Flint 2011a; 
Waizenegger and Hyndman 2011).  The book complements a broader set of studies that adopts a 
place-based view of reconstruction as a process that comes together through contingent 
intersections of norms, narratives, practices, processes, and relations from both above and below 
to produce place-specific reconstructions of peace (Cupples, Glynn, and Larios 2007; Dahlman 
2009; Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 2005a; Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 2006; Hyndman 2009; Jeffrey 
2006; McGinty 2008, 2010; Megoran 2011; Pickering 2007; Williams and McConnell 2011).   
 For example, Waizenegger and Hyndman (2011) and Hyndman (2009) explore post-
conflict / post-disaster reconstruction in Indonesia demonstrating the place-specific relations that 
came together to define what themes, issues, and subjects were objects for reconstruction and 
which were excluded from that process.  Dahlman and Ó Tuathail (2005b; 2005a; 2006) have 
produced a series of works that consider how international reconstruction norms have been 
adopted, adapted, and resisted on the ground to produce place-specific geographies of 
reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Jeffrey (2006) similarly examined the contingent 
relationships between formal international juridical structures and place-based, informal 
institutions that have led to the hybrid reconstruction outcomes observed in the Brcko district of 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina.  In a more normative direction, Megoran (2011: 178) argues for greater 
attention to the ‘spaces of everyday peace’.      
 These hybrid reconstructions of peace and its discontents set the tone for the current 
study.  I draw from the diverse literature discussed above on the normative blend of liberal and 
neoliberal reconstruction programs to consider how political subjects negotiate the terms and 
content of reconstruction in particular places.  This reconstruction approach adopts the global, 
progressive, relational sense of place that I described in Chapter 1 (Massey 1994; Sharp et al. 
2000).  Reconstruction redefines the political-economic structure, institutions, and governance 
patterns of a place through the political connections among actors both near and far that come 
together in particular places.  At the same time, reconstruction always reflects the place-specific 
historical conditions of peace and war that condition how international reconstruction norms are 
transmitted, received, and made meaningful in place. 
 
2.4  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
  The varied literature reviewed here point towards a common conclusion.  The 
reconstruction of liberal/neoliberal peace is a malleable, contested process whose political and 
spatial outcomes are never set in stone.  Reconstruction involves complex entanglements of 
political power that are made visible through the daily practices and political subjectivities that 
comprise the everyday spaces of post-conflict life.  From this perspective, the reconstruction of 
political economy discussed above becomes a contested political process to negotiate the terms 
of post-conflict peace: the winners and losers, the people and places who benefit from post-
conflict norms, and those precluded from the benefits of the normative peace.       
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 The reconstruction literature equally is clear in stating that maintaining post-conflict 
peace is hard (Doyle and Sambanis 2000).  The policy-centered and critical reconstruction 
literature discussed above share a common concern with better understanding the organization of 
political power that supports the international reconstruction efforts that have developed in the 
past two decades.  The attention to international and state actors in many of these works has 
provided important information about how normative reconstruction efforts penetrate into post-
conflict states and societies.  However, this chapter makes clear that a more robust geographic 
perspective is essential to better understand how reconstruction develops through relational, 
political processes.  Reconstruction forms within particular places that simultaneously are 
distinct yet bound together within complex webs of political, economic, and social relations on a 
global scale.  With this geographic mandate in hand, the following chapter details how I 
approach reconstruction in the current study as a contested political process to renegotiate the 
hybrid forms of political economy and political-economic regulation through particular places in 
post-conflict Nicaragua.   
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CHAPTER 3 
RECONSTRUCTION GEOGRAPHIES: NEOLIBERAL REGULATION AND PLACE 
IN POST-CONFLICT NICARAGUA 
 
 
3.1  THE GEOGRAPHIES OF RECONSTRUCTION 
 The preceding review of post-conflict reconstruction research reveals increasingly 
complex lines of thought about the origins and practices of reconstruction.  The critical 
reconstruction literature discussed in Chapter 2 cogently argues that reconstruction has blended 
political discourse and political economy to advance an international neoliberal norm as the 
standard for rebuilding post-conflict states and societies.  Nevertheless, the rush to condemn 
reconstruction as the immutable handmaiden to neoliberal globalization has limited our 
collective ability to explore the multiple, contingent forms that reconstruction may take.  The 
generalized portrayal of reconstruction as imperialist engineering in war-torn states ultimately 
limits our intellectual gaze to the top-down policy efforts handed down from the international 
community.  The range of actors, practices, and relations involved in this transformation and 
integration of post-war societies into the global capitalist regime – while not ignored – is largely 
reduced to the status of bearers of international policy projects. 
 Many international practitioners and even scholars have addressed Nicaraguan 
reconstruction within a discourse that sees reconstruction as a beginning, a distinct break from 
the protracted Nicaraguan history of foreign occupation, authoritarian rule, war, revolution, and 
counter-revolution.  All too often, reconstruction has become an act of forgetting that silences the 
deep Nicaraguan history of dependency at the point of a sword.  The Nicaraguan history of 
subjugation, collaboration, and resistance to international intervention, military occupation, and 
political interference for the past century become historical footnotes confined to the early 
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chapters of Nicaraguan history books and rarely enter into international reconstruction policy 
discussions at all.  Yet, this complicated Nicaraguan history – at once cultural, social, political, 
and economic – has powerfully shaped the complicated geographies of conflict and peace that 
inform the reconstruction process.    
 This chapter sets out a distinct approach to reconsider reconstruction and its role in 
advancing patterns of neoliberal regulation in Nicaragua.  Foremost, I break from the dominant 
view that reconstruction is a coherent international effort introduced from above onto post-
conflict states and societies.  We can more carefully unpack reconstruction to examine who and 
what are the subjects and objects of reconstruction.  The Nicaraguan case suggests that 
reconstruction is a contingent, relational process that develops through complex political 
negotiation processes at multiple sites and across scales.  As scholars, we must take into account 
the distinct set of historical/spatial conditions, institutional patterns, political relations, actors, 
and daily practices through which reconstruction acquires contingent meaning and is brought to 
life in time and space.   
 The Nicaraguan reconstruction stories that I tell reflect the deeper global and Nicaraguan 
histories of political power, economic development, and conflict that inform the reconstruction 
process.  The international attention to reconstruction as a means to address the global 
proliferation of civil conflicts during the 1990s, the global dissemination of a neoliberal 
discourse at the end of the Cold War, and the 1990 Nicaraguan election and subsequent shift 
towards a post-socialist, post-conflict regime undoubtedly reflected a distinct historical moment 
of convergence that cannot be discounted. Yet, the diverse reconstruction patterns I encountered 
can be firmly grounded in the deeper historical and geographic conditions of authoritarian rule, 
conflict, and post-conflict and post-socialist transformation that have defined the Nicaraguan 
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experience for 100 years.  Nicaraguan reconstruction can be seen as part of a deeper political 
process shaped by the historic Nicaraguan patterns of political economy, prolonged political 
struggle, and contested culture that develop on the ground.  In this light, the labeling of 
Nicaraguan reconstruction as a post-Contra conflict process must be recognized as 
simultaneously a political discourse and an acknowledgement of the distinct political-economic 
conditions that characterize Nicaraguan state and society before and after the 1990 transition 
from FSLN rule and the end of the Contra conflict.   
 
3.2  RECONSTRUCTION, NEOLIBERAL POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND     
       REGULATION 
 
To begin, I return to the connections between reconstruction, political economy, and 
neoliberal regulation that I discussed in the previous chapter.  Reconstruction from 1990-2006 
has produced a counter-revolution as profound in scope as the 1979 revolution and FSLN-
dominated reconstruction period that preceded it during the 1980s.   For the most part, 
Nicaraguan reconstruction adhered closely after 1990 to the dominant neoliberal regulation 
discourse at the heart of the Washington Consensus.  From its inception, however, reconstruction 
has been both an international and domestic effort to establish the broad contours of a neoliberal 
political-economic regime and attendant mode of regulation.  This counter-revolution has 
extended far beyond political-economic, institutional, and governance reforms to reorder the 
daily practices and political subjectivities of the Nicaraguan population in profound ways.   
At first glance, the Nicaraguan case indicates that international reconstruction efforts for 
the past two decades have been successful at promoting reconstruction as a reified, rational, and 
inevitable path from conflict to neoliberal post-conflict peace.  The reconstruction regime that 
took hold among major international organizations, donor states, and transnational development 
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NGOs undoubtedly has played a powerful role in advancing broad patterns of neoliberal 
political-economic structure in post-conflict Nicaragua (and elsewhere).  This international 
constellation of actors has effectively used its unparalleled financial, material, and ideological 
resources to extend a neoliberal political-economic structure that reorients the Nicaraguan state, 
political society, and civil society ever more towards the interests of this same international 
community.     
The recent critical perspectives that see reconstruction and neoliberalism as political 
concepts grounded in particular historical and geographic conditions have begun to tear down 
this hegemonic vision of international reconstruction as an unwavering path to neoliberal peace.  
The chapters above made clear that geographers in recent years have challenged the black-box 
visions of neoliberal thought that have dogged the social sciences for the past three decades 
(Craig and Cotterell 2007; England and Ward 2007; Gill 1995; Larner 2000, 2003; Larner and 
LeHeron 2003).  For these scholars, neoliberalism has been extended to such a vast set of social 
conditions that the concept has been rendered ineffectual and lacking a clearly bounded 
definition to guide social research (Barnett 2005).  Many geographic works in the past decade 
have attempted to recognize the specific historical and geographic conditions of neoliberalism.  
The efforts to explain the varied historical, spatial, and thus political conditions of neoliberalism 
are reflected in scholars’ qualified definitions, including roll-back/roll-out neoliberalism, 
contingent neoliberalism, neoliberalizing processes, and the perhaps under-theorized post-
neoliberalism (Macdonald and Ruckert 2009; England and Ward 2007; Larner and LeHeron 
2003).  For example, Peck and Tickell (2002) highlight the transformation from a regressive 
‘roll-back’ neoliberalism during the 1980s and early 1990s to a progressive ‘roll-out’ 
neoliberalism during the past 15 years.  More recent consideration of the Bangladesh Consensus 
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and other alternate neoliberal development models that challenge the Washington Consensus has 
drawn attention to the political negotiation of what neoliberalism means and can become in 
practice (e.g., Roy 2010). 
In order to narrow the conversation, I examine reconstruction as a process that attempts 
to establish a new mode of capitalist regulation.  The mode of regulation concept refers to the 
complex of institutions, relations, and political subject positions that sustain and normalize the 
social and spatial structure of capital accumulation within capitalist society (Aglietta 2000; 
Jessop 1995).  The early regulation approaches in the 1970s and 1980s provided a truncated 
economic vision of regulation focused on how formal and informal economic institutions like 
banking practices, labor relations, and monetary policy had anchored different forms of capital 
accumulation.  From these beginnings, capitalist regulation has morphed along multiple schools 
of thought that examine inter-regime transitions, governance structures, global regulation, and an 
expanded societal mode of regulation that take neoliberal regulation in many directions (Jessop 
and Sum 2007; MacLeod 1997; Roberts 2002; Tickell and Peck 1995).10  
This recent attention to societal modes of regulation is a welcome advance that brings 
regulation approaches together with critical and post-structural theories on cultural economy 
(Thrift and Whatmore 2004; Cosgrove and Jackson 2004).  From this perspective, capitalist 
regulation extends beyond the traditional focus on economic institutions, norms, and practices to 
                                                
10 The regulation concept has been misunderstood by some critics who think about regulation 
only as a formal set of rules, institutions, and principles that structure political-economic 
conditions.  As Jessop (2007) notes, the confusion comes in part from mistranslating the French 
regulation as ‘regulation’ rather than ‘regularization’ – i.e., the normalization of a particular 
political-economic regime through the institutional and social organization of a society.  In this 
vein, we can think about a societal mode of neoliberal regulation as a broad-based organization 
of economic, political, and social life around dominant notions of capitalist accumulation (Brown 
2003b; Dean 2007; Low 1997; Rose 1996). 
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examine the varied economic, political, and social conditions that reproduce and sustain 
capitalist political economy.  Societal regulation operates through a comprehensive regime of 
formal and informal institutions, relations, and practices that collectively normalize the capitalist 
political-economic structure and secure continued capital accumulation (Jessop and Sum 2007).  
That is, a neoliberal political-economic regime is made natural through the organization of 
multiple institutions, governance conditions, and spaces seemingly far removed from the macro-
economic structure of capitalist accumulation.  Regulation operates through rules and norms that 
discipline the state and political society, economic organization, civil society organization, and 
the complex blend of economic and extra-economic practices and identities in ways that directly 
or indirectly consolidate the political-economic regime.  For example, recent work has discussed 
how neoliberal regimes are mutually bound to the reorganization of democratic institutions and 
practices that normalize tropes of individual responsibility for well-being and attempt to 
decouple politics from neoliberal formations of the state (Brown 2003b; Fraser 2003; Hindess 
2002; Thaa 2001; Rose 1996).   
This study of Nicaraguan reconstruction can draw from a societal regulation approach to 
examine how reconstruction efforts have produced broad patterns of neoliberal political-
economic structure in recent years.  Reconstruction is a comprehensive political process that 
permeates many aspects of post-conflict states and societies.  In Nicaragua, reconstruction has 
involved a host of institutional and governance reforms that address economic, political, and 
social conditions and the fabric of daily life for Nicaraguan citizens.  We can see neoliberal 
processes becoming normalized through diverse conditions and practices.  The danger that 
comes with viewing reconstruction as societal regulation is that we begin to see neoliberalization 
everywhere we look.  The international reconstruction regime may appear hegemonic in its 
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capacity to establish neoliberal political-economic norms that extend into the darkest corners of 
Nicaraguan post-conflict society at the expense of alternative reconstruction visions.   
However, the dominant reconstruction discourse promoting a mainstream neoliberal 
political-economic structure only tells part of the reconstruction story in Nicaragua and other 
post-conflict states.  With notable exceptions among some international financial institutions and 
donor states, international and domestic reconstruction policy stakeholders do not intentionally 
set out to establish a neoliberal political-economic structure.  The connection between 
reconstruction and neoliberal regulation is better understood (at least in part) as a political effect.  
For most actors, reconstruction involves a good-fatih effort to address the immediate and longer-
term needs of post-conflict states and societies in the areas of institutional reform, economic 
development, and citizen security.  Reconstruction actors put into effect policies and practices 
based more on financial and resource limitations – based on the art of the possible – than on any 
grand designs for transforming the political-economic structure.        
This real-world perspective indicates that reconstruction is not a coherent project, but 
rather develops through a broad array of political relations fraught with limited knowledge, 
limited capacities, and limited visions for how to approach the post-conflict goals of just peace 
and stability.  In this cloud of uncertainty, we can approach the categories we use to explain post-
war life – terms like reconstruction, neoliberalism, peace, and place -- as heterogeneous, 
relational political processes grounded in the distinct cultural histories and geographies of place. 
Reconstruction and neoliberal reform do not constitute an a priori policy package, but rather are 
constituted through the contingent articulations of political actors that generate distinct 
reconstructions of political-economic structure in time and space.  Destabilizing the discourse of 
reconstruction requires that we examine more carefully what reconstruction and neoliberalism 
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mean in practice, and how the reconstruction of neoliberal political-economic peace and non-
peace take shape in the spaces of everyday life. 
 
3.3  RECONSTRUCTION AND NEOLIBERALISM AS CONTINGENT, RELATIONAL  
       PROCESSES 
  
 One of the key themes in the current study is the argument that the international 
reconstruction regime efforts to establish a neoliberal political-economic structure in post-
conflict states are neither inevitable nor natural.  This assertion is based on the recognition that 
reconstruction and neoliberalism are contingent political processes.  The normative vision of 
neoliberal reconstruction from above masks the contingent articulation of institutions and actors 
that actually establishes distinct modes of reconstruction and neoliberal political economy in 
time and space.  If we remove that mask, we can see that the reconstruction of neoliberal 
political economy is a heterogeneous process that incorporates multiple international 
organizations, financial institutions, donor state actors, transnational development NGOs, private 
sector actors, civil society organizations, grassroots social movements, and individuals at many 
different geographic scales.  How different actors define and approach reconstruction and 
neoliberalism is indelibly shaped by the distinct political-economic position, grounded relations, 
and limited perspectives that influence their distinct visions for addressing post-conflict 
conditions in war-torn states and societies.  
 Recognizing the contingent nature of reconstruction and neoliberalism allows us to move 
beyond the normative, hegemonic models for establishing neoliberal political economy and 
regulation from above in post-conflict states.  In its place, we can imagine, quite literally, a world 
of possible reconstruction outcomes through the contingent forms that reconstruction and 
neoliberal political-economic structure take in particular post-conflict settings.  Reconstruction in 
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Nicaragua, El Salvador, Kosovo, or Iraq takes particular forms through the particular web of 
connections between multiple institutions, organizations, and actors involved in the process.  The 
socio-spatial reconstruction policies that these varied political actors adopt from their particular 
localities both outside and inside post-conflict states take shape through a combination of 
strategic interests and the varied structural position that privileges some actors more than others.   
We cannot forget the privileged structural position that international organizations, donor state 
agencies, and transnational development NGOs occupy that grants these actors considerable 
influence over the reconstruction process.  Yet, we should not overstate the power that these 
international actors exercise by ignoring that they do not speak in one voice any more than does 
the general population in post-conflict states. 
 This view of reconstruction and neoliberal political-economic structure offers cautious 
optimism that post-conflict paths to peace are not set in stone in the mold of neoliberal regulation 
at a global scale.  If we see reconstruction and neoliberalism as effects of political power 
relations that come together on the ground, we can begin to imagine complex patterns of 
domination and subordination, but also of adaptation, negotiation, and resistance as fundamental 
parts of the reconstruction process.  We should not overstate the space for variation from the 
international reconstruction model described in Chapter Two.  However, what passes for the 
reconstruction of neoliberal peace becomes a product of a negotiated and at times highly 
contentious process to define and establish the everyday conditions of post-conflict economic, 
political, and social order.   
 We can approach Nicaraguan reconstruction from this contingent, relational point of view 
through attention to the mutual connections between culture and neoliberalism that come 
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together in time and space. 11  Nicaraguan reconstruction during the past two decades has 
operated within a complex historical and geographic context that weaves together the early 20th 
century political-economic history of U.S. intervention in the longstanding conflict between 
Liberals and Conservatives, the long years of authoritarian Somoza family rule and the 1979 
revolution, the 1980s FSLN period and Contra conflict, and the post-1990 turn towards 
neoliberal integration into a global capitalist system.  The reconstruction of a neoliberal political-
economic structure (as the prefix re- suggests) has developed within these complicated cultural 
patterns of political economy, institutions, political power relations, daily practices, and subject 
self-understandings that provide the context for rebuilding Nicaraguan societal order. 
 From one perspective, reconstruction has been mediated by the existing cultural patterns 
of political, economic, and social life that provide the context for post-conflict reforms both from 
above and from within the Nicaraguan state.  This view of culture brings to light the role that 
Nicaraguan history plays in shaping the reconstruction process.  That is reconstruction operates 
through the distinct cultural milieu provided by historical patterns of political-economic 
                                                
11 This research field increasingly has incorporated a cultural political economy perspective in 
the past decade (Von Heur 2010; Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008; Jessop and Sum 2007; Jessop 
and Sum 2001; Sayer 2001; Jones 2008).  This rapidly evolving cross-disciplinary perspective 
centers on the concept that political economy takes contingent, culturally mediated forms that 
cannot be reduced to a limited set of class relations.  Capitalist political economy continues to be 
the central object of analysis.  However, the cultural political economy perspective recognizes 
that the reproduction and regulation of capitalism is negotiated through a tangled set of societal 
institutions and relations whose contingent articulations determines the particular ways that 
capitalist accumulation is established, resisted, and adapted in particular time-space settings.  
More recent cultural political economy works have emphasized the affective dimensions of 
capitalism as simultaneously a cultural, economic, and political performance of political power 
relations that constitute capitalist order as an emergent effect (Von Heur 2010; Jones 2008; Amin 
and Thrift 2003).  Cultural political economy concepts inform this study on Nicaraguan 
reconstruction.  However, I provide a narrower analysis of how the reconstruction of capitalist 
political economy is negotiated and mediated by the deeper cultural institutions, relations, and 
practices that constitute particular places.  Future research will expand on the connections 
between reconstruction and cultural political economy production. 
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organization, institutions, and social relations that filter how reconstruction has been defined and 
negotiated in ways that fit within the existing cultural context of Nicaraguan society at different 
scales.  To come at it from another angle, reconstruction to a large extent is delimited by 
historically and geographically informed notions of what constitutes appropriate patterns for the 
nominally neoliberal transformation of the Nicaraguan state and economy, political society, and 
civil society.   
 From another perspective, reconstruction involves a two-way process that combines 
political-economic reforms and cultural reforms to produce the contingent patterns of neoliberal 
political-economic structure that exist in Nicaragua and many other post-conflict states.  
Reconstruction not only is mediated by cultural patterns, but equally is a productive process that 
modifies cultural conditions in ways that support the social reproduction of a new post-conflict 
capitalist regime.  That is, reconstruction is powerfully influenced by cultural conditions that 
contribute to the contingent patterns of neoliberal political economy.  However, the 
reconstruction of political economy simultaneously acts upon and in part renegotiates the 
meaning and organization of that culture through the changed institutional conditions, political 
relations, daily practices, and political subjectivities that comprise the reconstruction process.  
Reconstruction reorganizes the contingent neoliberal structure of post-conflict life only 
imperfectly, however.  Reconstruction thus establishes new sets of political power relations that 
both maintain dominant neoliberal modes of regulation and open the door to new forms of 
resistance and adaptation that can be observed at varied geographic scales and in particular 
places both within and outside of post-conflict states.  
 This is a perspective that compels us to view reconstruction through the mutual 
interactions between political economy and daily practice as dual processes bound into the 
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historical and geographic preconditions, evolution, and transformation of culture.  
Reconstruction in Nicaragua simultaneously reflects both the international and domestic efforts 
to reform political-economic structures, institutions, and governance relations in the name of 
building neoliberal peace and the ways that everyday Nicaraguans have carried on their daily 
lives within and have negotiated the transformed conditions of post-conflict life.  In both cases, 
we can view the deeper cultural patterns of societal organization as a central part of the 
explanation for the contingent patterns of neoliberal reconstruction that have developed from 
place to place in Nicaragua in the past two decades.  
 Specifically, we can adopt a grounded, embodied perspective to view the contingent 
reconstruction of neoliberal regulation not from a global-local binary, but through the grounded 
articulations of political power relations among a host of international and domestic actors who 
come together in place (Gibson-Graham 2003).  Taking a more grounded perspective grants us a 
different vantage point from which to observe the mutual transformation of political-economic 
structure, institutional and governance reforms, and daily practices of post-conflict 
reconstruction.  For example, recent work by geographer Matthew Sparke (2006) discusses how 
neoliberal political economy develops through the concurrent political reorganizations of 
governance and governmentality.  For Sparke, the global advance of neoliberal political-
economic structure in recent decades has established new modes of neoliberal regulation through 
institutionalized governance systems.  At the same time, Sparke directs attention to what he calls 
the ‘congeries of calculative practices’ (i.e., neoliberal governmentality) that reproduce and 
embody the broad conditions of neoliberal regulation through the conduct of daily life (Sparke 
2006: 8-10).   
 74 
 Post-conflict reforms are experienced in particular places in ways that meaningfully draw 
upon the historical and geographic cultural context to guide the political-economic conditions 
that will emerge.  These place-specific articulations of political power among international 
actors, post-conflict state agencies, transnational NGOs, micro-finance institutions, political 
organizations, civil society actors, grassroots social movements, and the general population give 
us a distinct perspective for understanding how reconstruction actually works in everyday 
practice.   The contingent ways that these grounded actors – at once local and bound into broader 
configurations of political power – come together in particular places ultimately define the 
direction that the reconstruction of neoliberal peace and non-peace will take internationally, 
within post-conflict states like Nicaragua, and in the spaces of everyday life  (Hewitt de 
Alcántara 1998; Mertus and Sajjad 2005; Romeo 2002).  
 
3.4  TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE RECONSTRUCTION  
       SECTOR 
 Reconstruction after conflict is an exceptional period in which established societal norms, 
political-economic structures, state and non-state institutions, established social relations, 
everyday practices, and subjectivities frequently are contested and in flux.  The blurred lines 
between conflict and post-conflict pose unique challenges for reconstruction actors attempting to 
establish a way forward in the middle of such transitional settings (Dahlman 2009, 2011).  The 
indeterminate distinctions between war and peace require complicated efforts to begin post-
conflict operations even as conflict may continue within parts of a war-torn state and difficult 
choices over how best to pursue peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and longer-
term reconstruction (Kirsch and Flint 2011b).  Reconstruction often perpetuates long-standing 
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conditions of political-economic inequality, contested and illegitimate societal institutions, and 
deep political cleavages that carry over from conflict to the post-conflict period.  
 From the prior section, it should be clear that reconstruction, political economy, and 
culture have come together in varied ways to produce the contingent patterns of neoliberal peace, 
resistance, and conflict that define the Nicaraguan post-war experience.  In the following pages, I 
expand on the relationship between the international and domestic actors that put these 
contingent reconstruction patterns into motion through their daily practices.  This relational view 
of reconstruction recognizes that the post-conflict period has brought together actors from 
multiple international and domestic locations to negotiate the meaning and conditions of 
neoliberal political-economic reconstruction within the broader cultural traditions and relations 
that inform the reconstruction process.  Seeing reconstruction relationally does not confine 
analysis to the local scale, to place, or to conditions on the ground.  However, the political actors 
that come together on the ground provide multiple, partial snapshots of how Nicaraguan 
reconstruction has developed through the contingent intersections of neoliberal political 
economy and culture that produce place-specific experiences of post-war peace. 
 Nicaraguan reconstruction undeniably reflects the powerful position that international 
reconstruction stakeholders occupy over the reconstruction process, notwithstanding the 
multifaceted and at times contrasting political perspectives and post-conflict development goals 
that guide their actions (Bebbington 2004; Sheppard 2002; Guilhot 2005).  These actors have 
adopted the mantle of responsibility for rebuilding post-conflict states to compensate for the 
common political vacuum and lack of a shared national vision among domestic stakeholders for 
how to pursue reconstruction (Labonte 2003; de Zeeuw 2005; Junne and Verkoren 2005a).  For 
example, Guilhot (2005) has examined the increased collaboration among international 
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organizations, Western capitalist democracies, and transnational NGOs in the past two decades 
to promote a shared normative commitment to neoliberal capitalist democracy and human rights.      
This transnational set of international organizations, donor state agencies, and development 
NGOs are both a product of and causal factor in the neoliberal patterns of political-economic 
reconstruction through their control over reconstruction finance and programs.   
 However, the Nicaraguan case demonstrates well that the international reconstruction 
elite operates through transnational networks of financial, political, material, and intellectual 
capital that combine international actors with a host of elite post-conflict state agencies, domestic 
NGOs, microfinance institutions, private sector and civil society organizations, and the general 
population within post-conflict states.  These transnational networks are the principal social 
formation for understanding how reconstruction is able to establish contingent patterns of 
neoliberal political economy (and resistance) on the ground.  The transnational conditions also 
suggest how reconstruction may be bound to broader patterns of neoliberalization and 
transnational elite dominance on a global scale (Robinson 2003).    
 I adopt the concept of reconstruction sector governance in order to formally examine the 
structural position that these elite reconstruction actors occupy within Nicaraguan localities as 
the visible ‘face’ of the transnational reconstruction networks that dominate the political-
economic reform process.  The reconstruction sector refers specifically to the set of on-the-
ground political actors that have become the principal conduit connecting international donors 
and the Nicaraguan general population through a range of short- and long-term reconstruction 
development programs.  This sector includes a range of different actors, from state and sub-state 
agencies, regional development organizations, community-based NGOs, microfinance 
institutions, private organizations, smaller civil society organizations, and individual actors.  
 77 
Reconstruction sector actors are a heterogeneous set of organizations with different agendas and 
ideological commitments that often, but do not always, mesh with the dominant neoliberal 
reconstruction discourse of the past two decades.   
 We can focus on the reconstruction sector and their tangled international and domestic 
connections to better understand the contingent patterns of neoliberal reconstruction while 
managing to avoid black-box explanations centered on tired tropes of neoliberalism, imperialism, 
or globalization.  These connections grant the elite reconstruction sector actors considerable 
power to define and shape the contingent patterns of post-conflict political economy, regulation, 
and the ‘neoliberal peace’ (Paris 2000; Richmond 2010b). The organizations that constitute the 
reconstruction sector generally do play an important role in promoting neoliberal political-
economic conditions.  However, the reconstruction sector does not act as a simple bearer of 
neoliberal regulatory and disciplinary reforms any more than do the international stakeholders to 
whom they are so closely connected.  
 Rather, the reconstruction sector needs to be understood within the historic cultural 
conditions that inform Nicaraguan reconstruction both nationally and within particular places.  
Reconstruction sector actors find themselves pulled in multiple directions by the heterogeneous 
interests of the donor community and the culturally grounded interests of the communities and 
general populations in which they are embedded.  Place-based NGOs and microfinance 
organizations, for example, must meet international donor conditionalities for the receipt of 
financial aid, but also must use those funds in a manner that addresses the cultural mores, 
historical patterns of political economy, and social relations that constitute the everyday 
conditions for reconstruction.  This tangled web of interconnections is key to the contingent 
patterns of culturally embedded, ‘actually experienced’ neoliberal political-economic 
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reconstruction, adaptation, and resistance that come together in Nicaragua (Brenner and 
Theodore 2002, quoted in Craig and Cotterell 2007). 
 The distinct conditions of governance reconstruction relate back to the aforementioned 
interest in the connection between post-conflict reconstruction and neoliberal modes of societal 
regulation.  The reconstruction sector governance patterns that we observe reflect the contingent 
articulations of political power that come together in the context of rebuilding war-torn states.  
We can view reconstruction sector governance as a contingent, contentious process that adopts, 
adapts, and challenges the neoliberal traditions that guide the Washington Consensus and the 
Chicago school of political economy.  How the reconstruction sector translates into contingent 
reconstruction patterns of neoliberal regulation is an interesting question.  To find a tentative 
answer, we can turn towards a specific aspect of reconstruction – the political efforts to promote 
post-conflict democratic institutions, relations, practices, and subjects.  
 As noted above, recent contributions have theorized how the rise of a neoliberal 
rationality extends beyond economic regulation and discipline to condition a broader societal 
reorganization grounded in contingent patterns of neoliberal thought and practice (Brown 2003b; 
Dean 2007; Low 1997; Rose 1996).  Reconstruction in the past two decades, in particular, has 
emphasized the production of contingent neoliberal forms of democratization and democratic 
citizenship as central aspects of societal regulation (Brown 2003b).  Several prominent works 
point to the neoliberal discourse on citizenship that promotes personal responsibility for 
individual well-being in ways that place the ability to enjoy the substantive benefits of 
citizenship (e.g., greater democratic access) at the feet of individual actors rather than viewing 
democratic access as a collective, and thus political, issue (Hindess 2002; Rose 1996; Thaa 
2001).   These contingent forms of neoliberal governance and governmentality have had a 
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transformative effect on all manner of institutions, political, social, cultural, and economic 
practice, social relations, and political subjectivities (Fraser 2003). 
 Reconstruction and democratization mutually influence one another through the 
reconstruction programs that promote a democratic structure, the contentious political struggles  
that define the development of democracy on the ground, and the way that these contingent 
democratic conditions shape reconstruction from within.  This mutual relationship between 
reconstruction and democratic representation is bound to dominant political-economic patterns, 
institutional norms, and governance systems that define the terms of popular participation in the 
reconstruction process.   
 The transnational reconstruction networks, and particularly the reconstruction sector 
actors on the ground, maintain a powerful influence over the form of democratic institutions and 
practices in post-conflict states (Sampson 2003).  From one direction, the dominant position of 
international finance, NGOs, and international states in reconstruction shapes a project-driven set 
of narratives and engagements with local actors that Sampson (2003) calls “the project society”.  
The reconstruction regime that emerges among these networks sets it apart as a distinct political 
community of workshops, capacity-building workshops, and short-term development agendas 
among local NGOs, micro-finance lenders, and development organizations within the larger 
post-conflict society.  The formal democratic institutions established through reconstruction 
policy, when seen in operation, are often dominated by these reconstruction sector networks with 
little active participation from the more broadly defined civil society or general population (de 
Zeeuw 2005). 
 The reconstruction sector plays a key role in regulating and disciplining the political 
struggles to secure democratic representation and influence over the reconstruction process.  The 
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democratic institutions, practices, and relations that emerge from these struggles give shape and 
a degree of permanence to the contingent neoliberal patterns of reconstruction policy and praxis 
that we see in particular places.  The composition of the reconstruction sector can be approached 
as a democratic question of balance between illiberal democracy and the substantive 
participation of the ‘disorderly public’ in the democratic life of the post-conflict state (Staeheli 
2010).  The nature of democratic representation is central to this question of reconstruction 
sector governance and its influence on reconstruction.  Who is this disorderly public and how do 
the democratic institutions, practices, and relations formed through these struggles for 
representation play into the consolidation of particular forms of reconstruction as ‘societal 
regulation’?   
 The Nicaraguan case suggests that the dominant role reconstruction sector governance 
actors play has shifted democratic representation away from the substantive voice of the general 
population onto the host of place-based NGOs, development organizations, private sector and 
civil society organizations bound to the international donor community and its interests.  These 
grounded reconstruction sector actors work within the local community to conduct 
reconstruction projects focused on rural and urban development, healthcare, education, 
governance, and a range of social issues.  However, these actors are bound closely into the 
political, financial, and ideological orbit of – and are accountable to – the largely unaccountable 
body of international donors and financiers who sit outside the structure of the liberal democratic 
state.  The wedge that forms between domestic actors bound into the reconstruction sector and 
those left largely outside the transnational networks shaping reconstruction practice have a 
withering effect on democratic representation that further drives the move towards illiberal 
democracy (Sampson 2003). 
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 Illiberal democracy describes a distinct democratic pattern common to post-conflict 
states (O'Donnell 1996; Zakaria 1997).  Illiberal democratic states involve a blend of formal 
democratic institutions such as multiparty elections alongside a marked lack of more substantive, 
inclusive democratic institutions that foster greater democratic participation (Young 2002).  The 
project society nature of reconstruction governance both reflects and reinforces the trend towards 
illiberal democracy on the ground.  The disorganization or outright lack of civil society, 
grassroots social movements, or formal popular engagement in the political process cedes further 
political power to the cadre of place-based NGO, state, and market actors for the definition and 
establishment of the institutions, practices, and political economy of post-conflict reconstruction.  
 The contradictions between post-conflict reconstruction discourses promoting 
representative democracy and the general weakness of more horizontal patterns of democratic 
inclusion raise thorny questions about the consequences of reconstruction sector governance.  
The general set of neoliberal norms within which reconstruction takes shape suggest that post-
conflict governance reforms cannot fully escape the powerful influence of at least some 
neoliberal thought and practice even if it is not the only game in town.  The grounded struggles 
to define and establish democratic institutions, practices, and relations reflect these limited 
conditions for autonomous political thought and action.  Perhaps the distinct conditions of 
illiberal democracy, project society, and weak popular democratic representation that frequently 
emerge through reconstruction are less an aberration and more a fundamental part of post-
neoliberal modes of societal regulation (Carothers 2002; Linz and Stepan 1996; O'Donnell 
1996).   This state of affairs has profound implications for the ability to establish a more 
democratic post-conflict society through inclusive forms of civil society development and 
horizontal political relations (Buček and Smith 2000; Ross 2006; Young 2002) 
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 The hierarchical nature of reconstruction sector governance shaping democratic 
institutions, practices, and norms is not set in stone.  The grounded struggles that take place in 
distinct localities among different organizations and social groups – however fleeting and shaped 
by the uneven political position of the different actors involved – continue to produce a range of 
contingent neoliberal reconstruction outcomes that defy easy categorization using terms like 
illiberal democracy or project society.  Formal modes of representative democracy may be weak.  
Substantive democratic participation in the reconstruction process may be tepid.   
However, we can look at how distinct democratic institutions, practices, and social norms take 
shape through the grounded, everyday experiences of reconstruction to define and establish post-
neoliberal modes of societal regulation. 
 
3.5  RECONSTRUCTION FROM A PLACE PERSPECTIVE 
 Places are the proving grounds for reconstruction.  Reconstruction discourses produced 
by international and domestic actors, alike, ultimately have been articulated through culturally 
influenced, place-specific institutions, political relations, and practices that take shape in 
particular places.  Adopting a contingent perspective on Nicaraguan reconstruction empowers us 
to better understand that reconstruction comes from particular places and actors, and develops in 
particular places through the diverse ways that actors negotiate the meaning of reconstruction 
and neoliberalism in their daily lives.  In this section, I argue that reconstruction must be 
approached through a place perspective.  Reconstruction involves the territorial reorganization of 
political power among a diverse range of international, state, and non-state interests.  However, a 
limited focus on the international reconstruction regime of the past two decades fails to account 
for the distinct governance patterns that we witness in particular post-conflict settings.  Further, 
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we come away with a limited understanding of just how reconstruction is bound to the spread of 
neoliberal structure in post-conflict states.  A place-based focus can get us past the challenges of 
these top-heavy models of reconstruction to see the complex, contingent patterns of 
reconstruction as lived experience. 
 Post-conflict reconstruction can draw upon a place-based perspective to complement the 
top-down neoliberal theories of reconstruction and capitalist political economy.  Neoliberal 
impact models focus on the top-down effects of reconstruction policy through localized case 
studies of neoliberalization through reconstruction (see chapter two).  These ‘neoliberal impact 
models’ limit our view of reconstruction to policy outcomes derived from the powerful 
international community actors and their affiliates who rest above the fray to impose 
reconstruction from the geographic centers of power (Hart 2002).  This limited perspective fails 
to capture the distinct interplay of reconstruction policy with the grounded institutions and 
political relations found in place.   
 The particular geographic concept of place that I use highlights place as a socially 
produced convergence of people and institutions within the structural framework of the global 
political economy (Agnew 1987; Appadurai 1995; Massey 1994).  Drawing from Lefebvre 
(1991), we can assert that different capitalist eras have an attendant spatiality as the geographic 
structure that makes capital accumulation, production, and consumption possible.  The 
production of particular places is one form of the spatiality of capitalism, endowing particular 
geographic spaces with meaning and practices grounded within the broader capitalist system 
(Merrifield 1993).  The role of places within the broader capitalist system is a recursive one, as 
the unfolding, lived experiences in place reproduce and transform – i.e., reconstitute – the 
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conditions of the capitalist political economy from which such places have gained their meaning 
and relevance.  
 For this study, I focus particularly on the recursive nature of the grounded political 
struggles that unfold within and reproduce places within the broader capitalist system.  Massey 
(1994a) highlights the global nature of place as a fluid pattern of relations that stretch both near 
and far, but come to rest fleetingly in the place-specific articulation of those relations.  In other 
words, place represents the grounded ways in which global entanglements of political and 
economic power play out through place-specific relationships.  There is no global vs. local 
framework here.  Rather, place is simultaneously shaped by political forces, institutions, and 
relations that spread through countless networks.  Places become complex sites of domination, 
authority, and resistance through the distinct ways that these conditions simultaneously unfold 
within (and create) particular places as key nodes in the creation and reproduction of the 
capitalist political economy (Creswell 1996; Pile and Keith 1997; Sharp et al. 2000).   
 This place-based perspective highlights the geographic patterns of reconstruction that 
develop through the contingent articulations of international, reconstruction sector, and general 
population actors on the ground.  The geography of reconstruction may be approached through 
examination of the grounded institutions, political relations, and lived experiences of 
reconstruction. The outcome illustrates the range of post-conflict outcomes that are realized on 
the ground.  We can get beyond a top-down geographic analysis that reflects the impact of an 
overarching reconstruction policy to demonstrate how the overall experience of reconstruction – 
its successes, its failures, its role in societal regulation – emerges through the particular 
conditions of reconstruction found in specific places.   
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 The historical place context within which reconstruction takes root compels us to 
consider the effects of longer-term, culturally mediated histories of conflict and social tension on 
the place-specific patterns of post-war institutions, discursive practices, and narratives of both 
war and peace.  The material conditions surrounding reconstruction – i.e., demands for land and 
housing, micro-credit financing, employment opportunities, social welfare, democratic rights 
exercised -- play an important role in shaping the nature of the institutional and governance 
relations in that place.  These material conditions emerge from the historical place context 
shaped by history and war to condition how people respond to reconstruction and establish 
political and economic relations on the ground. 
 In Chapter 2, I considered how international reconstruction efforts introduced from above 
influence the place-based conditions of reconstruction.  International actors’ reconstruction 
programs commonly target particular regions and communities through a host of technical 
efforts, financial assistance, and advisory services.  It must be recognized that these international 
efforts often serve both the strategic interests of the external donor community and the 
immediate post-war needs of particular localities for reconstruction assistance.  As Junne and 
Verkoren (2005b) comment, reconstruction efforts that grant attention to the geographic patterns 
of conflict may advance post-conflict peace through place-specific development assistance to 
those localities most affected by periods of conflict.   
 However, attention to the geography of reconstruction requires that we go beyond the 
dominant hierarchical view that examines how international programs have varied from place to 
place.  The reconstruction of neoliberal political economy in post-conflict states develops within 
particular places through the tangled, hybrid connections between reconstruction efforts both 
from above and from below (Richmond 2010b).  The contingent neoliberal patterns of post-
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conflict political economy that are encountered in different places are not mere artifacts of 
international reconstruction policies, but rather cast light on the constitutive role that place plays 
in producing the broader post-conflict patterns of neoliberal peace.   
 In this context, we can see geographic places as distinct ‘theaters’ for reconstruction in 
which the struggles to define the political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions of place 
within the global capitalist economy give rise to new modes of societal regulation almost 
accidentally.  The grounded institutional and governance systems that emerge through and 
reproduce reconstruction in place – transnational, regional and place-based NGOs, microfinance 
institutions, new political organizations, development alliances, new state agencies, social and 
market institutions, religious mission groups, and more – come together to establish the place-
specific terms for post-conflict democratization and capitalist inclusion.  These place-specific 
experiences of reconstruction reflect back onto the institutions, practices, political relations and 
political subject positions that are being transformed in a mutual relationship between 
governance, reconstruction, and societal regulation that perpetuates the distinct nature of places 
as simultaneously global and local. 
 The geography of post-conflict reconstruction does not only center on places as the 
grounded historical, institutional and social conditions of political struggle through which 
reconstruction is defined and established as lived experience.  Moving in another direction, we 
can examine how places emerge as socially constructed, meaningful geographic spaces through 
which the institutions, practices, and relations that define post-conflict reconstruction take shape.  
Geographers have written extensively on the discursive construction of geographic places, 
regions, territories, and states (Murphy 1991; Paasi 2003; Sparke 2005).  The construction of 
place draws upon semiotic, narrative and material practices to establish the institutional and 
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relational conditions through which these new places become sites through which the policy 
goals of post-conflict reconstruction governance actors can be realized and resistance can 
develop. 
 The construction of post-conflict places centers on the mutual relationship between the 
policy intentions of reconstruction governance actors and the diffuse relationships and practices 
that can lead to the discursive construction of place.  First, reconstruction governance actors 
bring reconstruction policies, narratives, and material practices to bear in ways that can create 
new places in the popular imagination as distinct frameworks for the realization of policy goals 
(Junne and Verkoren 2005b). This policy community actively promotes policies and projects to 
construct new places as territorial focal points for the consolidation of particular post-neoliberal 
political and economic goals through reconstruction (Junne and Verkoren 2005a).  For example, 
the construction of place can be a powerful tool that grounded reconstruction sector actors like 
economic development agencies and agricultural market actors can use to create a political 
identity in order to secure a powerful political-economic position within broader scales of state 
and international politics and economics.   
 Second, the intentions of governance policy are paralleled with the production of place as 
an emergent effect.  Places, in other words, can come into existence gradually through the daily 
intersections of policy, institutions, narratives, and material practices on the ground that shape 
lived experience and popular imagination towards a discursive recognition that a ‘place’ exists.  
The political tensions that we can see within these constructed places of reconstruction reflect the 
balance between the policy intentions of particular reconstruction governance actors and the 
grounded relations through which these places are being defined and reproduced.  
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 The intersection of these two aspects of place – as the grounded context for 
reconstruction and as a socially constructed, emergent effect of reconstruction – highlight the 
need to take stock of the constitutive power of places to establish the nature of post-conflict 
reconstruction and related governance systems from the ground up. The power of reconstruction 
governance to define and guide post-conflict reconstruction is rendered legible only through the 
contingent articulation of institutions and social relations within place (Massey 1994).  Abstract 
concepts of transnational governance must be filled out by examining the distinct ways that 
governance actors’ projects not only operate through place-specific institutions, but how the 
contentious, place-based governance relations that take shape among place-specific institutional 
and relational contexts actively constitute the broader ideas and practices of reconstruction.   
  Finally, approaching post-conflict reconstruction through place brings home the 
importance of acknowledging the patterns of contingent neoliberal praxis that have influenced 
reconstruction policy in the past twenty years (Larner 2003; Leitner, Peck, and Sheppard 2006).  
The contingent patterns of reconstruction and neoliberal reform permit us to recognize the hybrid 
blend of incorporation, adaptation, and resistance that defines the actual policies and experiences 
of reconstruction.  These reconstruction experiments come about through the grounded efforts to 
make reconstruction policy meaningful within the distinct context of place.  It is these place-
based encounters between power and the people that ultimately transform reconstruction from 
technocratic policy into a societal mode of regulation creating post-conflict institutions, practices 
and common sense norms that support the contingent post-neoliberal conditions introduced 
through reconstruction.  
 
3.6  CONCLUDING REMARKS: A NEW APPROACH TO RECONSTRUCTION? 
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 The relationship between reconstruction and neoliberal political-economic reforms 
cannot be reduced to the intellectual tenets of orthodox neoliberal thought.  The reasons for this 
are clear.  Neither reconstruction nor neoliberalism exist as homogenous, simple concepts.  The 
recognition of the contingent nature of neoliberalism challenges us to reconsider the nature of the 
international reconstruction regime that dominates post-war policy formulation.  First, 
reconstruction develops through the historical and geographic patterns of political economy and 
culture that come together to shape how reconstruction is imagined, put into practice, and 
adapted on the ground.  Second, reconstruction takes shape through the contingent connections 
among transnational reconstruction networks of international donors and grounded 
reconstruction sector organizations, the general population, and individual actors rooted in the 
historical cultural conditions of country, region, and place.  Far from a hegemonic regime, the 
powerful transnational network actors at the forefront of reconstruction policy reflect a 
fragmented set of international, state, and local interests whose incoherent post-conflict 
development programs are central to the varied, contingent paths that reconstruction may follow 
even within the general framework of neoliberal reforms.  
 We can begin to unpack these complex geographies of reconstruction with a focus on the 
geographic concept of place.  The contingent direction that reconstruction and neoliberalism may 
take within different geographic places is critically important for our understanding of the 
broader effects of reconstruction.  The tangled political-economic, institutional, and governance 
relations that operate within post-conflict states reflect a complex and contingent mix of political 
power and contradictions. Greater understanding of how these contingent articulations of 
political power take hold within, actively constitute, and emerge from particular post-conflict 
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places can help us to better understand the nature of reconstruction policy and to realize 
prospects for more democratic and just peace for the war-weary peoples of the world. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE ETHNOGRAPHIC EXTENDED CASE METHOD AS A MEANS TO STUDY 
PLACE-BASED RECONSTRUCTION IN NICARAGUA 
 
 
 
4.1  THE ETHNOGRAPHIC EXTENDED CASE METHOD  
 This dissertation sets out to understand the micro-scale experiences of the transition from 
conflict to post-conflict in Nicaragua and how reconstruction has advanced a normative, 
hegemonic political program around post-neoliberal modes of capitalist regulation since the end 
of the Contra War.  In this chapter, I elaborate a place-based research design that adopts a 
comparative ethnographic methodology as an appropriate framework for understanding the 
connections between capitalist processes of global scope and the grounded experiences of post-
conflict reconstruction in Nicaragua.  The central theme of this study is to critically explore the 
geography of post-conflict reconstruction as a normative, hegemony-building political project.  
As suggested in the previous chapter, reconstruction has become in the past two decades a 
loosely coordinated, well-intentioned, discursive political project to integrate war-torn states into 
a capitalist-democratic interstate order.  However, from a critical perspective reconstruction can 
be seen as an inherently geographic political process that reorganizes the governance structure of 
post-conflict societies towards the globally dominant conditions of post-neoliberal thought and 
practice.    
 An ethnographic, place-based perspective will allow us to explore the post-conflict 
reconstruction practices and relations that are producing the hegemonic conditions of post-
neoliberal organization within post-war states.  The powerful position held by international, 
transnational, and donor state actors – many of whom support market-democratic reforms – 
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grants them considerable influence over the definition and implementation of reconstruction 
policy.  The ‘roll-out’ of political and economic reform packages among this privileged set of 
reconstruction practitioners often targets particular places that are perceived to be most in need 
of- or most amenable to reconstruction.  However, the production of hegemonic consensus to 
reconstruction policy norms does not result naturally from the efforts of the reconstruction 
practitioner community.  Rather, reconstruction involves a complex, negotiated set of meanings, 
practices, and institutions that come together in particular places.  Dominant reconstruction 
practitioners’ influence over reconstruction is always mediated by the ways in which 
reconstruction is experienced and transformed among the institutions and relations that come 
together in particular places.  The real story of post-conflict reconstruction requires that we look 
more closely at the contingent articulation of such complex governance conditions on the 
ground.  That is, we need an ethnographic, place-based perspective that asks what reconstruction 
means, how it is experienced, and how it is produced relationally among the grounded conditions 
of everyday life.  
 This study employs an “extended case method” ethnography of post-conflict 
reconstruction in two Nicaraguan municipalities – Jinotega and Boaco – to explore the global 
political-economic conditions that have influenced post-conflict Nicaraguan life.  Sociologist 
Michael Burawoy (2009) – the intellectual founder of modern extended case method 
ethnography – describes the method as a reflexive mode of scientific inquiry that connects the 
micro-scale field work of participant observation with the macro-processes of global political 
and economic change.  The individual “case study” – the work of the ethnographer in the field – 
is redefined as a prism that permits greater understanding of historical political and economic 
structures, forces, and processes that are the context for daily life (Burawoy et al. 2000; Gupta 
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and Ferguson 1997).  In this manner, the ethnographic ‘present’ can be situated (i.e., extended) 
within a broader set of historical conditions, geographic patterns, and social relationships that 
move beyond the field site in both time and space.      
 The extended case method draws from twentieth century critical social theory traditions 
among social science departments at the University of Chicago, the University of Manchester, 
and most recently the University of California – Berkeley (Burawoy 2009).  With strong origins 
in Marxist political economy, the body of critical theory holds that theoretical commitments 
necessarily precedes and informs political practice, including research.  That is, theory is a 
necessary precondition for social explanation – theories held by the researcher, theories held by 
informants, theories held within the wider society.  Research within this tradition does not 
distinguish theory from practice, but rather puts research in the service of the theoretical and 
ideological interests of the researcher.  The extended case method reflects the theoretical 
pluralism that has come to define the body of critical theory in recent years, including a range of 
foundational and post-foundational political projects (i.e., Marxism, feminism, post-
structuralism) that guide case study field observation (Bohman 1999). 
 The key aim of the extended case method is a commitment to improve upon existing 
social theory in response to the inconsistencies and lacunae that ethnographic field observations 
reveal about the prior theoretical frameworks that guide research and praxis, alike (Burawoy 
2009).  The study of daily practices in particular field sites does not reveal an unadulterated 
‘reality’ waiting to be discovered by the researcher.  As Burawoy (2009) notes, the theoretical 
lens through which we approach ethnographic analysis is always an imperfect measure of how 
large-scale social forces operate.  The failings of theory in the face of ethnographic observation 
do not invalidate a theory, but rather provide an opportunity to redefine and explore new 
 94 
dimensions of our social theories on the world.  The extended case method permits us to bridge 
the false divide between social theory and social practice with the recognition that theory and 
observation move together to guide the research questions asked, the manner in which 
observation is conducted, and the interpretation of field results into new theoretical points of 
view. 
 In the last few decades, many ethnographic studies have used elements of the extended 
case method to examine the post-neoliberal transformations and globalization projects that have 
influenced contemporary political and economic life (Burawoy 2009; Burawoy et al. 2000; 
Comaroff and Comaroff 2001; Ferguson 2002; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Gille 2001; Marcus 
1998).  Research studies such as geographer Gillian Hart’s grounded analyses of labor and 
neoliberalization in South Africa (Hart 2002), sociologist Aiwa Ong’s work on transnational 
labor networks (Ong 1999), and anthropologist Anna Tsing’s research on social movements in 
the Indonesian rainforests (Tsing 2004) have deployed the extended case method to study the 
articulation of global political and economic processes in particular places.  The central 
ethnographic concept of the ‘field’ has been extended through these global ethnographic 
projects.    The extended case method approaches the field – be it a place, a social group, an 
institution, or a network – as a point of entry for understanding the global political-economic 
transformations shaping our contemporary world.  
 For example, in her recent work Gillian Hart (2002; 2004) critiques what she calls 
neoliberal impact models that reproduce the global/abstract – local/concrete divisions so heavily 
criticized within geographic theories of place.  Hart argues that seemingly global processes like 
neoliberalization cannot be viewed as an inevitable movement from the global to the local scale, 
where external forces act upon the relatively powerless, place-based actors who are the subject of 
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ethnographic study.  Rather, the extended case method more accurately collapses global-local 
dichotomies into an awareness of the global within the local.  The political and economic 
experiences observed within distinct ethnographic field sites – from geographic places like cities 
and rural districts, to international organization offices, to factory floors – reflect a 
geographically complex web of institutions and actors connected across time and space.  This 
“global sense of place” debunks the argument that micro-scale practices are distinct from larger 
political and economic forces (Massey 1994).  Rather, it is the distinct conditions in particular 
places that collectively constitute and reproduce the macro-scale political and economic 
conditions of the global political economy.   
 In the early 1990s, anthropologist Martyn Hammersley famously asked “What’s wrong 
with ethnography?” (Hammersley 1992).  The question came at a watershed moment in the 
development of the social sciences and ethnography, in particular.  The latter decades of the 
twentieth century were a period of redefinition across the social sciences.  An epistemological 
revolution swept through the qualitative social sciences, destabilizing fundamental concepts like 
power, knowledge, theory, and practice through the recognition that political power and ideology 
informed all aspects of social research and social life (Bohman 1999; Rabinow and Rose 1994).  
The development of critical geography, critical ethnography, post-structuralism, post-Marxism, 
and heightened interest in both Foucault and Gramsci during the past two decades reflects the 
depth of the transformation that has occurred.  Ethnographic research incorporated critical theory 
through a heterogeneous blend of Marxist, feminist, and post-structural political commitments 
brought into the research process (Burawoy et al. 2000; Comaroff and Comaroff 1992; Gille 
2001; Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Marcus 1998; Tsing 2004; Wolcott 1999).  The debates over 
the nature of ethnography during this period challenged researchers to recognize the partiality of 
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their own research as a social product (Burawoy et al. 1991; Hall 1991; Hammersley 1992; 
Marcus 1998).  The production of knowledge, itself, reflected the broader structure of political 
relations, political ideology, and situated perspectives that influenced both researchers and 
informants (Clifford 1986).     
 The rational, hermeneutic, and critical ethnographic traditions that have developed in the 
past three decades reflect this on-going struggle to accommodate a new model for ethnography 
that can adequately address the relationship between theory construction and empirical 
observation (Burawoy 2009; Schwandt 2000). The extended case method is based on a reflexive 
social science model that recognizes the inherent theoretical influences that extend throughout 
the ethnographic research process to filter the research questions asked and the conduct of field 
observation.  These diverse perspectives all recognize that research cannot produce objective 
explanations of social conditions untouched by the theoretical perspectives that shape the 
research process (Hammersley 1992).   
 However, the extended case method stands apart as a theory-driven research program that 
embraces the political nature of social research as a source of strength.  Theoretically influenced 
field observation provides the basis for reconstructing existing social theory rather than rejecting 
it in the wake of anomalous observation (Burawoy 2009).  The constant interplay of theory and 
observation permits researchers not only to rebuild political theory but also to influence more 
effectively social conditions on the ground.  Thus, critical extended case method ethnography 
bridges the divide between rational and hermeneutic traditions in qualitative research (Burawoy 
2009).  The extended case method offers a research model that maintains a rational focus on 
theory-laden, empirical examination of a macro-level reality (through micro-scale observation) 
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alongside a recognition of the critical role of theoretically informed research in the social 
construction shared meaning and practice forged among human subjects.  
 Anthropologist Mark Peterson (2010) has cautiously suggested that ethnography has an 
affinity to journalism with their shared story-telling and hermeneutic traditions.  Interestingly, it 
is the biased, political nature of critical ethnographic approaches like the extended case method 
that has been criticized for reducing ethnography to the production of political journalism 
incommensurate with objective social science (Hammersley 1992).  To its critics, the extended 
case method does not meet orthodox scientific standards of researcher objectivity and study 
design deemed necessary to produce qualitative research that is appropriate to the needs of policy 
makers and practitioners beyond the academy. To my mind, this criticism unfairly condemns 
critical ethnography on standards not necessarily shared by extended case method practitioners.  
The goal of the extended case method is to balance the theoretical voice of the researcher with 
that of the informants, both to understand informants’ life-worlds and to situate those 
experiences within a broader political-economic context.  Finding the appropriate relationship 
between a predefined, theoretical research model that specifies key informants and research 
questions, and a reflexive research model open to the ambiguity, multiple viewpoints, and 
fluidity of field research is a constant challenge for ethnographers (Burawoy et al. 2000; Marcus 
1998).  The risk that research lapses into ‘unscientific’ political journalism is always present.  
Nevertheless, the political commitments that guide critical ethnographies do not translate 
automatically into a failure of responsible scholarship simply because researcher subjectivity is 
acknowledged and embraced in the research.  These dangers must be avoided through vigilant 
scholarship by the researcher to remain aware of the inherent biases that influence how 
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informants are selected and how their partial, fragmented experiences are reported and evaluated 
throughout the research process.   
 The comparative benefit that the extended case method offers – at least in the study of 
global political and economic forces – comes directly from its theoretically informed, explicitly 
political mode of social inquiry (Burawoy 2009). The multiple theoretical perspectives that 
researchers adopt expose the extended case method (and other critical methods) to critique that 
the knowledge produced lacks a central core from which competing claims might be compared 
(Hammersley 1992).  Bohman (1999), speaking on critical theory in general, offers a strong 
support for the theoretical pluralism that defines the extended case method.  This critical 
ethnography does not pretend to offer comprehensive explanations or holistic claims to “truth” 
through the fragmented, partial accounts generated through place-based ethnographic research 
(Haraway 1991).  Rather, the diverse theoretical traditions –- from Marxism, to feminism, to 
various post-structuralisms – that guide ethnographic research are approached as an opportunity 
to bring together complementary perspectives on a research topic in order to better understand 
the complex synergies and contradictions that define both the macro-scale and micro-scale 
conditions of the social world. 
 The extended case method connects the micro-processes of daily life to the historically 
and geographically distinct macro-forces that bind places together. The goal of demonstrating the 
connections between the macro and the micro through study of the life-worlds of informants 
drives research towards place-based ethnographic field sites.  The various critical ethnographic 
approaches that adopt the extended case method approach every case study field site (and the 
different informant experiences observable within the site) as a partial, fragmented part of the 
macro-scale whole.   The contingent social relations that come together in particular places are 
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distinct parts of the global capitalism system, with each place having distinct relations, social 
conditions, and experiences that result from and partially constitute the macro-scale forces under 
discussion (Hart 2004).   
 The persistence of this place-based ethnographic field site approach can be a limitation of 
the current method.  Though not without its own faults, the “multi-sited” ethnographic 
framework put forth by anthropologist George Marcus does address the need to break free from 
the static geographic fields of ethnographic space that continue to inform the extended case 
method (Marcus 1998). The spatial reorganization of political and economic life into 
transnational networks is just one new conception of the field site that reflects the mobility of 
informants and relationships under global capitalism.  Insofar as the extended case method 
succeeds at contextualizing its observations in time and space, but fails to incorporate new 
historical and spatial paradigms into the actual conduct of field observation, these criticisms have 
some purchase (Marcus 1998: 13).  Nevertheless, the recognition that global processes operate 
within distinct global and transnational geographies not wholly confined to “place” is not 
ignored within the extended case method (Gille 2001).  However, the practical realities of 
conducting ethnographic fieldwork complicate efforts to follow the informants through these 
new geographic landscapes.  A place-based extended case method addresses this issue through a 
focus on how such transnational, multi-sited processes come to rest – if fleetingly – within the 
geographic places that constitute empirically observable spaces of everyday life (Massey 1994).   
  With specific reference to this dissertation, I adopt the extended case method as a fruitful 
perspective for understanding the connections between post-conflict reconstruction and capitalist 
political economy that have shaped everyday life in post-conflict Nicaragua.  In doing so, I hope 
to explore the tangled political relationships that come together in particular places to define and 
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constitute reconstruction in ways that address not only the localized experiences of post-conflict 
life, but also become part of the broader social fabric of the global capitalist political economy.  
As noted in the previous chapter, post-conflict reconstruction policy in the past two decades has 
operated in conjunction with the range of post-neoliberal political and economic transformations 
that continue to reshape the global capitalist system.  The place-based governance framework 
that I have adopted to study post-conflict reconstruction draws on the same global sense of place 
that is the centerpiece of the extended case method.  Ethnographic field observation of the lived 
conditions of post-conflict reconstruction within particular field sites can cast a distinct light on 
the relationship between reconstruction and the production of post-neoliberal forms of political 
and economic hegemony in war-torn states.  Understanding the complex reconstruction 
experience on the ground – the political and economic pressures, the contradictions, the actors 
involved – will open our view to the contingent and uncertain nature of reconstruction as both 
policy and practice that takes root not from above or from below, but from within. 
 The practical results of producing an extended case method ethnography of post-conflict 
reconstruction in Nicaragua are two-fold.  First, the ethnographic knowledge gained through 
intensive field observation will establish new insights into the lived ‘mechanisms’ of post-
conflict reconstruction.  These insights into reconstruction as a grounded experience will permit 
a reevaluation of post-conflict reconstruction theories to better reflect the new understandings 
gained through the particular cases under study.  Second, field studies that examine how the 
hegemonic production of post-neoliberal forms of societal regulation (see chapter three) has been 
experienced in post-conflict settings will cast new light onto the broader theories of 
neoliberalism and globalization.  The complex and relatively distinct institutional and 
governance conditions that accompany post-conflict reconstruction challenge us to consider how 
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reconstruction may play a distinct role among the broader patterns of structural adjustment, 
market-democratic institutional and governance reforms, and reterritorializations of political 
power that have accompanied global capitalism. 
 
4.2  CASE STUDIES: RECONSTRUCTION IN TWO NICARAGUAN LOCALITIES 
 The central decision to begin an extended case method ethnography is field site selection.  
This study draws from Ragin’s comparative case method framework to select two Nicaraguan 
field sites (Ragin 1987).  Ragin approaches case study methods from a rational-scientific 
perspective that approximates the controlled conditions of laboratory settings within the more 
fluid fieldwork environment.  For Ragin, the key to comparative case selection is to let theory 
inform the selection of case sites: The research question being asked leads to a set of expected 
causal variables that must vary between case sites.  Beyond these expected causal variables, 
cases must be selected to control for extraneous structural and contextual variables that may 
undermine efforts to make causal connections between particular factors and the particular 
observed outcomes in each case.  This solution points to what Ragin calls a “multiple, 
conjunctural causal analysis” that bounds the selection of cases around a shared set of general 
patterns, but does not require conclusive identification of a single dependent variable or 
establishment of direct, one-to-one causal connections.  It is the complex articulation of multiple, 
interacting variables that may lead to particular outcomes in each case.  
 The use of comparative case method to select the particular field cases for this study 
raises immediate challenges for the use of the extended case method.  The extended case method 
is based on the structural totality concept that individual cases represent distinct, fragmented 
parts of the whole (Gille 2001).  The selection of cases based on principles of comparison – 
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limited independent variables, controlled incidental variables, causal connections – seems to 
superficially contradict the more open-ended approach favored by the extended case method.  
This tension has confounded otherwise strong ethnographic scholars like Marcus (1998), whose 
a priori framework for selecting key informants and sites contradicts the principles of the 
extended case method.     
 However, we can resolve this apparent tension if we recognize the shared aspects of both 
the comparative case method and extended case method.  In both instances, theory is the 
foundation for the decision to observe particular cases and to value particular information as 
relevant to the research question.  The initial use of a theoretical framework for case selection 
does not interfere with the conduct of ethnographic research, as long as care is taken throughout 
both case selection and field work to avoid allowing initial assumptions to crowd out 
contradictory evidence and alternate paths of investigation in response to continued observation 
(Burawoy et al. 2000).  Indeed, careful selection of cases in response to research questions and 
expected causal relationships can enhance the ability to engage informants effectively in the 
field.  Furthermore, the extended case method does not preclude the possibility of ethnographic 
case study comparisons both between field sites and longitudinally at a single field site.  Michael 
Burawoy describes the concept of the ‘revisit’ as an effective way to demonstrate the 
geographically and historically distinct nature of change in macro-scale forces among and within 
place-based field sites (Burawoy 2009).  
 With these precautionary notes in mind, this study sets out to produce a comparative, 
extended case method ethnography of post-conflict reconstruction in two Nicaraguan 
departments and their related capital cities. The first field site is the city of Jinotega in the 
northern Nicaraguan highlands.  The second field site is the city of Boaco in the central 
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Nicaraguan highlands [Figure 4.1].  The choice to conduct research in Jinotega and Boaco 
departments reflects the case-selection principles to limit the range of structural and contextual 
variables to those necessary for explanation.   
 
 
Figure 4.1. Case Study Field Sites in Nicaragua Nicaraguan Departments (map by author)  
Nicaraguan departments:  1). RAAN; 2). RAAS; 3). Boaco; 4). Carazo; 5). Chinandega; 6). 
Chontales; 7). Estelí; 8). Granada; 9). Jinotega; 10). León; 11). Madriz; 12). Managua; 13). 
Masaya, 14). Matagalpa; 15). Nueva Segovia; 16). Río San Juan; 17). Rivas 
 
 
 A central question in the investigation of post-conflict reconstruction is the role of the 
effects of conflict on the subsequent post-conflict reconstruction experience.  In this regard, 
Jinotega and Boaco have had distinctly different experiences.  Situated in the northern highlands, 
Jinotega department (and to a lesser extent the city) was a central front during the 1980s Contra 
conflict.  The directly experienced violence, collapsed infrastructure, failed institutions, 
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collapsed agricultural production, and violent trauma inflicted on both combatants and non-
combatants throughout the region has been definitive in shaping post-war conditions in the 
department.  In contrast, the low levels of direct violence experienced in most of the Boaco 
department cast a different wartime experience upon the Boaqueño population.  The indirect 
experiences of war – sons killed, rationed food supplies, military conscription, international 
economic isolation – were far more influential in shaping the post-conflict conditions 
experienced at war’s end. 
 In addition, the structural position that Jinotega and Boaco occupy within Nicaragua set 
the stage for their selection as case study field sites [Table 4.1].  The Jinotega and Boaco 
departments both occupy a remote geographic position on the northern and central frontiers of 
Nicaragua that until recently has been reinforced by deteriorated and non-existent transportation 
and communications infrastructure.  The similar urban structure of both capital cities as mid-
sized market towns surrounded by a large, impoverished rural population dedicated to coffee and 
horticulture production in Jinotega and dairy and beef cattle ranching in Boaco further deepens 
the similar structural position of both sites.  Compared to the 20,000 residents of the city of 
Boaco, the city of Jinotega has 41,000 inhabitants – many of whom were displaced from rural 
farms during the war (INEC 2006).  The political climate of both departments reflects the 
clientelistic patronage traditions that divide the population roughly between Liberal and Frente 
Sandinista political forces often regardless of economic and social class (IPADE 2008). 
 The central questions shaping the selection of these two field sites are two-fold: First, my 
interest rests in how the post-conflict reconstruction of governance institutions and relations has 
taken distinct forms in each location in ways that reflect the different political-economic 
conditions that extend from the conflict into the post-conflict period.  Second, my interest also 
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rests in how reconstruction has facilitated the hegemonic conditions of capitalist regulation in 
both locations, despite the distinct political-economic patterns of conflict and post-conflict 
governance reform. 
 
 
Table 4.1. Comparison of Nicaraguan Field Sites 
 
 Therefore, the political economy of war and post-conflict are central factors guiding the 
decision to conduct case study fieldwork in Jinotega and Boaco.  The distinct governance 
patterns found both at war’s end and now twenty years into the post-conflict period become a 
key variable for understanding the complex experience of post-conflict reconstruction in Jinotega 
and Boaco.  The contingent, place-based articulation of social forces among global and 
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international organizations, transnational NGOs, state agencies, micro-credit lenders, place-based 
civil society organizations, and grassroots social movements define the distinct-yet-parallel 
political economies of post-conflict reconstruction in both ethnographic field sites.  
 Further, the field-based post-conflict reconstruction conditions that were observed among 
the streets and farms of Jinotega and Boaco permitted the refinement of the theoretical lens 
through which social science can explain the reproduction of the hegemonic power relations of 
post-neoliberal capitalism(s) (Gibson-Graham 1996).  Drawing from diverse works by scholars 
including sociologists Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore (2002) and geographer Matthew Sparke 
(2006), the reterritorialization of political authority can be examined among new forms of global 
and transnational governance that take root through post-conflict reconstruction processes in 
places like Jinotega and Boaco.  These reterritorializations inexorably reinforce the connections 
between macro-scale forces and micro-scale processes that this study reveals through the 
extended case method. 
 The selection of Jinotega and Boaco as ethnographic study field sites offers a welcome 
addition to existing research on post-conflict reconstruction.  Most reconstruction studies that 
draw upon ethnographic methods focus predominantly on top-down accounts that highlight the 
local reconstruction experience (Babb 2001; Hays-Mitchell 2005; Lancaster 1992; Oglesby 
2007).  In contrast, limited attention has been given to the mutual relationship between macro 
and micro-level processes and the transformed transnational governance conditions that collapse 
the macro and macro into the place-based reconstruction experiences that are the object of this 
study.  Recent ethnographic studies on post-conflict institutions, governance, and daily life in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 2005b, 2005a), South Africa (Hart 2002), and El 
Salvador (Moodie 2010) stand out as notable exceptions.   
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 This complements existing work on Nicaragua that examines the connections between 
post-conflict reconstruction and hegemonic modes of capitalist regulation.  Recent ethnographic 
research has supported post-neoliberal impact models that look at the effects of post-conflict 
reforms in Managua-based working-class neighborhoods, rural agricultural regions, and 
Nicaraguan rainforest communities (Babb 2001; Cupples, Glynn, and Larios 2007; Lancaster 
1992; Larson 2004).   The post-conflict reconstruction experience is less understood in mid-sized 
Nicaraguan communities whose political-economic position rests somewhere between Managua 
and the rural periphery.  This study of two mid-sized Nicaraguan municipalities challenges the 
received wisdom about Nicaraguan post-conflict reconstruction and hegemonic regulation 
through a grounded look at the distinct governance structures that take hold far beyond the 
activist civil society communities of the capital city.  As such, knowledge of the post-conflict 
reconstruction experience in Jinotega and Boaco deepens our understanding of post-conflict 
reconstruction and the consolidation of global capitalist hegemony in post-conflict Nicaragua in 
the past two decades.  
 
4.3  RESEARCH PROCEDURES  
 The selection of Jinotega and Boaco as principal case study field sites resulted from an 
initial country visit in July 2008.  In total, I conducted three months of fieldwork in the two 
Nicaraguan municipalities in July 2008 and July-September 2009.  I completed most of the 
research within the principal cities of Jinotega and Boaco, although research did extend into the 
rural countryside, neighboring municipalities within the larger Jinotega and Boaco departments 
(i.e., first-order territorial divisions of the Nicaraguan state), and two weeks in Managua as the 
network of informants expanded during my time in the field.   
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 The research detailed in the following chapters foremost reflects the daily experience of 
living and conducting field observation throughout the two municipalities.  The compact size of 
both Jinotega and Boaco as mid-sized cities with a limited number of NGOs, civil society 
organizations, and government offices was a practical benefit of conducting ethnographic field 
observation here.  Life in the field was informal.  Transportation involved a flexible mix of 
walking, taxis, inter-urban buses and word-of-mouth bartering for rides with neighbors and 
acquaintances.  Observing the daily rhythms of the cities became a way of life, from the female 
street vendors loudly announcing their wares in every doorway, to the queues outside 
microfinance lending offices, development NGO centers, and the readily visible signage 
announcing the latest donor state-sponsored development projects.  
 The collection of archival material provided additional research information.  The 
material collected within the field sites – books, newspapers, NGO publications, municipal 
government documents, religious literature, political propaganda literature – has supplemented 
the research considerably.  The absence of local print media in Jinotega and Boaco proved to be 
a challenge, since reporting of local news and events was limited to occasional reports in the 
Nicaraguan daily newspaper, La Prensa.  News, events, and analysis were relayed in the cities 
mainly through word-of-mouth and by loudspeakers mounted to vehicles that passed through the 
streets of Jinotega and Boaco.    
 Finally, a series of informant interviews provided crucial insights into the lived 
experiences of post-conflict reconstruction in the two field sites.  I conducted approximately 100 
unstructured informant interviews among the Jinotega and Boaco field sites, Managua, and other 
locations.  The majority of interviews occurred in formal office settings, although some 
interviews reflected the variable settings of everyday life: personal residences, restaurants, 
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vehicles, nature parks, coffee plantations, agricultural communes, and idle conversation on street 
corners.  The informants provided a rich cross-section of post-conflict life in Jinotega and Boaco.  
 The theoretical foundations of the study on post-conflict reconstruction and hegemonic 
modes of post-neoliberal regulation drove the initial selection of informants. The recent scholarly 
literature has suggested that post-conflict reconstruction has developed into a global political 
regime in the past twenty years (Brinkerhoff 2005; Caplan 2005; Jakobsen 2002).  The presence 
of these global and transnational architects of reconstruction policy within Jinotega and Boaco 
provided a logical starting point upon entering the field.  The transnational networks of 
development NGOs, municipal and state government offices, and grounded microfinance lending 
institutions were an institutional point of reference as I began conducting informant interviews. 
 This initial set of interlocutors expanded throughout the field research to include an array 
of informants as new theoretical insights and empirical observations took me in different 
directions to understand better the contingent conditions of post-conflict governance 
reconstruction within both Jinotega and Boaco.  Ultimately, I spoke with senior municipal 
government officials, local representatives of Nicaraguan central government institutes and 
ministries, and political party representatives; former Sandinista and Contra soldiers; foreign and 
domestic NGO officials, human rights organizations, and formal civil society organizations; 
microfinance lenders, private business owners, international religious charity organizations, and 
local religious leaders and practitioners; coffee farmers, cattle ranchers, dairy producers, and 
agriculturalists; print media representatives, labor union organizers, grassroots social movement 
activists, taxi drivers, and itinerant street vendors.  
 The informant interviews were digitally recorded with the formal consent of all parties 
present.  To capture the full experience of informant interviews, including verbal and non-verbal 
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cues and my thoughts throughout the interview, I supplemented digital audio recordings with 
extensive personal notes written both during and immediately following each interview.  I 
conducted follow-up interviews as needed for clarification of particular points raised during the 
initial informant interview.  In less formal interview settings (e.g., conversations with street 
vendors and neighbors), digital recordings often begin several minutes into a conversation.  In 
those instances, I have supplemented verbatim transcripts with paraphrased accounts of earlier 
conversations.  Finally, I transcribed and coded the digital audio recordings following my return 
from Nicaragua. 
 The result of three months’ fieldwork has provided new insights into the conditions of 
post-conflict reconstruction and capitalist regulation as these have been experienced in Jinotega 
and Boaco.  As the next two chapters discuss more fully, the tangled governance structures that 
exist in both field sites reflect the distinct conditions left over from war, the geographically 
uneven presence of the broadly defined ‘international community’ in reconstruction processes, 
and the creative, adaptive lived experiences of post-conflict reforms on the ground.      
 
4.4  CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE EVERYDAY SPACES OF RECONSTRUCTION 
 Given the promise and pitfalls of using extended case method ethnography, we must ask 
what is gained and lost through using the method for the study of post-conflict reconstruction.  
The benefits of examining the lived experience of post-conflict reconstruction are hopefully 
clear.  Ethnographies of post-conflict reconstruction provide an intimate window into the often-
contradictory processes, practices, and lived experiences that define the nature of reconstruction 
and in a very real sense determine its success of failure on the ground.  The particular benefit of 
the extended case method comes through the mutual connections that can be made between the 
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experiences of post-conflict reconstruction and broader political and economic forces that both 
influence and respond to the uncertain course of reconstruction processes in time and space. 
 There are few objective modes of defense against the critics of extended case method 
ethnography.  The method readily embraces theoretical bias and ideological taint as part of 
ethnographic research (and, in truth, all forms of social science, acknowledged or not).  
Moreover, the extended case method makes theoretical bias a friend and traveling companion 
along the two-way path of theory reconstruction and field observation.  In part, the validity of 
ethnographic research is in the eye of the beholder.  It is the responsibility of the researcher to 
acknowledge his or her positionality and subjectivity and to use these as part of the knowledge-
building process.   
 As for the shortcomings of extended case method ethnographies of post-conflict 
reconstruction, the usual suspects come to the fore: the anecdotal policy-irrelevance of research, 
the partiality of informants and lack of an objective standard for validity, the researcher’s self-
qualifications about positionality and theoretical bias, the incommensurability of cases.  In 
contrast, post-conflict reconstruction is a complex political process, a wholesale transformation 
of societal institutions, social relations, and political subjectivities taking place in the challenging 
context of an uncertain transition from war to peace.  The knowledge generated through 
ethnographic studies represents a complementary set of data that can serve the interests of policy 
makers, practitioners, and those being ‘reconstructed’ in war-torn states.  The information 
uncovered through ethnographies of reconstruction will have its greatest importance when it 
contradicts knowledge generated through alternate forms of knowledge generation about post-
conflict reconstruction processes.  The current ethnographic study of Nicaraguan post-conflict 
reconstruction moves in this direction.  The following chapters take up this challenge through 
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analysis of post-conflict reconstruction and the hegemonic conditions of post-neoliberal 
governance reform in Jinotega and Boaco. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
RECONSTRUCTING NEOLIBERAL POLITICAL-ECONOMIC PEACE FROM 
ABOVE IN JINOTEGA AND BOACO  
 
 
 
5.1  NEOLIBERAL POLITICAL ECONOMY FROM ABOVE  
 The following two chapters examine the place-based connections between post-conflict 
reconstruction and capitalist regulation of the Nicaraguan political economy two decades after 
the formal conclusion of the Contra war.  Foremost, Nicaraguan reconstruction has provided a 
vehicle for the development of a capitalist political economy as the dominant framework for 
reorganizing the everyday spaces of Nicaraguan society.  The formal reconstruction programs 
and professionals at work in Nicaragua since 1990 have generated new institutions, governance 
reforms, and political space for citizen participation that support the emergence of a particular 
form of capitalism: neo-liberal regulation.  
 Throughout Central America in the 1990s, post-conflict reconstruction has permitted the 
penetration of transnational governance as a guiding force behind the move towards neoliberal 
capitalist political economy, including in Nicaragua (Moodie 2010).  However, post-conflict 
capitalist regulation arises through the contingent articulation of political-economic relations, 
governance, institutions, and what Sparke (2006, 8) calls the ‘congeries of calculative practices’ 
that occur in the micro-spaces of everyday life rooted in place.  
 In chapter three, I suggested that reconstruction privileged the transnational connections 
binding a ‘reconstruction sector’ of place-based NGOs, microfinance credit institutions, and 
development organizations with international donor institutions, states, and non-state 
professionals.  This reconstruction sector served as the bridge to unite international and 
transnational actors, post-conflict state and sub-state apparatuses, political forces, private sector 
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actors, non-state organizations, civil society actors, and grassroots social movements within the 
post-conflict reorganization of neoliberal capitalist political economy.    
 The case studies in this chapter examine the post-war articulation of these reconstruction 
sector, political forces, and civil society actors in the Nicaraguan municipalities of Jinotega and 
Boaco.  Chapter five emphasizes the reorganization of post-conflict political economy, 
institutions, and governance through the micro-practices that constitute post-conflict 
reconstruction and neoliberal regulation on the ground (Jones 2008).  Chapter six focuses on the 
contingent intersections of neoliberal political economy and culture that are made visible in the 
place-specific efforts to negotiate reconstruction and its discontents from the ground up.  
 
 
5.2  BUILDING NEOLIBERAL STRUCTURE IN JINOTEGA 
 
 Driving the Jinotega-Guayacán Highway north into mountainous Jinotega, travelers 
encounter multiple signposts promoting the latest internationally financed development projects.  
The rural and urban landscapes surrounding Jinotega reveal the depth of international financial 
connection to small-town Nicaragua.  The Inter-American Development Bank, USAID, the EU, 
Governments of Japan, South Korea, Norway, and Sweden, and NGOs like Catholic Relief 
Services are a few of the international donors whose support for both large- and small-scale 
infrastructure and social development projects appears on the Jinotega landscape. In most cases, 
international donor community material and financial support for post-conflict development 
programs passes through a place-based community of ‘reconstruction sector’ NGOs, 
microfinance credit institutions, and other organizations that emerged in the 1990s to provide 
development, governance, and social infrastructure assistance to the Jinotega region. 
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 The constellation of place-based reconstruction sector organizations in Jinotega reflects a 
varied set of organizations and actors.  The most striking aspect of this reconstruction sector in 
Jinotega is the large number of small, entrepreneurial organizations that exist on the ground.  
These organizations include multiple small Nicaraguan and Jinotega-based NGOs, microfinance 
credit institutions, faith-based development organizations, coffee and agricultural production and 
technical services cooperatives, private business organizations, and public-private interest 
groups.  Collectively, the organizations that make up this sector have become the principal 
conduit for interstate organizations, foreign donor state agencies, international NGOs, 
international faith-based development organizations, and private sector actors to provide material 
and financial support during the post-conflict period.  
 We can turn to the historical patterns of liberal political economy and culture to grasp the 
particular position that these place-based reconstruction and development organizations occupy 
in the region.  Paige (1997) describes the historically peripheral political-economic position that 
Jinotega and northern coffee-producing regions of Nicaragua have held since independence in 
1838.  The historical account in chapter one suggested that the history of northern Nicaragua 
reflected a mix of isolation from the centers of power alternating with spasmodic moments of 
political violence and conflict that too often has concentrated in northern departments like 
Jinotega.  The resulting cultural mores that have developed particularly since the 1920s have 
produced a liberal regime of subjection among Jinotega peasant farmers and the proletariat 
centered on finding endogenous solutions to the development challenges that the region has 
faced.  This historical trope can help explain how the Jinotega region has adapted to the 
transnational penetration of donor assistance and homegrown development programs during the 
reconstruction period.  
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Foremost, reconstruction in Jinotega has entered into a complex set of transnational connections 
between international donors and place-based development organizations.  These transnational 
reconstruction networks have gravitated towards the dominant neoliberal models for 
reconstruction and development.  However, the composition of the reconstruction sector in 
Jinotega reflects the broad range of political commitments and social needs that have 
accompanied the historic social structure in the Jinotega region.  For example, Saldaña-Portilla 
(2003b) described the complex political economy of northern coffee production as a blend of 
liberal elites, mostly liberal-oriented peasant producers, and a politically mixed set of rural 
proletariat and itinerant rural proletariat.  This complex social structure has helped to permit the 
proliferation of reconstruction sector organizations and transnational connections to meet the 
diverse needs of the regional population.      
 The practices performed among place-based reconstruction sector actors reflect the 
political contradictions between neoliberal capitalist penetration and the presence of entrenched 
poverty operating side by side in the region.  In the past twenty years, these development 
organizations have adopted a market-centered reconstruction assistance strategy that 
simultaneously binds local entrepreneurs and the masses into the transnational political economy 
through a host of financial connections and has shown neoliberal tendencies to provide support 
preferentially towards the poor, but not the indigent as part of an effort to promote responsible, 
profitable use of reconstruction support.   
 These deep historical conditions of peripheral political-economic position and liberal-
minded development efforts come through in conversations with reconstruction sector personnel.    
Their views demonstrate a strong neoliberal capitalist orientation and their self-aware interest in 
advancing a neoliberal regional program through their normative efforts to combine 
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reconstruction programs as a path to neoliberal subject formation in aid recipients.  The regional 
office of the Nicaraguan Association for Opportunity and Economic Development (ASODENIC) 
offers one example.  Founded in 1994, ASODENIC provides low-interest loans for female-
centered, multi-partner micro-enterprise development.  Concurrently, ASODENIC administers to 
the financial, social, and religious needs of its financial beneficiaries.  Julia, an ASODENIC 
director in Jinotega, embodies the ASODENIC mission.  Educated at the Nicaraguan 
Universidad Centroamericana in the 1990s, Julia returned to northern Nicaragua to manage 
post-conflict NGO programs in the region.  Julia explained:  
 ASODENIC is a business based on Christian principles...on coming closer to God. That 
 is the foundation, because when we encounter those clients that have – that live in places 
 with great poverty, extreme poverty and they have gone through abuse, divorces, 
 mistreating their children, alcoholism and drugs – we try very subtly to find ways to talk 
 with them about God, about the plan God has for their lives. ... These lessons are 
 distributed along three dimensions: the economic, the social, and the spiritual. So  we try 
 little by little not to appear like a church, but to get the clients to change, you know? – an 
 attitude of improving themselves. .... It is very difficult, because a comfortable and 
 tranquil attitude is very ingrained in them to say give me, I need it.’ But our idea is to 
 develop in them a mentality that says ‘give me, I am going to work, and I am going to 
 repay you. 
   
 In another instance, I spoke with officials at the Association of Volunteers for 
Community Development (AVODEC), a community-based NGO founded in the late 1990s to 
coordinate international donor support, Nicaraguan state funds, and private donations to realize 
social infrastructure programs in impoverished urban and rural districts of Jinotega.  AVODEC 
works with governments, religious groups, transnational NGOs and foundations to build homes, 
composting latrines, potable water wells, and other micro-scale projects throughout the region.  
In the past decade, AVODEC has responded to shifting mechanisms of transnational donor 
support with a move from grants-based to loan-based program assistance for the impoverished 
Jinotega beneficiaries.  AVODEC administrator Carlos explained:  
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 [Since 2000], we too have improved our best practice, as we say, to match the limited 
 resources.  We also have created an exclusive credit-based fund.  We have in our 
 organizational structure a part the gives credit and a part that gives out donations. 
 Generally, the technical assistance that we give is free, but if we give seeds or inputs, 
 those are given on credit. For construction and housing, we pay for the labor or part of 
 the materials, but people also have to pay their share. This was established from 2004 
 onwards.   Before 2004, we contributed various homes and they were completely 
 donated, given away.  But one the problems we identified was that in that moment, we 
 gave away homes, but the people did not live in the homes – they would sell them.  So, 
 they showed no interest in the home because it had been given to them.  They believed 
 that it was nothing. ... Many people that had a little more money would buy the house 
 from the people for the precio de un Guate mojado (laughs) [Note: ‘el precio de un Guate 
 mojado’, or ‘price of a wet Guatemalan’ is a Nicaraguan colloquial term meaning 
 ‘cheap’ or ‘inexpensive’].   
 
Carlos continued later in our conversation:  
 
 As a beneficiary of a program, you have an obligation to be productive. Once you 
 produce, you have to buy your clothing.  It is a way to get the people involved. There was 
 a common condition before that the people waited for you to give things to them, nothing 
 more – ‘give me, give me, give me a little gift” but they did not want to work. So, we as 
 an organization, like many organizations, have reoriented with a new focus on not giving 
 things away and placing conditions that require people to work in some way.  
   
  
 While some informants like Julia and Carlos demonstrated a deep-seated commitment to 
neoliberal modes of reconstruction as a path to regional prosperity, I also encountered a strong 
sense of ambivalence among many informants towards the overarching transnational political-
economic structure of reconstruction.  These informants seem to reinforce the uncertain view that 
the Jinotega region and its residents historically have had in their intersections with power 
directed from above.  In practice, these concerns seem to manifest as reconstruction sector 
organizations struggle to balance transnational donor pressures for capitalist reform with place-
based political and social needs illustrates the contingent nature of the formation of neo-liberal 
practices.  Founded in 1998, The Education and Communication Association ‘La Cuculmeca’ 
operates in the Jinotega department to promote citizen participation, good governance, gender 
equity, and sustainable agriculture programs to impoverished rural communities. One La 
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Cuculmeca senior director, José, reflected on the balanced path that his organization has 
navigated in the past thirteen years:   
 International donors come here with beautiful visions for what they want to accomplish.  
 The problem is that the plans often do not work as planned.  They do not take into 
 account our history, the particular context here in Jinotega.  Cuculmeca has rejected 
 many international plans because they do not meet the needs for citizen development here 
 in Jinotega. They are learning – the international community is beginning to bring in 
 more local participation to develop programs, for planning, for implementation of 
 projects. ...  And it is not just international aid that is getting it wrong.  The national 
 government is getting in the way of aid, too.  For example, OXFAM has left Nicaragua.  
 They protested to the Foreign Ministry about mistreatment of two OXFAM partners 
 here.  What happened next? Local organizations working with OXFAM have been 
 shut out by the Sandinista government, including Cuculmeca. 
 
 Finally, FSLN functionaries created the Jinotega Foundation for Sustainable 
Development (FUNJIDES) in 1996 following the post-war Nicaraguan state retrenchment of 
employment, spending, and services under both UNO and PLC administrations (i.e., la 
comptactación).  FUNJIDES provides citizen participation capacity-building programs and 
social infrastructure projects to impoverished urban and rural districts throughout Jinotega.  As 
Anna, one FUNJIDES office director, noted:  
 There are many people with limited vision who obstruct civil society and international 
 help. Why? Not all international forces agree with what the [FSLN] government is 
 trying to do. But lots of money comes directly to organizations like this one, bigger ones, 
 even smaller ones. So the government, through the Ministry of Governance, is trying to 
 pass an NGO  law where every little thing would have to be declared – and that is fine. 
 We agree completely that the source of our funds should be transparent, because there are 
 many institutions that take advantage of what they do to enrich certain people – but there 
 should not be restrictions on our work.  For example, right now [the government is] 
 telling us ‘if you get involved in executing  programs about citizen participation, we will 
 close your organization.’ Or send INSS. That young man [motioning to a young man 
 seated at a nearby desk. Her voice notably drops in volume] is from INSS.  He is 
 reviewing if we have everything in order, that we have declared all our workers, they are 
 all covered.  It is fine that they do so, but they are doing it with a lot of pressure, as if to 
 say ‘if you complain, we are going to bring La Renta, the INSS, the Ministry of Labor – 
 that is not correct. 
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These portraits of reconstruction sector actors in Jinotega demonstrate well the 
connections between the regional political-economic history and liberal traditions that inform 
contemporary reconstruction processes.  First, the transnational reconstruction networks that 
grant such a prominent position to reconstruction sector organizations in Jinotega certainly have 
helped to promote neoliberal modes of political-economic reform and subject formation.  The 
transnational connections that support reconstruction sector programs have successfully bound 
the population into a neoliberal mode of regulation.  This reconstruction sector dominance may 
be embedded within a broader neoliberal logic that guides the international donor community, 
reconstruction sector, political forces, and the general population towards adopting/accepting a 
market-centered calculus for allocating post-conflict development assistance to those 
entrepreneurial-minded actors most capable of benefiting from such support (Bebbington 2004). 
 Second, the reconstruction sector effort to promote neoliberal political-economic reform 
has been met with a generally receptive population whose willingness to adopt the conditions 
and practices introduced by this reconstruction sector reflects deeper cultural traditions of self-
empowerment and market-oriented praxis that carry into the post-war period.  This historic 
pattern comes through within the reconstruction sector, which has readily accepted the social 
responsibilities to provide governance, social well-being and development assistance to the 
general population in the relative absence of a robust state (Painter 2006).  
  While the political-economic conditions for reconstruction seem to enjoy a broad 
consensus among the Jinotega population. the fact remains that most political institutions and 
practices continue to be deeply divided by the persistent class-based and identity-based 
allegiances among FSLN, Liberal, and other political actors. Moreover, these divisions have 
intruded into the political space occupied by the reconstruction sector, as the FUNJIDES and La 
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Cuculmeca examples demonstrate. These entrenched political tensions reinforce the 
overwhelming influence of neoliberal transnational organizations over the social and economic 
character of Jinotega.  The contingent form of neoliberal capitalist democracy that has developed 
in Jinotega is a product of these tensions between transnational, Nicaraguan, and place-based 
governance forces within the reconstruction sector, political society, and civil society.  The next 
section discusses these legacies of war and their role in forming the current political landscape. 
 
5.3  GHOSTS OF WAR: POLITICAL RELATIONS IN JINOTEGA  
 Twenty years into reconstruction, the ‘ghosts of war and revolution’ still haunt Jinotega 
and the northern regions.12  As I recounted in chapter one, the history of Nicaragua for over a 
century has been the struggle to define and construct a hegemonic sense of statehood and 
nationhood (Whisnant 2005).  Close (1999) limits his view to the post-1990 reconstruction 
period that equally has failed to produce a hegemonic national project that can overcome the 
entrenched political divisions that fueled the Contra war.  From an historical perspective, the 
complex Nicaraguan political climate, from the FSLN-PLC power-sharing agreement known as 
the ‘dirty pact’ to the widespread and credible allegations of FSLN election fraud in the 
November 2008 municipal elections in Jinotega and thirty-nine other Nicaraguan cities, is 
merely the latest in a long political tradition of political brinksmanship and relative dysfunction 
(Envío 2008; Ética y Transparencia 2009).  The prolonged historical tensions among elites and 
the masses, Liberals and radicals have continued into the post-conflict milieu in Jinotega.  
Partisan political, economic, and social institutions, governance patterns that exclude political 
                                                
12 A Rainforest Alliance official I met informally in Managua offered the phrase ‘the ghosts of 
war and revolution’ (las fantasmas de la guerra y de la revolución) as she described the political 
tensions that persist in northern Nicaragua, including Jinotega. 
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opponents, and concerns over official disregard for the rule of law have shaped a Jinotega 
population who waits with growing concern for the future after two decades of peace. 
 When I returned to Jinotega in July 2009 – nearly a year after the fraudulent FSLN 
election victory – signs of political unrest appeared throughout the landscape.  FSLN propaganda 
decorated the municipal hall, from the red and black FSLN flag displayed above the doors to 
propaganda posters celebrating President Daniel Ortega, revolutionary icon Augusto Sandino, 
and the latest FSLN programs for the poor.  Recently repainted murals of armed FSLN militants 
in the northern coffee farms competed with graffiti-covered walls defaming the FSLN and 
Ortega, as well as announcing the resurgence of the Partido Resistencia Nicaragüense 
(Nicaraguan Resistance Party) among disgruntled Jinotega residents (Figure 5.1).  
 These political / politicized landscapes connect 100 years of contentious political history 
in the Jinotega region.   For over a century, Jinotega and the mountains of northern Nicaragua 
have witnessed the worst of conflict and warfare as U.S. marines, Liberal and Conservative 
forces, Augusto Sandino’s men, FSLN revolutionaries and Contra resistance fighters have  
 
 
Figure 5.1. Anti-FSLN graffiti on a residential wall in northern Jinotega.  Text reads 'Leonidas 
corrupt thief.  FSLN corrupt thief’ (photo by author) 
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passed throughout the region (Figure 5.2).  In the 1980s, the liberal peasant coffee producers 
from Jinotega and neighboring rural departments filled the Contra ranks (Paige 1997).  Displaced 
peasant farmers and rural proletariat who fled the countryside violence by warring FSLN troops 
and Contra resistance units often took refuge in Jinotega and other population centers to escape 
the conflict.  These historic patterns of destruction, death, and dislocation have shaped the 
political tensions that persisted into the post-conflict period. 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Recently repainted graffiti for the Nicaraguan Resistance Party, the political force 
formed in 1993 by former Contra members (photo by author) 
 
 
 
 In part, the persistent political tensions in the region reflect a more fundamental 
ideological discord over the meaning and role of the state at both the national and municipal 
scale.  Saldaña-Portila (2003a) argued (see chapter one) that a fundamental disconnect existed in 
the 1980s between the FSLN radical development vision of the state and a grassroots peasant 
producer vision of the state rooted in liberalism.  The informant conversations I held in Jinotega 
suggest that the situation is more complicated.  Political tensions certainly do continue between 
Liberal and FSLN militants, suggesting that the alternate visions of the state and society still 
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have not been bridged.  However, the historical traditions of a distant central state, politicized 
state institutions, and the directly experienced horrors of the Contra conflict seems to have 
produced for many informants a profound weariness in the political process and a lack of faith in 
state institutions as a neutral and legitimate political space democratic engagement  (Walter 
1993).   
 This cultural reading of the state seems to echo among many of the informants I met in 
the region.  The consistent themes that the informants expressed, of skepticism towards the state 
and a general fatigue with the political tensions, conflicts, and political process, support the 
general sense that the direct effects of war on the Jinotega region had a role in moderating 
political tensions between Liberal and FSLN rank-and-file.   
 This sense of weariness became apparent in my conversations with political elites, former 
military and Contra soldiers, and party faithful.  Humberto, a member of the Jinotega FSLN 
delegation, reflected the common political divisions I encountered among political elites: 
  Here [Jinotega] the war has converted to a war between the rich and the poor.  It is  
 an ideological struggle between the rich and the poor.  The wealthy want to exterminate 
 the poor.  And logically the poor are defending themselves so that they are not 
 exterminated.  That is what has happened in the past 16 years.  And still – remember that 
 [the FSLN] is  now in the government – we do not have the majority in the National 
 Assembly and  logically they do not vote for any project designed for the poor. So it is 
 still a war against the rich.  The only thing we want is that the rich distribute fairly what 
 they earn and not exploit the poor.  That is the only struggle that we have. 
 
Humberto and the FSLN delegation pored over consent forms and thoroughly interrogated my 
research purpose before agreeing to talk to me.  In contrast, Former Contra commander (El 
Enano), head of the local Contra veterans’ association, and recent PLC mayoral candidate 
Germán Zeledón greeted me at his door.13  Zeledón welcomed me into his modest home to drink 
                                                
13 I quote Germán Zeledón using his actual name (with his stated permission) in a break from the 
pseudonym conventions adopted throughout the study. Zeledon’s views on the current 
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coffee and reflect over personal stories of Contra life, a shoebox of grainy, historic photos, and a 
faded 1984 Time magazine clip of him on the Northern Front.  Zeledón a man shaped by his past, 
warned of deterioriating political conditions in Jinotega: 
 My father – on May 20, 1979, when the Sandinista war came to Jinotega, I was 12 years 
 old.  Tragically, at 7:30 in the morning, the Sandinistas came to my house and killed my 
 father.  We have suffered since I was very little. I had to find room behind the wall of my 
 house.  Two bullets – one in his chest, one in his back.  We buried him in the yard.  ... 
 After the [November 2008 municipal] elections, everyone is susceptible, they are – they 
 are a time bomb.  The people  who were in the war, and moreover the fraud, moreover the 
 governing style of the FSLN,  the bad economy – the people are fed up. What I am saying 
 is that the places where there  was war are now a time bomb. The totalitarian tendencies 
 of the government, the bad politics, the insecurity – with all those conditions, the  people 
 just need a push. They are susceptible in any given moment. What we have to do as 
 political leaders is to maintain a better social order. Because if I had gone in the middle of 
 the elections and had acted violently, we would have had war in Jinotega. That fervor is 
 distinct. Jinotega is burning with anger over the election fraud. ... The calm situation is 
 not what it appears to be  - it is a volcano.  
 
Zeledón, who announced in January 2011 that he intended to run for a seat in the National 
Assembly, has been careful to denounce violence and express hope for reason to prevail against 
the more aggressive mood allegedly forming among the Jinotega Liberal community (González 
2011).  Despite such protestations, Zeledón recently stated in the Costa Rica-based Tico Times 
newspaper that Nicaraguan “[p]olitics has failed. If there is no rule of law, there comes a time 
when the only way to express yourself is through other forms. ... There is a group that is 
organizing in Jinotega called the FDN [Nicaraguan Democratic Force], which was the original 
part of the Contra. The FDN are the true Contras” (Rogers 2009).  
 In large measure, the deep political divisions among political elites like Humberto and 
Germán have not been adopted among the general population.  For many and perhaps most of 
my informants, three decades of warfare and post-conflict reconstruction have moderated class-
                                                                                                                                                       
Nicaraguan political situation are a matter of public record. The readers’ knowledge of his actual 
identity is necessary to understand the full significance of his comments on the political tension 
in Jinotega and northern Nicaragua. 
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based political divisions and replaced hostility with a contradictory mix of hope and 
disempowerment in the face of entrenched political divisions, economic stagnation, and eroded 
civil institutions.  Former Sandinista Popular Army and Contra paramilitary soldiers frequently 
expressed a shared ‘post-partisan’ vision for capitalist democracy in Nicaragua.  One such case 
was Eduardo, an Association of Ex-Military Combatants representative:  
 The history of Jinotega practically has been a conservative city. Very conservative 
 in its customs, you understand?  But, the [political]  thought of the majority of  
 Jinoteganos is Liberal.  ...  So it seems to me that Jinotega  transitioned positively 
 towards democracy. I believe that the most important thing is that Jinotega, being a 
 theater of war, after the war they put it behind and assimilated. Today there is a tendency 
 in the countryside to have less conflict, confrontations. There, Sandinistas and Contras 
 come together in the countryside.  There have been marriages between them. ... That 
 episode of the war, I believe that more than anything it has been left as a history to be 
 told.  Despite the fact that it lasted several years.  Despite the fact that lots of blood ran.  
 Despite that there were dead on both sides. ... The most important thing now is how to 
 educate the new generation, so that the new generation does not think about war and 
 resolving conflicts through arms. .... That is the challenge.   
 
The history of war and reconstruction has taken a toll on many former soldiers, dissident political 
activists and even current political leaders in Jinotega.  As former Contra soldier Paulo ironically 
stated over coffee in a small Jinotega cafe, ‘the war was better.’  For Paulo, as with many 
Jinotega residents, reconstruction has brought political and economic stagnation, and frustration 
with the pace of change after three decades of conflict and peace.  Former Sandinista military 
officer Luis expressed the despair generated through the reconstruction years: 
 For me, I thought I was a Sandinista. I was like a machine. They always told us 
 ‘Sandinismo – good, good, good’ and I believed it. And whatever the revolution asked 
 for, we were right there. ... when they called for military service, I went voluntarily to a 
 base to fight against those who disagreed with the government. ... I was a Sandinista who 
 would have died for the revolution. For me, it was natural. ... I came to a point where – 
 hombre, it is not too heroic – but I realized that the government had no sense. The war, so 
 many deaths, conflicts, even school friends one on this side, one on the other. Brothers. ... 
 We practically kidnapped women who supported the Contras.  We kidnapped them to 
 interrogate them. And at the end of the day what happened? Nothing.  A national vision 
 ... It does not exist here. Only politics of self-interest exists here.  Yo-ismo (self-
 interest).  Power makes people sick. All power sickens.  In the 1980s I heard Daniel 
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 Ortega speak, it made me all ‘gaga’, you could say (me puse chocho).  He had a good 
 National Plan. But it went on changing, changing, changing. When Don Enrique Bolaños 
 was president [2001-2006], for me he was a good man. He fought against corruption. 
 He had a vision.  But, who was in the opposition? Daniel Ortega.  
 
 I received a similar story from Gustavo, a former Contra soldier on the northern front.  
After the war, Gustavo returned to the fog-shrouded slopes north of Jinotega municipality, 
earning a meager living as a seasonal coffee farm laborer, where he lived in temporary quarters 
provided by the coffee farm during the brief coffee bean-picking season.  Gustavo was proud of 
his paramilitary service, raising his shirt to point out the three bullet hole scars that marred his 
middle-aged chest:     
 All of the world, both military and those who demobilized, offered their hand and they 
 are friends. We have gone on living, them and us. We have moved forward because in 
 reality it was a war that ended without a solution. More, there is a sense that we were 
 blind, fools.  
 
  Senior FSLN municipal government official Antonio best reflected the political 
contradictions that define post-conflict reconstruction in Jinotega.  Antonio invited me to his 
dusty bookshelf-lined living room where, under the watchful, framed portrait of Augusto César 
Sandino on the wall opposite, he reflected on the revolution, the war, and the tumultuous 
reconstruction period:  
 ‘The 1990s period up to now has been a time of poverty, but I have endured it because I 
don’t know what is more expensive.  Being free – feeling oneself free – has a price. You 
cannot be hungry. But if you have that notion that you are free, you feel better, I would 
say.  The problem is that our leaders attack us.  Someone with the best job, the best salary 
still does not feel good, he does not feel happy.  That’s the  thing – freedom is expensive, 
it has a price.  And feeling free is very important.  The people do not feel free.  They feel 
threatened.’   
 
 The political forces that dominate the post-conflict reconstruction experience, with all 
their contradictions, have contributed to the reconstruction of a capitalist political economy 
oriented foremost towards the transnational governance realized through the reconstruction 
sector.  The political tensions have undermined the role of the local state within the 
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reconstruction process.  Where people feel the state to be politically biased and unreliable, the 
reconstruction sector has been the sole recourse for meeting the social needs of the community. 
 
5.4  NEOLIBERAL GOVERNANCE AND RESISTANCE IN JINOTEGA 
 The decline of FSLN-based mass organizations in Jinotega, like everywhere in 
Nicaragua, opened a politically independent institutional space for citizen participation and civil 
society development.  At a national level, the Law on Citizen Participation (Law No. 475-03) 
established in 2003 a formal institutional structure for citizen participation in municipal and 
departmental governance.  The creation of Departmental Development Councils and Municipal 
Development Committees provided a financially and legally supported political space for civil 
society organizations collectively to consult and advise municipal government on the interests 
and needs of the municipal and departmental communities14.  The legislative foundations 
provided by these laws established an institutional framework through which we can examine the 
ongoing interaction between  reconstruction sector institutions and entrenched partisan political 
divisions.   The outcome has established the place-based conditions for citizen participation and 
civil society development that have evolved through, and continue to define, the reconstruction 
period. 
                                                
14 The Law on Citizen Participation (Law No. 475-03) created extensive political space for 
citizen participation at the national, departmental and municipal levels, including the 
Departmental Development Councils and Municipal Development Committees (i.e., art. 50, art. 
97).  These institutions were designed to consult and advise both the mayors and municipal 
councils “in the management and planning of social and economic development in their 
respective territory” (art. 50).  Under the Law, the consultative committees are to be non-
partisan, open to all NGO, civil society organizations, and interest groups, and have legal 
standing as the state-financed, politically independent institution for citizen consultation with 
municipal government.   
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 In After Revolution: Mapping Gender and Cultural Politics in Neoliberal Nicaragua 
(2001), anthropologist Florence Babb examined citizen participation in Managua in the early 
1990s and found that the FSLN defeat had generated a wave of citizen participation among 
militants left in the cold when the FSLN mass organizations went into decline.   
My field research in Jinotega suggests that there is a notable difference between the robust 
patterns of citizen participation and civil society mobilization in larger Nicaraguan cities like 
Managua and León compared to the far more limited, NGO-dominated forms of citizen 
participation that I encountered in Jinotega (see Babb 2001).   While the differences undoubtedly 
rest in part on the limited nature of small-town civic participation, the historical political-
economic structure that has guided Jinotega for the past century seems to offer additional 
explanation of the limited participation and elite-driven nature of civil society organization in 
Jinotega.  Foremost, we can draw from Bebbington and Kotahri (2006) and Guilhot (2005) to 
recognize the appropriation of civil society in the last two decades by the transnational networks 
of professional organizations, international donors, development organizations, and 
reconstruction professionals that operate in the political space commonly set aside for civil 
society.  This combination of institutions has become the dominant ‘civil society’ actors involved 
in contemporary political and economic development (cf. Guilhot 2005).  Second, the lack of 
robust mass participation in civil society organizations or grassroots social movements (with 
notable exceptions discussed below) is perhaps an historical result of the historical orientation of 
everyday life towards rural production under conditions of small-scale coffee and agricultural 
production that precludes the time, interest, or utility of ‘getting involved’ at the local level.    
 Post-conflict reconstruction in Jinotega has followed this pattern via the lead role that 
reconstruction sector NGOs and other organizations have adopted among the key governance 
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institutions established during the post-conflict reconstruction period.  For example, the 
Municipal Development Council (CDM) in Jinotega has included members La Cuculmeca, the 
José Nieborowski Foundation, the Council of Protestant Churches of Nicaragua (CEPAD), and 
AVODEC as key actors alongside civil society organizations like Movimiento Comunal 
Nicaragüense, the Association of Jinotega Municipalities (AMUJIN), and private sector interest 
groups like the SOPPEXXCA coffee cooperative federation and the National Agricultural and 
Ranchers Union.15  
 The reconstruction sector governance role within civil society spaces like the CDD and 
CDM institutions is not inherently problematic, to be clear. These organizations bring substantial 
organizational skills and financial resources to bear on the complex problems of citizen 
participation, regional, and local planning addressed by the CDD and CDM.  Rather, the 
transnational connections that bind reconstruction sector NGOs and development organizations 
to the international donor community have become political fodder for the divisive political 
forces that intrude into civil institutions and efforts to promote political participation among the 
general population.  As José Nieborowski Foundation representative Miguel noted (in apparent 
self-criticism):  
 Perhaps, in quotes, we can say that there is a Nicaraguan government interested in 
 developing a neutral civil society – that’s why I say ‘in quotes’ – Well, if the resources 
 come from the North Americans, then they create a structure to serve their interests.  If 
 the resources come from Europe, then they create a  structure that serves their political 
 interests.  And if the resources come from the Left, then they also create a structure for 
 civil society organization that responds to their political needs. 
 
The political divisions that dominate the post-conflict reconstruction process in Jinotega have 
produced a political ‘barrier’ that penetrates throughout civil society in Jinotega to produce a 
                                                
15 The important role of producer and technical-services cooperatives among coffee and 
agricultural producers in Jinotega since the late 1990s is a key feature of post-conflict 
reconstruction that will be addressed fully in chapter six. 
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highly politicized political space for reconstruction.  In 2007, the national FSLN administration 
established the Councils for Citizen Participation (CPC) as an institutional alternative to the 
governance structure created under the Law on Citizen Participation.  For CPC supporters, this 
alternate space for citizen participation offers a neighborhood-based remedy to the elite-
dominated NGO and organized civil society interests more commonly represented in the CDD 
and CDM (Cuadra and Ruiz 2008; McKinley Jr. 2008).  To political critics, the CPC councils 
offer a direct institutional connection between the FLSN-dominated Nicaraguan state and 
community-based FSLN partisans designed to circumvent the neoliberal reconstruction model 
and the democratic space for civil society governance enacted through the Law on Citizen 
Participation.  The contentious relationship between CDD/CDM and CPC participants in 
Jinotega has fractured citizen participation in recent years into competing sets of political actors 
struggling to become the dominant civil society institution involved in municipal governance. A 
FSLN political party member explained:    
 The problem with the Municipal Development Committees is that they are elitist.  They 
 invite ‘you, you, you and you’ and they stop there.  The masses, the people who really 
 need development do not have access.  They are made up of the elite levels. ‘That guy, 
 that guy, that guy’, no?  They are representatives of organizations,  representatives of the 
 mayor’s office – do you see what I mean? They are representatives, but they are not the 
 people – [the people] were too far down, they did not exist.  The CDM was hegemonic, 
 there was no democracy. There was not true citizen participation. ... Representative 
 democracy is not the best model.  I can represent you, but ‘why are you representing me? 
 Why can’t I represent myself?’  Participatory democracy [is a better system] because I 
 participate in making decisions saying ‘look, friend, I want you to build a bridge.’ That is 
 what the gabinetes [CPC] do. 
 
 The complex connection between reconstruction sector dominance and entrenched 
political divisions has eroded a coherent political space for citizen participation that can be 
perceived as non-partisan and open to all members of the community.  From mutual 
recriminations between CDD/CDM and CPC supporters, a broader pattern has emerged where 
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political opponents refuse to cooperate, consult, or provide the (legally required) institutional and 
financial support to implement the reconstruction vision of providing a political space for 
heterogeneous citizen participation in the governance process.  Vladimiro, a senior CDM 
spokesperson, frequently recounted the mounting political tensions in the city, as during one 
2009 visit: 
 I can tell you that the relationship between political institutions and civil society 
 organizations is very precarious.  Precarious  in the sense that organized civil society, 
 whose only objective is coming together and working for municipal development, is 
 being truncated right now by the [FSLN] government. The  current government is 
 proclaiming the creation within the government structure of what they call the Councils 
 of Citizen Power.  For the government, there is no other organization exists aside from 
 that.  The whole world knows that they are organizations of the state and the party [the 
 FSLN].   ... The political system of the 1980s appears to be  repeating itself. Everything is 
 polarized and politicized by both parties.  ...  International cooperation is now afraid, to 
 put it that way, to continue supporting a government that does not meet its  requirements, 
 that is not walking hand-in-hand with democracy. So, organized civil society continues 
 struggling so that donor organizations still have confidence like before in Nicaragua. 
 
 Since my last research trip to Jinotega, the political tensions have intensified the divisions 
that undermine citizen participation through an organized civil society.  In late 2009, the FSLN-
controlled municipal government de-financed the CDD and CDM, effectively (and illegally, per 
Law 475-03) debilitating both institutions.  In 2010, the FSLN municipal council orchestrated a 
partisan 6-5 vote to exclude the Municipal Development Committee from the consultation 
process in favor of the Jinotega CPC (Rivera Méndez 2010).  By 2011, and as an example of the 
place-specific consequences of such politics, CDM official Vladimiro had left Nicaragua and his 
family to find alternate work in Costa Rica, citing a mix of political intimidation and financial 
destitution following the political attacks on the CDM in Jinotega.16    
 This deeply political status of civil society and citizen participation has reinforced the 
transnational governance power over the direction of post-conflict reconstruction in Jinotega.  
                                                
16 Personal communication with author, February 22, 2011. 
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The place-based reconstruction sector organizations increasingly have been left without 
organized civil society interlocutors capable of forging a coherent position within the post-
conflict capitalist political economy.  The result has been a sense of civil disempowerment and 
fatalism towards capitalism, democracy, and the reconstruction process.   FUNJIDES official 
Anna aptly noted that “people are reticent to get involved because they do not feel that anyone is 
listening. ... Organizations and groups are more involved in making demands.  But for 
individuals, for the general population, there is not much participation, because the perception is 
that their protests do not have any effect.”  The remaining civil society organizations generally 
are small interest groups or regional affiliates of Nicaraguan political networks who look to the 
reconstruction sector, given their own organizational lack of resources to mobilize the general 
population effectively (Serra Vázquez 2010).  As Movimiento Comunal Nicaragüense 
representative Rafael noted during our conversation in an abandoned conference room of the 
CDM headquarters, “What was all the effort for? What did you fight for? ... We have arrived at a 
moment of great discouragement (desanimo).”     
 Recent scholarship involving scholars at the Nicaraguan Network for Democracy and 
Local Development supports the argument that leading municipal governance institutions have 
become politicized in ways that undermine citizen participation (Howard and Serra Vasquez 
2011; Serra Vázquez 2010).  The research suggests that the both the Liberal CDD/CDM 
institutional structure and the FSLN CPC institutional structure are imperfect institutions that fail 
to adequately represent popular interests beyond the leadership of member NGOs, social 
movements, and neighborhood committees.  Moreover, the FSLN Nicaraguan government has 
been criticized for repeated cases where municipal CPC organizations have limited citizens’ 
access to national community development programs (e.g., Hambre Cero, Usura Cero) and 
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citizen rights (e.g. voter registration cards, commercial licenses) in favor of FSLN party 
members (Serra Vázquez 2010).  Equally, I encountered these concerns throughout my 
interviews, such as one meeting with former FSLN military veteran Roberto: 
 There is no more revolutionary consensus. And if I say that to our leaders, I am an enemy 
 of the government. ... [the CPC] have looked for me. Given my job, they all know me 
 and they are looking out for who is talking badly about the revolution and - they interfere 
 with you.  They tell me they are going to impose a tax because I sell this or that.  Maybe 
 we say we are going to solicit a health permit or something – they are going to get in your 
 way to pressure you. When the elections come, they already know how to find you. You 
 have to be very careful. There is no freedom of expression.    
  
 These post-conflict reconstruction stories spotlight the central feature of the 
reconstruction experience in Jinotega.  The transnational dominance over post-conflict 
reconstruction has both superceded and reinforced political divisions that undermine governance 
institutions and the ability to forge an endogenous, homegrown vision for post-conflict 
reconstruction from below.  The persistent political battles among FSLN and Liberal militants 
that have so dramatically defined the reconstruction process in Jinotega within the overarching 
post-war shadow of neoliberal regulation contain tragic ironies not lost on more reflective 
Jinoteganos I encountered.  Senior FSLN municipal government official Antonio poignantly 
concluded as I prepared to depart his house into a rain-soaked Jinotega evening:  
 Democracy is who knows where? ... Arnoldo Alemán made a big impression with his 
 government.  There were many schools and many roads. The people in the countryside 
 remember that. They wanted a new Arnoldo Alemán in power. On the other side are the 
 Daniel Ortega supporters. But if you  look in a community, [both groups] have the same 
 conditions. That is incredible. Over there is a PLC banner on a house that has no 
 electricity and is made of plastic. And next door is a Sandinista flag on a house with the 
 same conditions. They are neighbors.  
 
 
 
5.5  BUILDING NEOLIBERAL STRUCTURE IN BOACO 
 The week following the November 2008 municipal elections in Boaco has become the 
stuff of legend.  Boaqueño Liberal Constitutionalist Party (PLC) supporters tell stories of mass 
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demonstrations, crowds allegedly brandishing machetes, streets clogged outside polling stations, 
the Supreme Electoral Council regional offices, and the Municipal Hall to forestall election fraud 
and defend the PLC election victory for mayoral candidate Dr. Hugo Barquero17.  As one local 
Catholic priest recounted to me ten months later, “I have never seen anything like it in Boaco.” 
 My prior visit had suggested Boaco to be a rather bucolic, reserved place.  A gentle 
commotion of small stores, microfinance banks, NGOs, pharmacies, Internet cafes, pulperías, a 
labyrinthine central market, a tree-filled central square crossed by office professionals, informal 
sector produce vendors, and dusty cattle ranchers by day, Boaco went to bed with the sun on 
most evenings.  Fresh from Jinotega where the 2008 election fraud had been met with only a 
whimper of rocks and protests, I began to wonder what this unprecedented outburst told about 
the broader conditions of post-conflict reconstruction in Boaco.  The answer rests in the place-
based political-economic history of Conservative (and later Liberal) cattle production that has 
dominated the region for over a century.  While the Conservative party is largely defunct, we still 
may recognize a pervasive small-C conservatism in operation in Boaco that draws upon historic 
tropes of rural oligarchic privilege, patriarchal/clientelistic social relations between wealthy elite 
landowners and a large rural proletariat, and a cultural tradition in which the urban and rural elite 
have a strong historical memory of long being at the top of the political and economic pyramid.  
This hierarchical political-economic and cultural structure is manifest in the everyday spaces of 
reconstruction, elite political dominance, and precluded modes of resistance.  
                                                
17 One leading Nicaraguan daily newspaper regional correspondent assured me that ‘that were no 
machetes.’  True or not, the consistent narrative I encountered in Boaco speaks to the bravado 
that consumes PLC political supporters in Boaco.  The violent confrontations in 2008 were a 
scene that would be repeated in June 2010 under alternate circumstances (reported in the 
following pages).   
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 The broad contours of post-conflict political economy in Boaco closely mirror the 
neoliberal orientation witnessed in Jinotega and throughout Nicaragua. The penetration of 
transnational governance has positioned a dominant reconstruction sector to have powerful 
control over the production of a capitalist mode of regulation.  The general Nicaraguan pattern of 
FSLN-Liberal political tensions runs deep in Boaco, dividing societal institutions, political elites, 
and the general population.  Moreover, the limited civil society and citizen participation in Boaco 
struggles with partisan fragmentation and tense relations with political forces on the ground. 
 However, post-conflict reconstruction in Boaco has developed through a closer 
relationship between the transnational reconstruction sector and the place-based Liberal political 
forces than exists in Jinotega.  The deep-seated conservative political tradition in Boaco has 
carried through both the Contra war and the reconstruction period to reinforce the dominant 
neoliberal patterns of institutional reform and governance in Boaco.  This close relationship has 
helped override alternative reconstruction visions from the Left, deepening the entrenched 
political antagonisms between FSLN and Liberal militants among both elites and large portions 
of the general population.  The convergence of transnational forces and political tensions has left 
a very limited, albeit functioning, political space for civil society and citizen participation in 
municipal governance.  At the same time, the deepening Nicaraguan political tensions in recent 
years are eroding this political space in ways that are redirecting the reconstruction experience in 
Boaco more closely towards the political-economic pattern of transnational governance, 
fractured politics, and a disempowered civil society already seen in Jinotega.  
 Foremost, four reconstruction sector organizations dominate the post-war capitalist 
political economy in Boaco: The Boaco-headquartered José Nieborowski Foundation, the 
Spanish development NGO Ayuda en Acción (Help in Action, AEA), the Boaco-based 
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Association for Integrated Community Promotion and Development (ASPRODIC), and the 
Boaco-based Association for Municipal Development all established operations in 1993-1994 
(ADM formed in 2003).  In conjunction these organizations promote a wide-ranging program of 
microfinance lending, economic development, civil society promotion, and good governance.  
While Maria Luisa, a non-finance programs officer at the national Fundación José Nieborowski 
headquarters (in Boaco) may be self-serving in her view that “the internationally funded NGOs 
are the only non-partisan organizations that have advanced democratization and democratic 
practices in Boaco”, these powerful NGO and microfinance actors have achieved nearly 
hegemonic influence to set the ‘best practice’ conditions for how to advance political, economic, 
and social development during the reconstruction period. 
 The complexity of the Boaco reconstruction sector makes general assertions problematic.  
Notably, the four dominant organizations, by all accounts, have worked closely with both FSLN 
and PLC Boaco municipal governments, consultative institutions like the Departmental 
Development Council (CODEBO) and the Municipal Development Committee (CDM), and 
other municipal leaders to construct a shared political program for reconstructing Boaco society.  
I observed this cooperation first-hand during a participatory budgeting forum I attended at the 
invitation of the City Manager.  During this two-hour forum, the major reconstruction 
organizations joined a host of municipal officials, political party representatives, and civil society 
actors to discuss the annual municipal budget allocation process, assessing priorities and 
possibilities for cooperation, and coordinating a radio campaign and on-site visit schedule to hold 
budget consultations in smaller communities of the Boaco municipality. 
 However, transnational connections give the dominant reconstruction sector 
organizations unparalleled influence over the political, economic, and social programs and 
 138 
practices initiated by this broader governance community operating in Boaco.  The financial and 
material contributions that these organizations provide (e.g., the iconic blue-and-yellow José 
Nieborowski Foundation colors are visible throughout Boaco) grant the reconstruction sector 
organizations a privileged position to advance their particular ideological perspectives for 
reconstructing Boaco society.  
 The José Nieborowski Foundation provides a key example.  For the Foundation, its 
hybrid role as microfinance institution and non-financial development NGO has been guided by 
a neoliberal logic of market-based development assistance and commercial viability as the 
principal metric for the allocation of its financial and material resources to beneficiaries. The 
Foundation consistently has received transnational donor support as they maintain a patriarchal 
control over reconstruction programs administered on behalf of the Boaco population.  Non-
Financial Programs Officer Maria Luisa readily produced for me notebooks of annual accounting 
reports and program details to highlight the Foundation commitment to international ‘best 
practice’ financial reporting standards, noting:   
 In the beginning, the people needed everything and every project was welcomed, as they 
 say -- (la gente necesitaba de todo y todo projecto ¡que gaba!).  Also, many projects 
 brought money to the people.  So the more a project brought money to the people, the 
 more they welcomed it.  But later we decided that those kinds of projects were not 
 sustainable – projects that paid out money, welfare, nothing more – so we began to 
 devalue that strategy and shifted to look for new programs through consultations with 
 regional leaders asking what projects were needed and looking at the plans that the 
 [Departmental Development Council] developed for the entire department and 
 municipalities, identifying common needs, specific needs for the regions. ... The 
 Foundation always tries to respond to concrete problems. We do not want to invent what 
 we want.  We try to talk with the people, although it is at times difficult to meet other 
 peoples’ schedules, their perspectives when suddenly they say ‘no’ to what we want. 
 
In a similar vein, the Association for Municipal Development has pursued an independent 
strategy for its civil society and citizen participation capacity-building programs in urban and 
rural Boaco districts. As ADM representative Julia noted of her organization:  
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 We are not representatives of anyone. We are not the voice, nor the throat of the people, 
 and we do not pretend to be that. It would be disrespectful to represent ourselves that way 
 to the people if that is not ADM’s role. Our role is to provide the capacity for the people 
 to manage and take care of things themselves. ... The other NGOs or institutions see us 
 [as not in touch with the people] because we are not an organization that gives things out. 
 We do not give anyone gifts. We do not like the idea of handouts [asistencialismo], nor 
 are we an institution that gives credit to people.  We want to be friends with the people. ... 
 The world knows what our philosophy is. We do not give a man a fish, we teach a 
 man to fish.” 
 
 The predominant narratives among these reconstruction sector informants reflect the 
deep-seated conservative, hierarchical regime of subjection that has dominated Boaco 
historically.  It is a regime that constructs conservative, liberal, and now ‘neo-liberal’ political 
subjects who are committed to the core idea that people are responsible for their own success.  In 
contrast, I observed in Boaco a broad-based and at times quite robust hostility to alternate forms 
of cooperation and assistance perceived as being aligned with the ideological left.  Informants 
were very quick to condemn different organization as being ‘Sandinista’ because of particular 
social policies or issue advocacy in which the organization may be involved (even when follow-
up questions to the accused organizations usually revealed a robust mixture of FSLN, Liberal, 
and Conservative political militants).   
  For example, the dominant transnational governance position over the reconstruction 
sector has provided only limited political space for reconstruction organizations like ASPRODIC 
and Ayuda en Acción to develop alternative programs and practices responsive to community-
based social development needs.  For example, ASPRODIC operates exclusively with non-
refundable international donor support (e.g., grants, in-kind repayment options) to promote 
micro-assistance programs for potable water provision, community health clinics, sustainable 
agriculture training, and gender-based cooperatives development in mutual consultation with 
impoverished rural communities.  As Dolores, one ASPRODIC director, explained, “We try to 
not invent another organization. Rather, we work with the existing leadership in the community, 
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the committees, the people who are leaders in the community, be it teachers, or minister, or a 
leading producer working at a basic level to organize and support the community.”   
 The main reconstruction sector organizations, despite different strategies, remain firmly 
bound into the transnational governance framework that has reoriented the Boaco political 
economy during the reconstruction period.  The general lack of coordination, cooperation, or 
even mutual understanding that I encountered among the principal reconstruction sector 
organizations suggests that the transnational connections between international donors and place-
based actors are more influential over the course of reconstruction in Boaco than are the 
horizontal ties between organizations on the ground.  Moreover, the concentration of donor 
support among so few place-based organizations has had a limiting effect on the production of 
alternative models to the dominant capitalist mode of post-conflict regulation. Simply put, the 
disciplining power of neoliberal capitalist democracy had become, for most of my interviewees, 
the only game in town.  Dolores (of ASPRODIC) echoed a common refrain in all my interviews 
about the paramount need for market-based cooperation over political divisions: 
 We formed with a perspective towards the individual and to form part of this society, that 
 we could be a  group that contributes to the social and economic development of the 
 locality.  That is what we try to accomplish – to contribute with our knowledge, with our 
 financial support, and to influence the centers of power.  [We want] to have relationships 
 with all of the local, national, and international organizations. We have tried to learn to 
 move within this political space, because we no longer work for the state [laughs].  We 
 are an  organization, and we have tried – although with the origins of all the people here, 
 they brand us as Sandinistas – but we have tried to work with all governments, all 
 organizations ... the same with the general population, we help in the communities. We 
 work with everyone, whatever politics they have. We have had very good relations 
 with people that were in the Contra, people dismissed from the military, Catholics, 
 evangelicals, we work with the whole world. 
 
The principal hurdle that the reconstruction sector encounters is the widespread 
perception that the dominant microfinance institutions (e.g., José Nieborowski Foundation) and 
development NGOs (e.g., ASPRODIC) are politically allied with Liberal and FSLN political 
 141 
forces, respectively.  While sector representatives freely professed personal political preferences, 
the documented, robust cooperation with both FSLN and Liberal municipal governments 
suggests that these organizations maintain institutional non-partisanship at odds with public 
perception.  As Ayuda en Acción director Maripaz told me with notable exasperation: 
 We have nothing to do with politics – not with the Sandinistas, not with the Liberals.  In 
 the prior elections, the Sandinistas won the mayor’s race.  In the most recent election, a 
 Liberal won.  Even so, whether it is a Sandinista or a Liberal, we always support them, 
 independently of who controls the government. We do not have anything to do with 
 politics.  Yes, the people say that.  Your commentary is correct.  But, really no – look at 
 the state institutions. In any state institution, you find the red-and-black flag.  Here we do 
 not have any kind of flag.  As you can see, the Nicaraguan flag.  But no type of political 
 party flag. We do not have anything of the Sandinistas, nothing of the Liberals. 
 
The reconstruction sector position within the post-war political economy in Boaco comes from 
its transnational connections, but that influence is realized through the principal organizations’ 
relationship with the state apparatus and political forces operating in Boaco.  In large measure, 
reconstruction sector organizations’ patriarchal control over financial and material resources is 
reinforced by the concentration of that power among a small number of Boaco-based NGOs 
(e.g., the José Nieborowski Foundation) who act as ‘gatekeepers’ over the reconstruction 
process.  In this respect, Boaco and Jinotega have similar patterns of reconstruction sector 
dominance, albeit in Boaco that influence is exercised more readily through cooperation with 
local political forces.  
 Despite the close reconstruction sector relationship with Liberal political forces, I 
encountered resistance to reconstruction sector organizations’ economic and social development 
programs among parts of the general population.  The political left commonly decried NGOs and 
microfinance lenders for advancing an unrepresentative, neoliberal policy agenda.  The political 
right decried social development programs as unwarranted, Sandinista-leaning ‘non-state’ 
welfare.  This common political rh
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advancing neoliberal regulation continues to be tempered by the entrenched political divisions 
that percolate beneath the surface of  Boaco society.  These political divisions play an important 
role in shaping the contingent form of post-conflict neoliberal political economy that has 
developed in Boaco.  
 
5.6  DEMOCRATS, SOCIALISTS, AND MEMORY: POLITICAL RELATIONS IN 
BOACO  
  
The longstanding conservative traditions that continue to inform Boaco political-economic and 
social life also help to organize political life and influence the political tensions that sporadically 
rise to the surface.  In chapter one, I detailed the patriarchal social order that dominated the 
ancien regime of traditional Conservative elites, while suggesting that echoes of that old older 
persist among the cattle farms and stratified social structure in Boaco.  One Catholic priest I met 
described the dominant Boaco political culture as an historic divide between ‘ranchers and 
bureaucrats.’  This fundamental socio-spatial identity it what drives Boaco politics during the 
reconstruction period, when the traditional labels have been superimposed by a more recent 
construction of ‘democrats and Sandinistas’ as the principal division and fault-line in Boaco 
society.  Quite distinct from my experiences of post-partisan resignation and cooperation among 
the masses in Jinotega, my informants in Boaco painted a picture of continued political hostility 
‘on people’s shirt sleeves’ and a much more evident conservative cultural milieu.  From frequent 
apologists for the authoritarian Somoza regime(s) (1936-1979), to one Boaco Cattlemen’s 
Association official who described corrupt Nicaraguan President Arnoldo Alemán as “the best 
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president Nicaragua has ever had”, I encountered deeply held political commitments not 
tempered by three decades of war and reconstruction.18   
 In War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning, Chris Hedges (2002, 38) writes “The myth of 
war rarely endures for those who experience combat.” For Boaco, post-conflict reconstruction 
has done little to temper the class-based political divisions that defined the Contra conflict.  
Unlike neighboring municipalities (e.g., Camoapa, San José de los Remates), Boaco escaped 
direct combat operations during the war. While returning military and Contra soldiers provided a 
direct connection to the war, most Boaco residents’ Contra war experience came at a political 
distance.  Both military and Contra forces confiscated livestock and produce during frequent 
passage through Boaco.  Neighborhoods, families, and friendships collapsed as Sandinista 
Peoples’ Army conscription under the 1983 Law on Patriotic Military Service and the Contra 
rebellion pulled young men to the northern and southern fronts.  Families were shattered by 
ideology, injury, and death.  But war remained at arm’s length for most Boaqueños.  Raquel, a 
Boaco office director for the FSLN-affiliated Luisa Amanda  
Espinosa Association of Nicaraguan Women, offered a cogent perspective on this condition: 
 Look, like in all of Nicaragua, fissures remained.  Wounds remained because people died 
 from one side or another.  I am talking about people that were Sandinista or in the army 
 because of the  patriotic military service [the 1983-1990 mandatory military service law].  
 Yes, the people remained resentful … the people here do not understand that there is 
 military service in all  countries.  Here, the people say ‘they took my son by force’, but in 
 all countries, even in yours, there is military service.  … Here, they took boys without 
 experience to the war, because we were in the middle of a war being initiated from 
 military bases in Honduras into Nicaragua.  Everyone became jaded because a soldier 
 would be killed in that war and it created resentment that at times has impeded our 
 progress.  The fissures remain, the enmities remain, the quarrels remain because 
 someone wants vengeance on another, and they do not understand the truth.  Many 
 mothers are like that because their sons were killed and they remained resentful of the 
                                                
18 Transparency International in 2004 named former President Alemán among the ten most 
corrupt world leaders after his 2003 conviction for corruption, money laundering, and 
embezzlement of US$100 million in state funds (Transparency International 2004).  
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 war. … It seems that people forgive, but they do not forget.  I think that there is no 
 amnesty from a mother if they took your son for military service and they got him 
 killed.  That mother is not going to forget until she dies, right?    
 
The former military and Contra combatants I encountered came closest to matching the 
more measured political views I encountered among Contra war veterans throughout my prior 
research in Jinotega.  As cattle rancher and coordinator with the Boaco Association of Contra 
Military Veterans Luis sporadically commented, “there is no good war.  War is very hard. ... 
People only resort to war as an alternative when they do not want what is happening here in 
Nicaragua. ... It is not good. ... As long as there are free elections, like we have now, there will 
not be more war.”  For Luis and other former Contra veterans I met, however, the hostility 
towards the thought of renewed war has not translated into political moderation towards the 
FSLN.  As Luis added:   
 Political sentiments in Boaco are stronger? Yes. I think that the department of Boaco 
 (I am talking about Boaco, Camoapa, Santa Lucia, Teustepe, various municipalities) is 
 a fairly right-wing, Liberal place.  Most of the people do not support the Frente 
 Sandinista.  I never see [widespread FSLN support].  It has always been that way in 
 Boaco.  I see that as a good thing.  We lived through the Frente times and we were beat 
 up economically and we could never surrender our [halts sentence] ... for example, the 
 mayor’s office when the Frente won it.  [Boaqueños] always work so that the Frente does 
 not win. ... I think there are lots of people here who had to go to war.  So, those people 
 are all against [the Frente]. 
 
 Indeed, post-conflict reconstruction in Boaco has become conflated with a dominant 
political narrative that depicts reconstruction as a battle between democracy and authoritarian 
FLSN rule.  The frequent self-description among Liberal militants as ‘democrats’ (demócratas) 
leaves scarce middle ground for political compromise with rival Sandinista militants, as both 
PLC and FSLN forces struggle to control political and civil institutions in Boaco.  The depth of 
the political antagonisms that have gripped many Boaqueños became clear during one three-hour 
meeting with the elderly Abelardo and Esperanza, an elite Boaco married couple.  From the 
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breeze-filled comforts of their dimly lit living room, Esperanza leaned forward, jabbed her 
thumb towards my chest, and declared, “I am not a Liberal. I am a democrat!”  The couple wove 
a political narrative that positioned Boaco residents as the conservative defenders of democracy 
against the FSLN, the revolution, and the resurgent political left.  The persistent and deep 
political hatred of the FSLN came through in their emotional depictions of 1980s revolutionary 
deprivations – the food rationing cards that gave you rotten beans and moldy rice, state security 
harassment in the streets – and their views on the reconstruction period.  
 [When the war ended], there was a tremendous optimism.  Nevertheless, with the Liberal 
 leaders [in the immediate post-war period] I felt like that had thrown a bucket of water on 
 me on one occasion.  They told me ‘he who wins, does not win everything; and he who 
 loses, does not lose everything’. That is, give some political space to the Sandinistas so 
 that they remain calm. They wanted to impose their political [compromise].  However, at 
 least here in the region that we called Boaco – Chontales, the people and the local 
 authorities rejected it  tremendously – No, No and No! Democracy and the democratic 
 process won here and we do not want any Sandinistas!  The Sandinistas began to rise up 
 and even killed people during the first five years. In response, there was a movement by 
 the people and the mayors that we called Salvemos Democracia! [We Will Save 
 Democracy!]. 
 
 The overwhelmingly conservative political-economic history and the contemporary near-
hegemonic control that the conservative narratives about Boaco hold among much of the 
population have left relatively little political space for the articulation of an alternative, FSLN-
centered political narrative about life in Boaco.  Nevertheless, FSLN militants have attempted 
within the highly circumscribed space available to them to counter the dominant conservative 
and Liberal discourse that attempts to erase the FSLN and the poor underclass from the 
collective Boaco consciousness.  The FSLN political headquarters, prominent FSLN-affiliated 
mass organizations like AMNLAE and the National Union of Farmers and Ranchers (UNAG), 
and the FSLN representation on the municipal council have provided limited space for the FSLN 
to break into Boaco political life.  However, the loss of state support since 1990 and the liberal 
Boaco mistrust of such leftist organizations have debilitated most of these organizations in 
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Boaco.  The FSLN militant and Boaco librarian Rosario reflected the common sense of anger, 
despair, and defiance that I encountered among FSLN political forces in Boaco.  Rosario was 
quick to forcefully count FLSN achievements in Boaco, from water treatment plants, paved 
streets, free education, free health care, rural electrification, and the library, before tearing into 
Liberal political militants in the region:  
 There was no war [in Boaco] – we did not suffer the consequences.  Even when the 
 Frente entered Boaco on July 17 [1979] they just came in and there was no combat.  
 Perhaps there was a skirmish or some small confrontation, but near Camoapa, those 
 places.  But there was no war [here].  The majority of the people are ranchers. The 
 ranchers have gone to their employees and they tell them, ‘if you vote in support of a 
 party contrary to mine, you will be cut off. I am going to leave you without work and 
 with no way to support your family.’ So, there has been a subtle pressure, camouflaged, 
 against people’s liberty. .... There is no consciousness [in Boaco] of the suffering that 
 comes with war, the effect produced by setbacks, deaths, and pain.  And the people [of 
 Boaco] see scandal everywhere. They do not have a collective vision of improvements 
 for the  whole  community.  
 
 From a small segment of the Boaco population, I encountered a discontent with the 
national and municipal concentration of power between the FSLN and PLC (the ‘dirty pact’).  
For these dissident left-leaning and right-leaning Boaco policymakers and residents, the old 
FSLN and Liberal/democrat political allegiances have yielded to a ‘democracy vs. 
authoritarianism’ discourse that bridges the traditional class-based political identities (Figure 
5.3).  The protection of capitalist-democratic institutions, governance, and citizen participation 
for both the left and right has become the paramount concern.  As an example, the Liberal Hugo 
Barquero municipal government administration (2008-2010), increasingly allied with the 
dissident national liberal political figure Eduardo Montealegre, actively supported multiple 
avenues for citizen participation during its brief tenure.  The administration prohibited the 
display in the municipal building of all manner of PLC political party flags or posters, 
propaganda art, or anti-FSLN material.  The municipal hall became an intentional non-partisan 
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political space for the Liberal administration, the FSLN-dominated municipal council, and 
several civil society organizations including the reconstituted Municipal Development 
Committee and Departmental Development Council.  As senior PLC municipal government 
official Armando explained to me:  
 We are wholly committed to the idea that we have to work with everyone without 
 political distinction. For that reason we have no – we have nothing, nothing, nothing with 
 our own party  symbols – there is nothing here in city hall except [the flags] of Nicaragua 
 and the municipality.   Here we say that when the mayor and everyone came here, we 
 came to work for the municipality.   Not for a political party.  And one more thing: we 
 have helped the Sandinistas even more than we have our own Democrats.  We have 
 helped the other party more than the ‘democrats’.  Because they demand it – give me, 
 give me, give me. That is, we do not sit around trying to guess if you are Sandinista or 
 Liberal because it does not matter.  If you need help, whoever you are, if we can do so,  
 we will help you. 
 
Political events in the past year suggest that the modest efforts to change the course of post-
conflict reconstruction face powerfully entrenched political forces on both the left and right 
interested in maintaining the current post-war political economy without change.  In June 2010, 
the Boaco streets once again filled with riot police, tear gas, and violent political demonstrations 
after FSLN municipal council members (and a lone PLC member) voted to remove the Barquero 
administration for alleged failure to complete Council duties and misuse of funds (Martínez 
2010).  The fear that Barquero and other Nicaraguan mayors were removed to purge political 
supporters for the dissident Vamos con Eduardo and Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) 
political organizations has prompted official government investigations and civil unrest.  As 
former FLSN militant, Contra war veteran, and (I suspect) Sandinista Renovation Movement 
supporter Ramón warned me one evening from his living room: 
 The Left now is just like the Right.  They both desire to control from above.  The 
 Sandinistas with Daniel Ortega. The Liberals with Arnoldo Alemán. What happened? ... 
 Political power is divided.  No one has made all the decisions for the country unilaterally.  
 Rather, they have been arranged between them. We cannot say there is a Left and a 
 Right. The Left for me no longer exists.  That’s my personal opinion.  They are all 
 148 
 capitalists. ... What they want it to stay in power and each time become richer. Both sides.  
 It is going to come to a head in the next few years.  In the next few  years, this 
 government [FSLN-Ortega] is going to make its pact in blood [En los próximos años, va 
 a ir pactando sangre este gobierno].    
   
 The longstanding FSLN and PLC political rivalries that have continued from the Contra 
war and throughout two decades of reconstruction have only intensified since Daniel Ortega and 
the FSLN returned to power nationally.   
 
 
Figure 5.3. Movement for Sandinista Renewal (MRS) Headquarters in Boaco. Text on sign 
reads 'I was born under a dictatorship. I do not want to die under one' (photo by author) 
 
 
 How the concentration of political power among increasingly undemocratic and 
antagonistic PLC and FSLN militants may affect the heretofore close relationship between 
reconstruction sector organizations and political forces that has guided neoliberal regulation in 
Boaco remains to be seen.  The recent post-conflict history of civil society development suggests 
that the limited political space for citizen participation is rapidly eroding under political 
pressures that have the effect of transferring even greater authority onto the transnational 
governance forces that have shaped the reconstruction period in Boaco.  
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5.7  NEOLIBERAL GOVERNANCE AND NGO DOMINANCE IN BOACO 
 As noted in chapter three, the rise of democratic civil society and citizen participation has 
been a key feature of capitalist-democratic transitions in Latin America (Shefner 2008).  
Borrowing from the recent cultural political economy literature (Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008), 
post-conflict reconstruction represents a transformative political moment where the meanings 
and practice of citizen participation are open to contestation and redefinition.  The mutual 
relationship between political-economic governance relations, societal institutions, and the 
micro-practices of daily life provides the framework for reconstruction to build the new forms of 
political thought, practice, and social connection that collectively constitute the post-conflict 
reconstruction experience on the ground (Sparke 2006).  In this manner, institution-building 
becomes a key technology of rule for conditioning social behavior and social relations towards 
the production of a neoliberal mode of capitalist regulation (Foucault 1991).  
 Boaco elites often demonstrated considerable pride in their efforts to construct 
institutional space for citizen participation during the post-conflict reconstruction period. Long 
before the 2003 Law on Citizen Participation (No. 475-03) created a formal institutional 
framework nationwide, Boaco citizens formed a prototype Municipal Development Committee 
in the limited political space provided under the 1988 Nicaraguan Municipalities Law (Law No. 
40-88; revised in 1997, No. 52-97; revised in 2000, No. 34-00 and No. 48-00).  However, how 
such institutional developments operated on the ground tells us much about the nature of post-
war civil society development.    
 The realities of citizen participation and civil society development do not quite match the 
elite rhetoric, however.  The transnational reconstruction networks that have guided the post-war 
development of civil society have positioned a small set of well-financed reconstruction sector 
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NGOs as dominant, market-centered representatives for channeling the interests of the general 
population – a clientelistic pattern seen in other parts of Latin America (Shefner 2008). The rise 
of professional NGO actors acting as civil society has reinforced the transnational governance 
connections among international donors, Nicaraguan and municipal state actors, Liberal political 
forces, and non-state actors that have advanced neoliberal regulation.   
 This liberal conception of civil society has not been received well for many Boaco 
residents on the political left, who argue that NGO domination over civil society has failed to 
produce a forum for expressing the needs and interests of the general population. José, a senior 
official at the state-funded Institute for Rural Development, commented:  
 Yes, civil society organizations operate in this territory  – they call themselves civil 
 society. ... The problem is that [the organizations] are not representative. So, if I establish 
 an NGO, and it is how I make a living, I will have to pay an administrator – maybe 
 family or a friend of mine. The secretary is a friend or family from the same political 
 party.  As the director, I have to pay myself.  That is what the NGOs do.  So, what they 
 invest in administration is more than they invest in poverty, as such. It seems that this 
 overwhelms NGOs.  It overwhelms them, because it is a way of life.  It is a modo vivendi.  
 For those large organizations, for example Ayuda en Acción from Spain, they bring their 
 formal organization with them and attend to the whole world, alone.  For example, take 
 the José Nieborowski Foundation. ... [It spends] $2,000-$3,000 for each monthly meeting 
 it holds, because they have branches now in Jinotega, Matagalpa, Managua, Boaco and 
 many places.  But the cost is that they have taken poor people’s houses, farms away from 
 many farmers.  They take things because interest is not being paid.  Because if they take a 
 television from someone who cannot pay for it, they take the television and other things, 
 and that is not just [emphasis added]. 
  
 The distinct Liberal and FSLN definitions of what democracy means are a key factor 
here.  Constitutional and participatory models of democracy contain stark differences about who 
constitutes civil society and what constitutes the proper institutional framework for citizen 
participation.  In recent years, these tensions have begun to tear apart the longstanding 
institutional space for citizen participation that developed early in the reconstruction period in 
Boaco.  The impermanence of a stable institutional framework for civil society underscores the 
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challenge of building a robust forum for broad-based citizen participation.  From 2005-2011, 
CODEBO and the CDM have struggled under intense political pressures to maintain 
membership, financial resources, and political access to the governance process (Figure 5.4).   
 
 
Figure 5.4. Municipal Development Committee (CDM) office in Boaco, August 2008.  From 
November 2008-June 2010, the CDM had offices in the Municipal Hall (photo by author) 
 
 The national FSLN resurgence that began in the mid-2000s has placed particular strain on 
both institutions.  The local FSLN administration and council majority under Mayor Vivian 
Orozco (2004-2008), the PLC administration and FSLN council under Mayor Hugo Barquero 
(2008-2010), and the June 2010 forced removal of the PLC mayor by the majority FSLN 
municipal council (and a lone PLC council member) have resulted in a deep politicization of 
CODEBO and the CDM.  The 2007 formation of Councils of Citizen Power by the FSLN has 
deepened the divisions further, as FSLN-leaning civil society members shift political support 
from CODEBO and the CDM to the neighborhood-based CPC governance framework.  As CDM 
spokeswoman Aurelia explained:  
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 In the year 2005, with the beginning of a new [municipal] government with a different 
 political leaning [FSLN mayor Vivian Orozco], the CDM hit an impasse throughout the 
 process, throughout the entire period.  In terms of bringing together the same people in 
 the CDM within the structure that the new local government assumed in this period, what 
 remained for us in the period was very little. [The city council] created a process to 
 include residents’ associations, neighborhood committees, rural district committees.  And 
 the people conformed to this period from 2004-2008.  ... It had an impact within the space 
 for citizen participation. Many civil organizations conformed to the municipal direction.  
 Many said “No!” and left. They did not get together, they did not invite each other ... 
 However, the CDM participated whenever it was convenient for the government. [The 
 government] approved the CDM, they convened the CDM, they advised the CDM – there 
 was no independent dynamic from the CDM.  They said to the organizations ‘we are 
 going to convene this, do this, do that.’  But they did take [the CDM] into account. The 
 CDM always had activities, but activity with only some organizations.  We were not a 
 pluralistic CDM like we had been in 2000. 
   
 The political penetration of the dominant civil society institutions has produced palpable 
frustration for many Liberal, FSLN, and non-partisan civil society activists who find themselves 
excluded from the governance process with every political transition in power.  Most recently in 
March 2011, Aurelia, the CDM spokeswoman, spoke to me despairingly of how the CDM had 
once again been excluded and ignored by the FSLN municipal council in conjunction with the 
recently installed PLC mayor and PLC municipal council members following the forced removal 
of dissident Liberal mayor Hugo Barquero.19  In similar form, senior CODEBO spokesperson 
Betilde complained bitterly during a 2009 meeting that she could not marshal participation from 
among the six municipal CDM representatives of Boaco department for a joint development 
planning session because CODEBO was “not able to provide food, lodging, or transportation 
costs” (Boaco department is roughly the size of Rhode Island).  I asked Betilde what she 
envisioned for CODEBO in five years.  She resignedly replied, ‘They do not pay me to dream.’ 
 I believe we may explain the general lack of interest in mass citizen participation and the 
poor state of organized civil society development in Boaco, at least in part, as a legacy of the 
                                                
19 Personal communication with author, March 25, 2011. 
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conservative historical foundations of Boaco society.  The top-down clientelism and 
subordination to top-down, centralized authority that have been key features of the Boaco 
political economy for centuries have contributed to the current patterns of individualism and 
autonomy that compel Boaqueños to describe themselves as ‘arrogant’ and not centered on social 
needs and activism.     
 The are grassroots civil society organizations that operate within (or outside of) formal 
institutions like CODEBO, the CDM, and the CPC including both regional affiliates of 
Nicaraguan organizations and Boaco-based grassroots women’s rights and civil rights 
organizations, youth organizations, handicapped women’s associations, senior citizen 
associations, and more.20  For both national-affiliated and local organizations, membership tends 
to be limited to a small core groups of 1-5 members often contend with what one organization 
representative called a “plague of individualism and a lack of interest in grassroots participation” 
as they attempt to maintain interest among larger numbers of potential participants who rarely 
take an active role in their respective civil society organizations.  
 The small set of volunteer-based grassroots civil society organizations struggle to 
navigate professional NGO dominance and the entrenched political divisions in Boaco.   These 
organizations increasingly have found themselves eclipsed by the conjunction of transnational 
governance forces and political forces that often preclude their meaningful ability to participate 
in post-conflict governance. As Jacinta, a local member of the Nicaraguan Human Rights Center 
(CENIDH), pointedly commented to me, “Political partisanship ruins everything. When 
                                                
20 A sample of the national and local civil society organizations operating in Boaco include: the 
Nicaraguan Center for Human Rights (CENIDH), the Nicaraguan Network for Democracy and 
Local Development, the Autonomous Nicaraguan Women’s Movement, the ‘Maria Luisa 
Espinoza’ Nicaraguan Women’s Association (AMNLAE), the Boaco Women’s Foundation 
(FUNDEMUBO), the Boaco Association of Handicapped Women, and The League of Water 
Rights Defenders. 
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partisanship gets involved, it is like a plague passing through, and it leaves the landscape without 
grass, without anything. ... We are not a poor country. We have impoverished ourselves.” 
 Collectively, the grassroots civil society capacity to mobilize financial and human 
resources has become dependent upon the ability to translate social-democratic development 
programs (i.e., enhancing citizenship rights or women, the disabled, the impoverished) into 
economically and politically palatable language of building market-viable communities and 
human subjects.  As Alicia, a spokeswoman for the six-member Boaco Women’s Foundation 
(FUNDEMUBO), commented, “In Nicaragua, the whole world indirectly, even if they do not 
know much about politics, has to get involved in it. If you do not, you cannot work.  Everything 
is under the influence.”  Notably, FUNDEMUBO does not participate in either CODEBO or the 
CDM.  As FUNDEMUBO co-founder Paula explained, “we do not want any other kind of 
[political] problems. ... Nobody wants to support us. I do not mean ‘nobody’, but no NGOs or 
anything.  This is only through our own efforts. That makes it very hard. We are at the point of 
closing down frequently.” 
 These stories of citizen participation reflect the place-specific political-economic patterns 
that connect transnational actors, state and sub-state political actors, private sector actors, and 
non-state actors on the ground in Boaco.  The frequent expressions of disempowerment and 
resignation suggest that reconstruction has reinforced a top-down governance pattern that has 
failed to establish adequate political space for citizen participation and civil society development.  
My interviews uncovered frequent accounts of partisan political divisions, apparently not 
dampened by their Contra war experience, intruding into the spaces of everyday life, from small 
cafe owner Mónica (who refused to be recorded) who complained about her mother being denied 
access to the Nicaraguan government Hambre Cero (Zero Hunger) rural nutrition program 
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because of political hostilities within one local CPC president (Loáisiga López 2007), to small 
retail store proprietor Julia, who commented that “the Frente – the CPC – have penetrated into 
the government institutions, the hospital, the INSS [Nicaraguan Social Security Institute]. It is 
becoming pretty bad.  You go to some of these places, they actually ask for your FSLN card or 
they will not serve you. There are stores here in Boaco where you cannot go.” 
 The contingent reconstruction experience in Boaco has involved a complex combination 
of transnational governance and political division that has limited citizen participation.  The 
long-term capacity for reconstruction in Boaco to supercede the root causes of conflict grounded 
in non-representative institutions, political division, and weakly developed civil society remains 
to be seen.  As Boaco librarian Rosario bitterly complained, “in Boaco, all we do is criticize and 
destroy, we see the bad in everything.  And if you go asking for something, it is because you 
want to take advantage of people, it is because you want this or that, because you want to rob 
everyone.”  Similarly, a Boaco-based national newspaper correspondent suggested to me during 
a 2009 meeting that post-conflict reconstruction had failed to mollify the pervasive political 
divisions that grip the general population in Boaco because “People think that pressure and 
violence is the only way. ... [It is] the effect of the war, more than anything. There are things that 
have been lost, our values.  Honor. Things you could see before. ... People think that they can 
only solve their problems with sticks and stones.”  
 
5.8  CONCLUDING REMARKS: DOES PLACE MATTER FOR NEOLIBERAL 
 RECONSTRUCTION? 
 
 The stories of post-conflict reconstruction from Jinotega and Boaco reveal the 
overarching transnational pressures that have reorganized the Nicaraguan political economy 
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grounded reconstruction conditions in Jinotega and Boaco throughout the past two decades 
challenge us to examine not only the similitudes, but also the differences in what reconstruction 
has meant, how it has been practiced, and the institutional forms adopted in each place.  In 
Jinotega, a diffuse NGO and microfinance community has promoted a broadly neoliberal 
discourse that connects the reconstruction sector directly to the general population with little 
collaboration from the fractured political elites or the barely existent civil society.  In Boaco, this 
reconstruction sector has been required to operate alongside the entrenched political forces that 
continue to polarize the reconstruction process.  In both cases, political divisions – among elites 
in Jinotega, more widespread in Boaco – have increasingly fragmented the institutions and 
organizations of civil society and citizen participation, further deepening the transnational 
governance influence over political-economic reconstruction.   
 In the following chapter, I recast the discussion from a focus on transnational governance 
forces and the political contests over the reconstruction of neoliberal political economy, towards 
a focus on the grounded production of political economy in Jinotega and Boaco as a central 
feature of neoliberal regulation.  A key lesson learned from spending time in both localities is 
that Nicaraguan reconstruction has taken multiple forms that simultaneously reflect orthodox 
neoliberal thought and a variety of place-specific political, economic, and social interpretations 
of what reconstruction – and indeed neoliberalism – can and should mean in practice. Moreover, 
the reconstruction process in different places is always in a state of becoming through the 
recursive relationship that unfolds between structural forces and the grounded actors who 
perform reconstruction in daily life.  These grounded reconstruction ‘outcomes’ reflect the 
historical experiences of war alluded to above, as well as the distinct historical economic 
conditions, social relations, and political divisions that have made each place what it is today. 
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The neoliberal vision for post-conflict reconstruction is built as much ‘from within’ as it is 
imposed from outside of the post-war society.   
 158 
CHAPTER 6 
 
RECONSTRUCTING CONTINGENT POLITICAL ECONOMIES FROM BELOW IN 
JINOTEGA AND BOACO 
 
 
 
6.1  PERFORMING RECONSTRUCTION IN PLACE   
 The previous chapter recounted how Nicaraguan post-conflict reconstruction remains 
‘unfinished business’ after twenty years.  Reconstruction of the Nicaraguan political economy 
has advanced a bundle of neoliberal, market-centered reforms intended to foster economic, 
political, and social development throughout Nicaragua.  Transnational governance has taken 
hold and played a key role in advancing a range of neoliberal institutions, practices, and relations 
both nationally, regionally, and locally.  The guiding influence that these ‘reconstruction sector’ 
actors maintain through their financial, political, and intellectual capital cannot be denied in 
either Jinotega or Boaco.  Moreover, the reconstruction of a transnational, neoliberal political 
economy has progressed recursively with the development of  domestic political organizations 
and a disorganized, disenfranchised, and restive general population held captive to the 
contentious post-conflict political conditions of recent years.   
  However, post-conflict reconstruction goes beyond the set of neoliberal political-
economic institutions, governance reforms, and development programs that have defined 
reconstruction in Jinotega and Boaco.  Reconstruction has extended neoliberal market rationality 
into the daily practices and political subjectivities that constitute reconstruction from below. The 
overarching neoliberal political-economic structure examined in Chapter 5 places limits upon, 
but also is responsive to, the daily, calculative practices through which grounded political actors 
perform and become neoliberal subjects in contingent, place-specific manners (Sparke 2006). 
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 We can return to a culturally informed political economy perspective to better grasp how 
political subjects in Jinotega and Boaco have negotiated the socio-spatial conditions of neoliberal 
reconstruction and their own political identities through their everyday practice.   
Recall (see Chapter 3) that I approach post-conflict reconstruction as a transformation of the 
political-economic regime.  The recent literature describes the production of culturally informed 
political economy as an evolutionary process of variation, selection, and retention that 
recursively connects a narrowly defined political economy and the broader life-world within 
which it is embedded (Jessop and Sum 2007; van Heur 2010).21  This blending of critical 
political economy and the post-structural focus on discourse, semiotics, and identity politics calls 
our attention to the daily practices and subjectivities through which individuals both respond to 
and ground the contingent neoliberal modes of capitalist political-economic regulation in time 
and space (Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008). 
 The reconstruction of daily practice and political subject formation becomes the ‘anchor’ 
that sets a particular political-economic structure in place.  Political subjects become part of the 
reconstruction process as they negotiate, contest, and adapt the terms of reconstruction in the 
conduct of everyday life (Jones 2008; van Heur 2010).  That is, political subjects actively 
perform ‘reconstruction from below’, reproducing through their daily, calculative practices the 
post-conflict structures, institutions, and relations that simultaneously discipline their individual 
self-understandings and actions within the broader reconstruction process (Jones 2008; Sparke 
2006).  This hybrid relationship suggests that the very definition of what reconstruction means is 
                                                
21 This literature emphasizes a ‘cultural political economy’ perspective as a relatively recent way 
of conceptualizing these connections.  The cultural political economy perspective continues to 
draw heavily on a foundation grounded in societal modes of regulation.  As noted above, future 
research will more fully develop the connections between Nicaraguan reconstruction and cultural 
political economy. 
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not an a priori product, but is being established in space and time through the place-specific, 
daily negotiation of different political-economic imaginations, practices, and institutions.  
 Accordingly, we cannot approach reconstruction as a uniform political project across the 
diversity of Nicaragua.  Reconstruction is a political articulation process that brings together 
institutions and actors from multiple geographic scales into relatively coherent, place-based 
visions for reconstructing a distinct political-economic regime (Chhatre 2008).  This variability 
compels us to question how reconstruction has produced and performed neoliberal political 
economy by drawing upon the grounded socio-spatial practices and self-understandings that are 
encountered among political subjects in distinct localities like Jinotega and Boaco.  The 
reconstruction stories encountered in both localities reflect the multiple ways that informants 
have made sense of the political-economic reconstruction process in which they are embedded 
and through which they have redefined their daily worlds.  Their collective voices come together 
to produce the distinct socio-spatial milieu that defines the contingent reconstructions of political 
economy in place.     
 My field research has brought to light the complicated nature of neoliberal political-
economic reconstruction within different Nicaraguan localities. Reconstruction has established 
distinct political-economic regimes that fall within a broadly defined ‘neoliberal’ framework 
from an emerging Northern regional, progressive market discourse in Jinotega to a highly 
localized, adversarial market discourse in Boaco.  These place-specific reconstruction outcomes 
share a focus on the everyday negotiation of political identities, practices, social relations, and 
governance institutions that define the parameters of daily life in Nicaragua.  Accordingly, we 
can understand better how dominant modes of neoliberal political economy and neoliberal 
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regulation have taken hold but also been reinvented through the place-based, historically guided 
daily reconstruction processes I encountered on the ground.    
 
 
6.2  IMAGINATIONS OF A NORTHERN POLITICAL - ECONOMIC SPACE IN    
       JINOTEGA 
 
 Reconstruction processes in Jinotega highlight the challenge attendant to rebuilding a 
political-economic structure grounded in the regional social and cultural conditions encountered 
in Jinotega both before and after the end of the war.  For the first half of the 1990s, the rush of 
transnational governance actors into the region (Chapter 5) undeniably introduced a range of 
neoliberal institutional solutions from above to address the humanitarian and development needs 
of the post-war population.  The rise of microfinance credit institutions, international financial 
support for agricultural commercialization programs, and external donor support for regional 
tourism promotion, commercial coffee cooperativism, and small enterprise development became 
a groundswell of neoliberal conditions introduced into Jinotega.  However, the political-
economic reconstruction process in Jinotega has not merely descended upon the subject 
population as a fait accompli, to be accepted and implemented by an elite reconstruction sector 
of organizations on the ground. 
 The post-conflict connections between post-conflict reconstruction and neoliberal 
political economy lead us first to question how people on the ground think about the political-
economic reconstruction processes on-going since 1990.  To answer that, we must begin with the 
historical conditions of regional peripheral abandonment and disconnect that have marginalized 
the Jinotega department for decades (Ferguson 2002).  As chapter one indicates, the mountainous 
region of small cities, small peasant farms and independent coffee producers that extends from 
the capital municipality northwards to the Honduras border region has long been a cradle of war, 
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revolution, poverty, and hardship.  From the 1920s, the Jinotega department has consistently 
found itself on the wrong side of history.  When Nicaraguan General Augusto César Sandino 
challenged U.S. military occupation from 1927-1933, Jinotega was the main theater of war 
(Walter 1993: 24).  The concentration of political power during the Somoza family regime 
(1936-1979) produced regional tensions between the pro-Somoza Nationalist Liberals and 
dissident Independent Liberals who sought to resist authoritarian rule (Walter 1993: 63).  
Following the 1979 FSLN revolution National Guard and Nationalist Liberal forces made 
Jinotega a central battleground for Contra resistance to the FSLN revolutionary government.  
Through these turbulent decades, Jinotega missed out on economic diversification, infrastructural 
improvements, and political leadership within the Nicaraguan political economy.  These historic 
conditions have established the dominant cultural tropes that guide the reconstruction of political 
economy in Jinotega. 
 From a culturally informed political economy perspective, the post-war reconstruction of 
a neoliberal political-economic regime has drawn from the cultural history and political identities 
that make up Jinotega daily life.  In particular, a Northern economic imagination has become for 
many Jinotega residents a way to frame the political and economic challenges confronting the 
region within a culturally distinct set of narratives, practices, and self-understandings that have 
guided the reconstruction of a post-conflict political economy from below.  Foremost, this 
Northern imagination has envisioned the Jinotega department and northern Nicaragua as a 
coherent regional space for the reconstruction of political economy.  The particular Northern 
imagination that Jinotega residents have envisioned for themselves since 1990 translates the 
regional historical geography of domination, abandonment, and dependence into a neoliberal 
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approach to post-conflict reconstruction that upholds private sector economic development as the 
rational path towards Northern regional political and social development.  
 The informants I met in Jinotega commonly viewed post-conflict reconstruction as an 
opportunity to correct the history of conflict, regional abandonment, and underdevelopment in 
the Jinotega department.  Moreover, the readiness with which informants from all political 
camps privileged neoliberal economic rhetoric over classic political cleavages (not to say that 
political tendencies are absent) suggests that reconstruction has been relatively successful at 
producing a regionally grounded neoliberal political-economic imagination on the ground.  For 
example, my conversation with Nicaraguan Tourism Institute (INTUR) representative Luis 
revealed a blend of political and geographic perspectives that informed his thoughts on 
reconstruction.  Luis faced me across his desk on another rain-soaked Jinotega afternoon.  The 
FSLN campaign posters, Augusto Sandino portraits, and red-and-black FSLN flags that cluttered 
the office walls reflected the political tendencies that guided the government-controlled tourism 
board.  Yet, Luis signaled a clear focus on Northern economic development that was frankly 
uncommon among FSLN officials I had encountered:  
Many people have a horror, a fear, when they think of the territories in northern 
Nicaragua. … Jinotega was always a generally forgotten department, despite the fact that 
it is a very ‘rich’ department. The war left producers out of the advances after the Contra 
war. We had a fear of losing our farms, losing our livestock, our coffee production.  
Many producers had died or found themselves in dangerous situations. This impacted 
development in the Jinotega department greatly. It was one of the most effected 
departments in Nicaragua.  The war generally ended by 1988 in many Nicaraguan 
departments with the peace process. But here in the North, the Contras continued into the 
1990s. 
 
Private sector informants echoed similar perspectives on reconstruction as a neoliberal market-
centered project to renegotiate the structural position Jinotega occupies within the Nicaraguan 
and global capitalist political economy.  Regional identities come through clearly in these 
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conversations about reconstructing political and economic conditions in Jinotega.  In this vein, 
private sector Tourism Alliance representative Juana hyperbolically asserted that the political 
struggle in Jinotega was not between the left and the right, but rather between the North and the 
rest of the world.  Juana later added:   
 Jinotega has to compete [against other departments] in the sense that – well, 
 Matagalpa (the department to the southeast of Jinotega) has always been our excuse. That 
 Matagalpa was better, that Matagalpa has more. However, here in Jinotega there is much 
 more as a department.  [People think that] Jinotega perhaps is the poorest department 
 and there nothing here.  Then they have all forgotten us and that’s wrong.  There is 
 always competition. The North competes with the South. 
 
 Without a doubt, international financial support for regional economic development 
programs and economic institutions has influenced informants’ readiness to adopt and internalize 
a Northern neoliberal rationality for reconstructing their department.  The establishment of 
transnational governance evident from Chapter 5 suggests that Jinotega actors from all political 
sides have been bound into common cause through the conditioning power of international 
money over reconstruction practice.  However, reconstruction of neoliberal political economy 
(and political-economic space) still must develop through the culturally specific daily practices 
and political identities that establish the particular boundaries of what constitutes and delimits 
the economic and political aspects of post-war life (i.e., the articulation of political economy).   
 As the Tourism Alliance quote suggests, reconstruction of neoliberal political economy in 
Jinotega has married neoliberal market-centered practices focused on competition and efforts to 
establish a Jinotega economic identity (a brand) within the global capitalist political economy to 
the culturally specific politics of coffee and agricultural production, the political history of 
conflict and neglect, and the regional desire to move beyond the partisan politics of the past.   
 What emerges from this balance of transnational reconstruction from above and 
culturally grounded reconstruction from below is a ‘dual discourse’ that informs how Jinotega 
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residents have made sense of post-conflict reconstruction and the development of a place-
specific, contingent patterns of neoliberal political economy.  The transnational governance 
influence over the shape of post-conflict political economy has played out for Jinotega residents 
alongside an internally held sense of regional subordination to the predominantly neoliberal 
tenets of this reconstruction from above. 
 Transnational development programs like the Ruta del Café (The Coffee Road) and The 
Ruta de Sandino (The Sandino Road) have helped transform the regional economic and political 
history centered on coffee production and conflict into a powerful engine for Northern regional 
political identity, economic reconstruction, and social development.  For example, the Ruta de 
Café project since 2007 entailed a €10 million collaboration between the Luxembourg Agency 
for Development Cooperation (Lux-Development), the Nicaraguan Tourism Institute (INTUR), 
and multiple regional public-private organizations to promote regional economic development 
throughout Jinotega and four additional northern Nicaragua departments (González 2010).  The 
anticipated economic benefit to the region’s network of organic, fair trade coffee plantations, 
ecotourism centers, and international coffee exporters has been represented by stakeholders as a 
(neoliberal) response to  the political and social needs of the affected rural and community 
populations (González 2010).  
 For example, Lux Development publications pointedly highlight the neoliberal goals of 
regional entrepreneurial development being advanced through the Coffee Road project 
implementation.  This international financier focus on entrepreneurial capacity-building, 
commercialization, and decentralization are building neoliberal practices on the ground:  
The [Ruta del Café] project aims to encourage and reinforce a municipal political focus 
on tourism development and entrepreneurial capacity-building through training and 
technical assistance to develop new tourism products, and to promote and commercialize 
the Ruta del Café nationally and internationally (Lux-Development 2011b, p. 11). 
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When the project launched in 2007 the principal challenge was to strengthen regional 
identity and to create an endogenous tourist route based on both decentralized 
management and small and medium-sized enterprises’ ownership of the project ( Lux-
Development 2011a, p. 83)    
 
The international program funds provided by Luxembourg have translated into Nicaraguan 
government and Departmental Development Council practices that further promote this 
neoliberal effort to generate global capitalist economic development that translates into political 
and social development for the Jinotega population.  Official INTUR publications market the 
Northern label for Jinotega and the Ruta del Café through visually appealing brochures that 
spotlight Jinotega coffee production through a menagerie of colorful pictures depicting coffee 
farms, rural producers, urban and rural landscapes, international tourists, and maps highlighting 
Jinotega and its neighboring departments.  The written text targets international visitors with a 
focus on regional export-quality coffee production, sustainable ecology, and the lure of learning 
about daily life among the coffee farms:  
The coffee farms, cooperatives, communities and plantations present throughout the 
 territory are making efforts to incorporate ecological processes into their crops through 
 environmentally sustainable, organic production or integrating agro-ecotourism activities 
 that allow visitors to learn about the precious biodiversity, natural beauty, and warm 
 hospitality that characterizes Jinoteganos and their socioeconomic realities  
(Source: INTUR and CDD de Jinotega 2009).  
 
 These formal Northern regional development programs set the tone for a Northern 
political-economic imagination that combines neoliberal market practices, political identities, 
and political subject formation as the homegrown solution to the entrenched poverty and nine 
decades of perceived neglect that directed against the coffee-producing elites, peasant farmers, 
and rural proletariat in the Jinotega department stretching back to the end of the authoritarian 
administration (1893-1909) of Liberal president José Zelaya regime (Paige 1997).  The historical 
focus on Northern coffee production and conflict speak to the deeply ingrained cultural traditions 
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and relations that make up the Jinotega department.  Accordingly, the reconstruction of a 
culturally informed, contingent neoliberal political economy around this Northern political 
identity and Northern political space must take into account the distinct ways that the basic 
structure of capitalist political and economic organization has taken shape through the daily 
practices and subjectivities through which my informants have made sense of post-conflict life. 
 Politics is never far from the surface in Jinotega. The political divisions that continue to 
interfere with coherent governance conditions (Chapter 5) have become more of a social liability 
for the general population as they carry on everyday life.  In this political climate, adherence to 
neoliberal market subjectivities simultaneously has become a way to supercede (or at least avoid) 
inter-party political retribution and the longer historical realities of political tension among the 
different Jinotega social classes.  Political subjects seek to avoid political entanglements by 
shifting their attention to business, market practices, and the quest for economic success.  As one 
coffee cooperative president (who will remain anonymous) told me: 
 We talk about democracy – democrats who fight for their rights. ... Democrats do not, 
 though. They are very divided. First, it is because they do not want the Sandinistas to see 
 them in a bad light. If they see me at a demonstration, someone is going to make note of 
 it. A taboo, a culture exists where I vote and I do not do anything else.  
  
 The neoliberal political-economic structure that has formed around a Northern cultural 
politics of coffee and agricultural production thus finds, on the whole, a welcoming set of 
political subjects who are primed to incorporate neoliberal principles into the daily practices and 
conceptions of self that develop through the reconstruction process.  These individuals have 
developed neoliberal political identities and practices that reflect the neoliberal market-centered 
approach for developing the full range of economic, political, and social life within the 
department.   
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 The political relations of coffee and agricultural production have granted this push 
towards neoliberal political economy a distinct cultural direction that shows up in how coffee 
producers, business leaders, and the general population have engaged with the ideas about 
Northern capitalist market relations.  The classic neoliberal focus on competition, flexible 
political subjects and personal economic responsibility has taken hold, but only selectively 
(Fraser 2003).  The more stringent aspects of this neoliberal rationality have been tempered by 
the Northern political-economic discourse that has bound individual political subjects into a 
collective geographic project of reconstructing their Jinotega department and the broader 
northern Nicaragua region.    
 We see the particular Northern version of neoliberal political-economic rationality take 
shape through the daily conditions in which coffee production and other activities related to the 
Jinotega coffee production sector are being performed.  From across the social and political 
spectrum, subjects have taken up the call to promote economic development in the name of post-
conflict reconstruction, political participation, and social development that will benefit Jinotega 
as a region.  For example, officials at the Unión de Cooperativas Agropecuarias SOPPEXCCA 
have combined participation in the Ruta del Café, global market development, and an explicit 
focus on adopting practices that benefit Jinotega communities, coffee producers, and their 
families.  This coming together of neoliberal practices and regional political identities in the 
name of economic, political, and social development of the Jinotega department has become a 
central political feature of the reconstruction process and how individual informants conduct 
their daily lives.  As SOPPEXCCA representative Anna commented: 
 In terms of cultural politics, of looking for social peace, [Soppexcca includes] producers 
 and entire families that were tied to either side during the war, ex-Contras and ex-
 military, and a diversity of political opinions and currents. Within our institution, there is 
 respect and liberty. We began with promoting human rights and respect. Everyone 
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 coming to us seeks production and market concerns. But, I feel the most wonderful 
 thing that we have been able to do is establish social peace within our organization. ... We 
 leave politics completely to the side and take up the banner of cooperativism – the banner 
 of SOPPEXCCA. Cooperativism has been a key support for reducing completely the 
 tensions of the war that divided us. 
 
 On a broader scale, the reconstruction of a Northern political-economic space has 
produced large-scale public practices firmly bound into the same neoliberal logic of capitalist 
‘brand’ development and regional promotion that stands side-by-side with the Ruta del Café, the 
Ruta de Sandino and other programs that have attempted to define regional political-economic 
relations from above.  Most notably, the first annual Feria Regional Norteña (Northern Regional 
Fair) brought northern Nicaragua political leaders, economic development professionals, and 
Northern Nicaragua coffee producers, craftsmen, and the general population together under the 
banner ‘Where tourism advances, poverty recedes’ (Figure 6.1) (INTUR 2010).  A Nicaraguan 
government report on the Feria Regional Norteña highlighted the Northern region of Nicaragua 
as ‘an alternative to the sun-and-sand tourism that the Pacific Coast’ offers visitors to Nicaragua 
(INTUR 2010). 
 The political conflicts that define the post-conflict reconstruction process ultimately will 
determine the nature of the post-conflict political-economic structure in Jinotega.  The daily life 
practices carried out by political actors to construct and advance a neoliberal regional 
development vision – or provide an alternative vision – are building the contingent conditions of 
post-war political economy.  The daily resolution of these complex political tensions defines the 
contingent neoliberal conditions that may be observed in Jinotega – patterns at once orthodox 
and heterodox, universal and intensely local in their content.  
 The political conditions shaping what political-economic reconstruction looks like come 
together across multiple geographic scales.  Most recently, the U.S. Millennium Challenge 
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Figure 6.1. Coffee production was a major focus at the 1st annual Northern Regional Fair in 
2010.  Source: INTUR (2010) 
 
 
Corporation (MCC) cancelled US$61.5 million and the European Union suspended US$70 
million in development funds following allegedly fraudulent 2008 Nicaraguan regional elections 
and government harassment of international NGOs (European Commission 2010; Marczak 2009; 
MCC 2011).  In this context, the Ruta de Café program stagnated briefly in 2011 as the 
Luxembourg Lux-Development agency delayed for four months the release of €6 million for the 
second phase (Project No. Nic/024) of the Ruta del Café project (Lux-Development 2011c).  As 
Alianza Turística representative Anna told me in during the funding gap in 2011: 
 Tourism investment has had little positive impact for [Jinotega department], nor for 
 Nicaragua, because the national elections are coming....  I went to the Nicaraguan 
 Tourism Institute. They told me that the Ruta del Café is not currently operating due to a 
 lack of funds. So you can see how we have dropped down a rung instead of climbing. 
 
 The contingent neoliberal patterns of post-conflict reconstruction are grounded in the 
historical conditions of regional cultural politics of coffee production, agriculture, historical 
conflict, and a prolonged historical condition of peripheral neglect by the Nicaraguan state.  
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From above, we see reconstruction playing out through a series of programs and related practices 
that have helped to rebuild the political economy from above around a neoliberal market-
centered discourse.  Participation in programs like the Ruta del Café have cultivated a Northern 
political-economic imagination that upholds regional economic development, impoverished-
community development, and the discursive production of a Northern regional ‘brand’ as the 
best path for improving the political and social well-being of the population.  However, the 
formal regional development programs that have come together, struggled, and in some cases 
collapsed reflect the contentiousness of the reconstruction process on the ground.  Beyond these 
formal programs, we can take a closer look at how Jinoteganos have actually lived the 
reconstruction process within the emerging Northern regional political-economic space set in 
motion around them.  
 
6.3  PERFORMING A NORTHERN POST-CONFLICT POLITICAL ECONOMY IN  
       JINOTEGA  
  
Top-down regional development projects like the Ruta del Café, the Feria Regional Norteña, 
and other related programs have blended reconstruction and long-term political-economic 
development within the distinct historical context of the distinct regional regime of accumulation 
centered on small-scale, peasant coffee and agricultural production in northern Nicaraguan 
departments including Jinotega.  At the same time, however, grassroots mobilizations in Jinotega 
– though few and far between – also have connected contemporary neoliberal approaches to 
regional political-economic development with a regional history of finding homegrown solutions 
to political and economic challenges in the region.  
 These grassroots mobilizations reflect another side of the reconstruction of a neoliberal 
political economy in Jinotega.  It is a different form of neoliberal practice not defined solely by 
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participation in formal programs and events, but rather by a recognition and rejection of the 
longstanding sense of regional subordination that many Jinotega residents feel.  Homegrown, 
grassroots practices and social movements have come together with their own conceptions for 
economic, political, and social development and political-economic organization in Jinotega.  
 The memory of the Movement for the Construction of Highways (Movimiento Pro-
Construcción de Carreteras) continues to be a touchstone for my informants.  Several people 
told me with pride the stories of post-partisan street mobilizations in 2004-2005 as agricultural 
and coffee producers, business leaders, NGO representatives, and civil society actors marched to 
demand roadway infrastructure improvements to facilitate better market access for their goods.  
As the Jinotega Foundation for Sustainable Development (FUNJIDES) representative Anna 
explained, ‘here in Jinotega, there have only been a couple things that ever brought the people 
together – the struggle against water privatization and the construction of the highway to 
Guayacán.’       
 These grassroots economic protests have had notable results in recent years with the 
construction of the El Guayacán-Jinotega highway from Managua (2009) and the re-
construction of the treacherous Matagalpa-Jinotega highway (2010) as two principal conduits 
for moving agricultural products to Managua and the Pacific Ocean coastal export centers 
(Rivera Méndez 2009).  A conversation with the private sector Tourism Alliance (Alianza 
Turística de Jinotega) representative Juana succinctly highlighted just what the idea of Northern 
economic development means to people in Jinotega:   
 We have always been a forgotten department in all respects.  Just recently, the new 
 [Jinotega-Guayacán] highway was built after many years in the making.  We struggled 
 and continue to struggle for new highways.  That has worn on us socially.  The truth is 
 that we want Jinotega to develop, but if we do not have highways, it will not happen.  All 
 the governments have forgotten us. 
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 These grassroots movements highlight a basic premise: That post-conflict reconstruction 
from below in Jinotega remains bound closely to the cultural politics of coffee and agricultural 
production (and producers) that dominates Jinotega and northern Nicaragua.  The place-specific 
institutions and practices that define daily life in Jinotega speak volumes to how grassroots 
producers and other actors have negotiated the terms of the transnational, neoliberal market 
political economy introduced since 1990 and have made it their own as a distinct regional 
arrangement of political, economic, and social forces.  
   Foremost, the reconstruction of a Northern regional political economy centers on the 
multiple dimensions of coffee production in Jinotega and northern Nicaragua. The coffee 
production sector has been a dynamic political and economic force in the past 15 years.  It is rare 
to encounter someone who is not connected to coffee in some way.  Jinotega daily life is bound 
to the cycles of international donor support and microfinance development directed at coffee 
producers.  Nicaraguan, regional, and municipal government agencies have advanced eco-
tourism development projects centered on coffee production landscapes and imagery.  Coffee 
producer organizations (Uniones, Centrales, and cooperatives) have formed to develop a 
regional market presence for Jinotega coffee, while grassroots social movements periodically 
arise to call for regional infrastructure development programs that can efficiently deliver coffee 
(and other agricultural) products to Nicaraguan export centers. This blend of formal and informal 
governance institutions constitutes a major part of the post-war conditions shaping political, 
economic, and social life throughout Jinotega (Painter 2006).         
 More than any other grassroots mobilization, the coffee producer cooperatives movement 
has become a cornerstone of the Northern regional political economy in the past decade.  The 
coffee cooperatives formed in post-war Jinotega turn the 1980s revolutionary cooperatives model 
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on its head.  Unlike the land redistribution and collective welfare model that characterized 
revolutionary-period cooperatives, contemporary coffee producer cooperatives are structured 
around a market-centered, neoliberal reconstruction ethos that guides their actions.  Individual 
producers voluntarily establish cooperatives, pay monthly membership dues, and maintain 
private ownership of their farms, most agricultural rents, and production decisions.  Cooperatives 
provide technical production support, lower production costs, promote exportation, secure better 
microfinance terms, and provide human capital development for members and their families.  
These services commonly include collectively controlled coffee bean processing facilities 
(beneficios), shared product quality standards and testing (catación), and bulk price negotiation 
with coffee exporters in Managua. 
 The widespread development of coffee producer cooperatives underscores the 
complicated relationship between transnational governance, grounded political practices, and 
neoliberal political economy in Jinotega. The new cooperatives model in the late 1990s emerged 
in response to individual coffee producers’ losing struggle to remain competitive within a global 
coffee production market following Nicaraguan government subsidy cuts and global coffee price 
drops.  The transnational community of financial donors and advisors quickly met the demand 
for economic solutions through the promotion and support of regional producers’ efforts to form 
coffee cooperatives focused on individual production and global market development [Figure 
6.2].  
 The close relationship produced and reinforced the broader 1990s discursive shift among 
coffee producers towards the neoliberal self-discipline that conditioned daily practice and 
political subjectivities that have guided the reconstruction process in the region.  As Unión de 
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Cooperativas Agropecuarios de Servicios Unidas de Mancotal (UCASUMAN) representative 
Fernando commented: 
 Look, it would be great if the state were investing in [the coffee sector] since we pay 
 taxes. But, if we waited for the state to manage this, we would die.  So we do it for 
 ourselves.  We look for our own solutions without waiting for them.  And we are bound 
 to the cooperativist principle of solidarity and mutual support.   
 
 The coffee cooperatives movement producers in Jinotega represent the distinct nature of 
neoliberal political-economic reconstruction in the department.  The decision to pursue an 
internationally financed, entrepreneurial model of cooperates-based coffee production reflects 
the distinct Jinotega political history of conflict and economic abandonment that coffee 
producers and other departmental residents desperately want to overcome. Their daily practices 
reflect a solid commitment to capitalist political economy and a self-conscious effort to  
 
  
Figure 6.2. Coffee and agricultural cooperatives line the Jinotega streets.  The photo shows the 
Central de Cooperativas CECOSPROCAES, a federation of several coffee producer 
cooperatives in Jinotega (photo by author) 
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move beyond the political divisions of the past with a single-minded focus on their coffee 
product.  The contingent neoliberal form adopted among producers has produced a market-
oriented, post-political discourse that emphasizes market development, social responsibility, and 
forward motion. 
 When you talk with coffee producers about their farms and their coffee cooperatives, 
their words reflect their underlying vision for how to reconstruct political-economic life in 
Jinotega and northern Nicaragua.  Their language is a technocratic, ‘neoliberal’ language of 
coffee quality control, international market agreements, promoting Northern brand recognition, 
of assuming governance responsibility to meet the human capital needs of their fellow coffee 
producers.  Producers talked very little about themselves – and this, too, may be a reflection of 
the contingent neoliberal patterns of political economy and regulation I encountered in Jinotega.  
This culturally informed political-economic structure is defined by coffee producers’ 
commitments to personal development and to Northern regional development, by an entrenched 
desire to separate the economic and the political as distinct parts of everyday practice in the 
region.     
 The strict post-political attention to Northern market development has become a clear 
focus for coffee producers within the many cooperatives I encountered in Jinotega.  The coffee 
producers’ visions for reconstructing Northern political economy at times echoed the more 
formal programs discussed above.  However, my coffee producer informants reflected a certain 
‘groundedness’ or ‘practicality’ in their closer knowledge of real-world conditions that did not 
always come through in my conversations with tourism and development NGO officials. For 
example, The Unión de Cooperativas Agropecuarias SOPPEXCCA representative Anna talked 
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about the disconnect between historical social conditions and her vision for post-conflict political 
economy:  
 There is a tendency to maintain the [old] patronage system. I see the tendency when I see 
 many people resigned to the idea that poverty is inescapable, and it takes considerable 
 effort to bring people together. There is an individualism that is hard to break. ... We still 
 lack the concept – we still think we are ‘Jinotega’ [the city] – no, we are a Department 
 and we all have to operate in that mind-set -- whomever we are, be it the mayor, the 
 president – we have to see ourselves as a [collective]. Soppexcca has been able to 
 develop well not only with the economic part, but in terms of human capital. Our human 
 capital has been strengthened, because without knowledge capital dries up. It is 
 something we can do even without a single dollar.  
 
 Informants’ efforts to build a Northern political economy frequently came together with 
strong expressions of neoliberal governance that eschewed the Nicaraguan and municipal state as 
reliable providers for the economic, political, and social needs of the population.  In its place, 
these coffee producers saw the cooperatives as an instrument through which they could generate 
the particular form of post-conflict political economy that they envisioned for their region.  For 
example, the Unión de Cooperativas Agropecuarios de Servicios Unidas de Mancotal 
representative Fernando brashly explained:  
 We have learned to come together. The whole world wants to work, and politics has been 
 set aside. ... We do not have much interference here because we have dedicated ourselves 
 to improving our business as a cooperative, a union of cooperatives, without government 
 support. ... Now, we are going to propose a project to build a new school in our 
 community, because the schoolhouse is falling down. We are going to build it and we are 
 presenting this to the city council to evaluate and, instead of screwing us over, to put it 
 bluntly, charging us taxes, they will know about this project and not charge us taxes. ... 
 Jinotega, really, is a place where everyone takes care of [himself or herself]. 
 
 In similar fashion, one prominent Nicaraguan political figure, businessman, and coffee 
farmer, Patricio, brought together a range of different themes highlighting the contingent 
neoliberal form of political economy that, in his view, would advance the general development 
of the Jinotega department and its market-oriented population.  Don Patricio noted:    
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 If a man lives from raising crops on adequate land to grow cabbage, carrots, or other 
 crops, we have to teach him how to market those products and to form the ‘clusters’ that 
 we talk about. How do cultivate products well, how to conduct business directly in a 
 more dynamic market. Incentivizing and promoting their products, where they organize 
 themselves, everything they produce. ... So there are three basic things that we need: 
 Roads, support for growers, and economic clusters. And I believe we need a map for 
 production in the department. It would say ‘this area is for vegetables. This area is for 
 ranching. This area is dedicated to coffee.’ The people grow in an artesan manner. If 
 someone says  ‘these 5 manzanas of land are mine and I am going to grow coffee’, it is 
 just because that is what they know. But there where no agronomers, no specialists, no 
 soil scientists who came to say whether the soil had minerals or not. No one checked if it 
 was good for coffee. They do not do studies. We need these issues to be central to policy. 
 
 The focus on getting past the conflicted political relations and chaos of the Contra war 
also informs coffee cooperatives producers’ daily practices and political subjectivities.  This 
post-political emphasis, perhaps more than any other facet of coffee cooperatives, has been a key 
aspect in the role that coffee producers are playing in developing the contingent neoliberal form 
of Northern political economy from below in Jinotega.  With notable exceptions, producers have 
united in their goal to promote a generalized commitment to neoliberal capitalist development 
through the political practices developed within their cooperatives.  The Cooperativa de 
Servicios Agropecuarios para Exportadores de Café (COOPSAEC) member David (an FSLN 
supporter) commented: 
 The cooperative has a little of every political tendency. In 7 years, we have never 
 punished someone for their political affiliation. For us, politics and religion do not exist. 
 We are only coffee producers that want to understand coffee well and from there 
 [associates] can be what that want to be independently. There is no politics. Discussions 
 of politics or bias for any one political party would never be acceptable, ever.  In the 7 
 years that we have existed, this has been clearly articulated. I believe it’s very important 
 for the cooperative – no politics, no religion.  We are producers and we go ahead as 
 producers. ... That was in the war, all of the political problems. But, for me politics does 
 not exist. I am a coffee producer. That is what I do and I cannot do anything more. 
  
 Similarly, the Cooperativa de Servicios Agropecuarios Humedal Apanas Jinotega 
(COSAHAJI) representative Benicio provided a similar perspective as we shared coffee within 
the dusty, concrete space that was both his personal office and storage room.  Founded in 2007, 
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COSAHAJI combine coffee production with limited agricultural and dairy production programs, 
regional tourism projects, and cooperation with INTUR.  As Benicio commented:  
 The associates’ politics are Sandinista, Liberal, Contra, everything. When they are here, 
 there is no politics. There is nothing. That has been one of our mottos. You want to come 
 work with our cooperative, leave your politics outside. The associates will not permit it. 
 The cooperative has a free market model.  We have a vision entrepreneurial. No one 
 is here because of a beautiful, romantic vision of the cooperative. It is to make more 
 money. Nothing more.  Here, what everyone wants is money for the associates.  They 
 have to have money.  Everyone wants the cooperative to grow, but we want the 
 associates also to grow with it.  
 
 The common thread binding most coffee producers is their transformation into neoliberal 
political subjects dedicated – beyond political lines – to a capitalist political-economic structure 
centered on competition, market performance, and accumulation.  However, the regional cultural 
identities bound to coffee production and the visceral memories of armed conflict have not 
disappeared under neoliberal pressures.  The contingent nature of neoliberalism as a political-
economic model recognizes  what we call ‘neoliberalism’ can demonstrate considerable – albeit 
not unlimited -- variation in its actual content on the ground (Wilson 2004). 
 This basic premise suggests that the reconstruction of the political-economic structure in 
Jinotega has been able to maintain a general tendency towards neoliberalization concurrent with 
the greater emphasis placed on regional identity, human capital development, and social need.  
As the comment by Benicio suggests, the reconstruction of daily practice in Jinotega towards a 
neoliberal market rationality has been tempered by a concern for fellow citizens and a sense of 
social responsibility within the overarching conditions of neoliberal regulationist and disciplinary 
reforms.  The institutionalization of this particular reconstruction of political-economic life has 
produced the contingently neoliberal political subjectivities that I encountered throughout my 
field work in northern Nicaragua. 
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6.4  CONTINGENT RECONSTRUCTIONS OF NEOLIBERAL POLITICAL ECONOMY  
       IN JINOTEGA 
 
 During the past decade, belated Nicaraguan government attention has institutionalized the 
previously grassroots rise of coffee producer cooperatives movement that began in the late 
1990s.  The 2005 General Law on Cooperatives codified the operation of coffee and other 
cooperatives throughout Nicaragua (Ley General de Cooperativas 2005).  Under this law, 
individual cooperative producers exercise full sovereignty over their production and profits while 
membership costs are limited to administrative fees that support an administrative council and 
also provide partial financial support for the government-established Institute for Cooperatives 
Development, INFOCOOP.  The 2005 General Law on Cooperatives differentiates between 
individual-member cooperatives, Centrales of five or more member cooperatives involved in the 
same economic activity (article 96), and Uniones of five or more member cooperatives from the 
same regional Department, regardless of economic activity (article 97).  Cooperatives are legally 
obligated to remain non-partisan (per 2007 enabling legislation, articles 63 and 99), a stricture 
that appears to be followed in most – albeit not all – cases I observed in Jinotega (Reglamento 
2007).  
 These recent developments have helped to lock in place the grounded political relations, 
practices, and identities that had come to define the post-conflict reconstruction of neoliberal the 
political-economic structure in Jinotega.  The longstanding cultural identity politics centered on 
coffee production and Northern identity has continued to provide a very distinct form of 
reconstruction in Jinotega centered on a balance of economic, political, and social development 
practices realized through inherently market-oriented organizations like coffee producer 
cooperatives.  The constellation of coffee producer organizations has become a political 
institution that plays a central role for translating regional economic development into private 
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sector-led modes of political and social development.  In particular, the reconstruction of the 
Northern political economy has set private sector coffee producer cooperatives as the principal 
institution for meeting many personal, community, and regional needs for school construction, 
medical clinics, technical training, and other functions historically reserved for the state 
(Trouillot 2001).    
 At first glance, it may surprise readers to learn that coffee cooperatives have become a 
preferred vehicle for economic development and for political and social development in 
Jinotega.  Paige (1997) notes a deep antipathy to the FSLN-organized producer cooperatives that 
were a condition for land redistribution during the 1980s.  However, the structure of coffee and 
agricultural cooperativism in the Jinotega region from the late 1990s to the present actually fits 
well with the historical patterns of cultural politics in the region.  Saldaña-Portilla (2003b), for 
example, makes the cogent argument that northern Nicaragua coffee producers resisted the 
FSLN radical development program not because of its content, but rather because the 
implementation of the agricultural reforms in the 1980s was an imposed solution from above.   
Northern coffee producers did not have the opportunity to find homegrown solutions that met 
their economic needs, their political and social needs, and their Liberal cultural traditions.  With 
the new species of production cooperatives and technical services cooperatives that arose in the 
reconstruction period, the core regional values of local ownership, independent production, and 
non-state intervention are respected.  These views come through powerfully in coffee producers’ 
own voices.  For example, the Cooperativa Multiactiva de Productores de Café Orgánico 
highlights the market-centered, yet balanced vision for reconstructing neoliberal political 
economy that frames its 2003-present growth from 33 to 180 members.  As Cooperativa 
Multiactiva representative Joaquín commented:    
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 Social development is the objective, the mission of the cooperative. When we sell our 
 coffee through fair trade there is a small fund for social projects – to replace plastic with 
 tile roofs, dig latrines. But that is just from slightly higher prices for fair trade. If the 
 cooperative had more funds, we maintain the idea, the vision to focus considerably on 
 social development.  There are very poor people. If you go to the countryside, you will 
 see the reality of poverty out there. 
 
 The transnational connections that surround the coffee production sector have had a 
powerful influence over the way that coffee production institutions have defined and 
implemented their governance roles for economic, political, and social development. The 
reconstruction sector, and particularly North American and European donor state agencies and 
NGOs, have provided extensive financial grants and, particularly since the mid-2000s, low-
interest loans to meet the gap between the financial support cooperative members are able to 
provide and the technical services that cooperatives provide for member producers.  This 
transnational reconstruction sector governance discussed in chapter five has been a source of 
stability – but also a problem - for the coffee production sector.   As COSAHAJI representative 
Benicio noted: 
 There was a strong, strong paternalism in the 1990s. We were coming out of a war.  ... 
 The international community logically wanted to help Nicaragua and Central America 
 end its wars. Unfortunately, we did not have the vision that we needed in that moment.  
 Those in charge lacked the vision that they had to teach us to fish, not give us fish.  They 
 gave us our fish for ten years, throughout the 1990s.  It was so over-the-top. I remember 
 millions and millions of dollars entered the country, but everything became – 
 everything was just given to us.  There was no process for teaching us to use it better. A 
 lot of money came to Nicaragua, but it has not resulted in – look even now, look what is 
 happening here [laughs]. ... If they had supported us in the 1990s in a way that was not so 
 ‘easy’ – in that period there were such quantities of money from NGOs. ... it was 
 paternalism, these handouts that just gave us money and now we see the results.   
 
 The preferential transnational connections that benefit larger coffee producer 
organizations have become a source of friction within the grassroots coffee production sector 
during the past two decades. In part, these tensions may be based in a long-term resistance to the 
historical experiences of patriarchal control from outside the region directed to elite actors at the 
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expense of the masses – regardless of whether the source of such clientelism was the historic 
Nicaraguan central state or the contemporary transnational reconstruction and development 
community (see Bebbington and Kotahri 2006; Ottaway 2002).  International donor support 
provides a financial foundation for nearly every coffee producer organization I encountered.  The 
transnational structure of this regional political economy has preferentially favored those 
producer organizations that have been able to forge the financial donor connections necessary to 
attract greater investment, global market presence, and alliances at the expense of small producer 
organizations, cooperatives, and farms.  As Central de Cooperativas de Servicios Multiples 
Productores de Cafes Especialistas (CECOSPROCAES) representative Xavier commented:  
 There are projects that [NGOs/international donors] help subsidize, but always with 
 credit.  For example, they say ‘here is the packet, this aid program. Manage it well. Give 
 it life.” ...  That is the case with CRS [Catholic Relief Services] funded by USAID that 
 supports 600 coffee producers. Likewise, we receive BID [Inter-American Development 
 Bank] funds passed through IDR [the Nicaraguan Institute for Rural Development] for 
 commercializing the white plantain. There is an OXFAM project to provide backing for 
 subsistence farmers –  the organizations always bring their own politics, but they also 
 understand the internal politics within the Cooperatives. 
 
 In this vein, the powerful Unión de Cooperativas Agropecuarias SOPPEXCCA (Society 
of Small Producers for Coffee Export) has been among the premier coffee producer 
organizations in the Jinotega region since 1997.  The organization has constructed a transnational 
network of government and NGO donors and trade partners from Germany, Italy, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, and the United States.  As their own publications make clear, SOPPEXCCA 
knowingly portrays its market-centered combination of economic, political, environmental, and 
social development programs as a full-spectrum benefit to both Unión associates and the regional 
community (SOPPEXCCA 2011).  The SOPPEXCCA administration remains highly focused on 
maintaining international donor connections through its everyday narratives and practices.  On-
site quality control and flavor testing laboratories, a retail cafe, cooperative-owned automobiles, 
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and extensive marketing efforts (e.g., pamphlets, website, logos, richly decorated office space) 
have set SOPPEXXCA apart among the Jinotega coffee producer organizations.  As 
SOPPEXCCA representative Anna stated:  
 [International] support has been essential to do what we do.  Our producers have been 
 part of this struggle to position themselves in the market. And if the sky falls down, then 
 what? They have to know you, to know the quality of your produce, know about quality 
 tasting, that we have tasters here.  In all of Jinotega, we established the first tasting 
 laboratory in the entire territory.  In spite of being the #1 coffee producer department.  
 There was never a tasting laboratory before. ... Almost everything we have achieved has 
 been the result of [international] cooperation. ... There are people who say ‘look! 
 Soppexcca has lots of money. The Cooperativa Soppexcca is sure doing well.’  Others 
 say that Soppexcca makes them angry.  I ask why, and they say that their cooperative is 
 struggling. Instead of coming to see that we can all be saved together ... it is hard.  Even 
 Soppexcca has struggled to maintain good relations, because there is conflict [among 
 cooperatives].  We have a strategy to have good communication with everyone. In spite 
 of all that, we still get flak.   
  
 The transnational connections drive many of the tensions encountered within the coffee 
producer cooperatives community.  My Jinotega fieldwork suggests that most coffee producers 
maintain mixed feelings towards the predominant political and economic power that the 
international donor community wields over reconstruction, even as cooperatives members seem 
to have internalized the basic neoliberal political-economic tenets that define the region and 
everyday practice.  The desire to supplant the dominant international financing model 
(asistencialismo) with their own cooperatives-generated revenue to fund economic, political, and 
social development programs became a dominant narrative among coffee producers, 
cooperatives, Uniones, and Centrales I encountered on the ground.  
 The prominent UCASUMAN coffee producers’ association provides a striking example.  
The Unión de Cooperativas Agropecuarios de Servicios Unidas de Mancotal (UCASUMAN) 
has struggled to balance transnational donor connections with plans to provide social 
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development programs for its members, their families, and the community.22  Like many coffee 
producer organizations, UCASUMAN has received international financial support from multiple 
backers such as the IADB, USAID, and the U.S.-based poverty reduction NGO TechnoServe 
(TechnoServe 2007).  These transnational connections that tie UCASUMAN to international 
finance play a complicated role in the reconstruction of neoliberal political economy centered on 
private sector coffee producers in the region.  Public protestations of gratitude for international 
financial support (TechnoServe 2007)  come up against the more nuanced views expressed 
privately by UCASUMAN representative Fernando, whose viewed echoed the same ambivalent 
perspectives I frequently encountered from coffee producers:  
 In the 1990s, there was a culture of assistance (asistencialismo) that directed our view of 
 cooperation towards saying “give me this, give me that” and that everything should be 
 given to us.  The many millions of dollars invested from everywhere have resulted in 
 organizations that had life only while the executing agency was present. When those 
 projects ended, it all fell apart, disappeared, it was unsustainable.  I believe that we have 
 to focus on sustainability. 
 
 From an alternate perspective, larger coffee producers have eschewed the dominant 
‘trickle-down’ transnational framework that connects international donor support to place-based 
coffee producer organizations and cooperatives.  These larger producers represent a distinct 
vision for rebuilding a Northern political economy that remains grounded in market-based 
principles, while simultaneously turning the hierarchical structure of the Northern political 
economy on its head.   
 The large El Bosque coffee farm in central Jinotega department demonstrates the multiple 
paths towards the reconstruction of a Northern political economy in the department. The El 
                                                
22 Throughout Jinotega, informants consistently called UCASUMAN ‘the Contra cooperative’ in 
reference to the alleged membership restricted to former Contra militants.  This political image 
stood in stark contrast to the professed apolitical nature of most coffee producer cooperatives I 
encountered in Jinotega.  
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Bosque Foundation brings together the large organic coffee plantations scattered on the central 
Jinotega mountain slopes with a range of social and economic projects, including Ruta de Café 
ecotourism development and an agro-economic technical school for secondary school-aged 
coffee producers.  Through its private efforts, coupled with very modest international NGO 
funds, El Bosque has constructed a business model that blends economic and social development 
for its workers, their families, and surrounding villages.  These initiatives include an on-site 
medical clinic, labor housing and cafeteria access during coffee harvest season (October-March), 
student lodging year-round, and small development programs in local communities.  Katia, one 
senior representative with the El Bosque coffee foundation, detailed her distinct political-
economic vision for Jinotega and Nicaragua:23 
 The Fundación has a vision that is focused on economic development because there are 
 local employees, we use local resources. The farm is constructed with local wood.  The 
 employment just goes on growing and growing. We are developing a social project, but at 
 the same time, growing the economy.  With tourism, we are going to have – through all 
 these productive activities – we will make the technical school self-sustaining and we are 
 going to improve the economic lives of the community. ...  For me as a Nicaraguan, this 
 project is the kind of thing that we need to develop more as a country.  This project is not 
 paternalistic. We are not waiting for donors to come support us.  We have a broader 
 vision that it is better to give us a hand, but allow us to take our own initiative as a 
 country to develop.  
 
 Despite their differences, independent producers like El Bosque and the dominant coffee 
sector organizations (Uniones, Centrales, and Cooperativas) have in common is a shared vision 
for reconstructing Northern political economy in the aftermath of the Contra conflict – one that 
takes shape within a market-centered, neoliberal discourse both introduced from above and 
grounded in the particular social, political, and economic conditions, needs, and relations that 
make up Jinotega.  The dominant transnational governance structure that has guided 
                                                
23 The term El Bosque is a pseudonym to protect the professional standing of the coffee 
plantation.  
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reconstruction towards neoliberal political economy continues to be contested and redefined 
through the distinct articulation of these complex political voices and their everyday struggles to 
define, put into practice, and forge a post-conflict space for economic, political, and social 
development.         
 Post-conflict reconstruction has produced a general pattern of transnational 
reconstruction sector governance from above informed by neoliberal discourse in Jinotega.  
However, reconstruction has played out through the grounded, everyday conditions through 
which people conduct their daily lives in the context of the broader move towards a neoliberal, 
market-centered political economy.  The multiple strategies and programs that have defined the 
reconstruction of a Northern regional political-economic space in Jinotega offer one view for 
how reconstruction draws from place-specific articulations of institutions, governance relations, 
and everyday practices to produce the contingent terms of neoliberal market democracy on the 
ground.  Reconstruction in Jinotega has thus taken shape around explicitly geographic tropes of 
regional development and private sector involvement in the economic, political, and social 
welfare of the general population centered on the ubiquitous coffee production sector.  This 
general pattern for political-economic reconstruction in Jinotega may be contrasted with the 
markedly different reconstruction patterns being adopted and adapted in the Boaco department in 
central Nicaragua. 
 
 
6.5  IMAGINATIONS OF A LOCAL POST-CONFLICT POLITICAL ECONOMY IN  
       BOACO 
   
 Post-conflict reconstruction in the Boaco department has produced distinct conditions of 
neoliberal political economy around a grounded set of institutions and governance relations in 
the region.  Chapter five recounted how reconstruction has been dominated by a transnational 
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reconstruction sector that has become the bearer of a generally market-centered framework for 
reconstruction alongside a fractured political and civil society.  This transnational governance 
provides the context for seeing reconstruction through the everyday, calculative practices that 
constitute place-specific, historically grounded political-economic conditions on the ground.   
 For both its apologists and its detractors, Boaco residents quite often direct their 
conversations to the traditionalism of the Boaco municipal political economy and its relative lack 
of technological development compared to neighboring municipalities.  The roots of this 
preoccupation rest in the 20th century conservative internecine conflicts between traditional 
oligarchs and the emerging agro-export elites from the 1910s to the present.   These historical 
political-economic tensions fed into the 1980 FSLN government decision to merge the Boaco 
department into neighboring Chontales department (the two department separated again in 1990), 
forming for a brief period a single Boaco-Chontales region.  The political, economic, and social 
effect on Boaco governance institutions and experience has played a notable role in the current 
political-economic patterns that define Boaco everyday life.  The cultural and political effect of 
the Boaco-Chontales merger on the conservative Boaco elite extended much deeper than merely 
the hollowing out of institutional strength, loss of political influence, and lack of economic 
investment that accompanied the geographic shift in power towards the Chontales capital, 
Juigalpa.  The central government interference in Boaco affairs further undermined regional 
cohesion as conservative elites retreated further into their local milieu in resistance to the FSLN 
and the Nicaraguan central state.  The resulting post-conflict vision for political-economic 
reconstruction has centered on an intensely local, place-based perspective at odds with the 
emerging regional discourse and political-economic space witnessed in the Jinotega department. 
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 The reconstruction of a Boaco-centered political-economic space has defined and guided 
the contingent conditions that constitute neoliberal reconstruction on the ground.  My fieldwork 
provided insight into the reconstruction of this place-specific political-economic space through 
which distinct neoliberal conditions have taken hold.  In short, Boaco (the municipality) has 
engaged the reconstruction process through a continuation and perhaps an intensification of the 
conservative, ‘go-it-alone’ social milieu that emerged relatively unscathed from the Contra 
conflict.  Informants’ candidly self-critical narratives portraying Boaco (the municipality) as 
having an antagonistic relationship with the five neighboring Boaco department municipalities 
highlight this dominant place-based political-economic imagination in Boaco.  One Association 
for Integrated Sustainable Development (ASPRODIC) representative ticked off a list of 
‘characteristics’ of different Boaco municipalities, explaining:  
 There are different responses [to neoliberal reforms] among different departments.  In 
 Boaco, there is no coherent (articulada) response among the different local forces. It does 
 not exist in the Boaco department. Locally, if I go from municipality to municipality, in 
 Camoapa I see a more coherent response from the different organizations and 
 communities in the municipality. ... I do not find a coherent response among the other 
 municipalities. I come up against dispersed forces with respect to the department. I do not 
 see much leadership in the department, anyone capable of bringing different forces 
 together, not from the Frente, not from the Liberals.  I have seen this since the 1990s in 
 this region. In the 1990s, all the mayors in the department were Liberals. However, 
 despite all being Liberals, they never were able to forge a connection with the central 
 government – they were divorced from the central government. 
 
 These narratives on post-war political economy revealed a deep frustration with how 
post-conflict reconstruction had unfolded in the region.  Boaco, for many informants, had 
become its own worst enemy, chasing away international investment, regional development, and 
post-war prosperity through its localist political-economic discourse.  As FUNDEMUBO 
women’s civil rights NGO representative Alicia commented, “Boaco is stingy,” comparing her 
city unfavorably to neighboring Camoapa as a municipality where industry, innovation, and 
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cooperation have defined the post-conflict period.  Private sector organizations shared similar 
concerns over the parochial political-economic perspectives they encountered in Boaco.  As 
Boaco Cattlemen’s Association representative Rodrigo complained: 
 
 We hope to build a dairy collection center here in Boaco. The truth is we [do not have 
 plans or a construction date yet]. We lack land and no one is supporting it because of the 
 economic situation, no one has money to do it.  And people say that they want to help 
 build a collection center for producers. ... If the association at least had a dairy collection 
 center, then the producers would sell their milk to us and we would pay the market price. 
 ... The thing is people [in Boaco] are very jealous of one another. If someone seems like 
 they are getting ahead, people say ‘hey, he is a crook, he is a drug trafficker, he is this, he 
 is that.’  Jealousy keeps the community from advancing. In contrast, Camoapa has their 
 own university.  Here, we cannot even get a coffee hall. The people are not progressive in 
 Boaco.  
 
 My informants’ comments brought to light their efforts to come to terms with post-war 
Boaco and its political-economic position alongside neighboring municipalities, departments, 
and within Nicaragua.  On one hand, Boaco clearly was a source of pride for my informants as a 
‘democratic’ bastion within Nicaragua.  On the other hand, my informants consistently revealed 
their concerns that Boaco was not moving in a favorable direction for rebuilding political and 
economic life during the reconstruction period. The tension between these two visions of Boaco 
life became part of the political-economic discourse taking shape on the ground.  My informants 
wrestled with the national, regional, and local visions influencing the emerging patterns of 
neoliberal political economy I encountered in Boaco.  One senior PLC municipal government 
official, Armando, demonstrated these complex conditions of Boaco daily life well.  First, 
Armando commented that:  
 In Boaco municipality, [social] relations are good. Boaco has other municipalities – 
 Camoapa, Teustepe, San Lorenzo, San José, Santa Lucía. There has always been a 
 friendly, good relationship.  Currently, although there are two new Sandinista 
 governments, in practice we do not have much communication, but we do not have 
 problems, either. They do their thing, we do not bother with them either.   ... With respect 
 to the other Nicaraguan departments in Nicaragua, relations [in Boaco] have been good, 
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 particularly the more limited relationship between democrats and communists. ... we try 
 to take into account the idea that we are all human beings.  
 
However, Armando later contrasted Boaco to neighboring Camoapa in less favorable terms: 
 
 “Look, Camoapa is a lot of potential -  a municipality with lots of cattle ranching, 
 agriculture, but mostly cattle. It is a municipality where the people are more united. The 
 people of Boaco do not have that – that wherewithal to unite to work together. That is a 
 characteristic in Boaco. It is more individualistic. ... [In Camoapa] there is more progress, 
 in terms of the dairy industry it is doing very well. They have invested with results.  They 
 have investment that we could not have because of that same lack of identity. Here 
 producers do not think about industrial development, only in their own development. It 
 becomes like - you earn $20,000 or $50,000 you are going to invest it in more farms, 
 more cattle.  You are not going to invest in setting up a small industry, or a hotel, or 
 something tourist-related, or a food processing facility, a factory ... this is the experience. 
 
 The frequent comparisons that Boaco residents made between their city and neighboring 
communities reflects their own prolonged struggles to define and come to terms with the nature 
of the daily political-economic conditions through which they carry on their everyday lives.  
These tensions came out frequently informants wavered between expressing hometown pride in 
Boaco and stating their frustrations with Boaco as a parochial, self-contained locality where 
reconstruction sector actors hierarchically sat above a fragmented group of individualized, 
market-centered Boaco residents living their own lives on the ground.  In contrast, I heard 
expressions of a broader, regional narrative about departmental political-economic development 
far more rarely and then only among organizations where such views may be expected, such as 
the National Tourism Institute (INTUR) delegation, the Departmental Development Council 
(CODEBO), and the Unión de Cooperativas de Servicios Agropecuarios Tierra Nueva, a 
federation of coffee and honey cooperatives operating regionally.  Tierra Nueva representative 
Francisca recounted the challenges of constructing a regional imagination from the parochial 
visions that dominated Boaco life:  
 There is no vision of the department as a whole. We were present in an INTUR-
 sponsored forum where INTUR discussed promoting Boaco [department] as a tourist 
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 destination. We indicated that Boaco’s identity needed to change. Boaco is not only 
 Boaco ‘the city’, but rather Boaco is a department. We do not have anything that 
 characterizes us.  For example, Jinotega is the top producer of coffee. That gives Jinotega 
 an identity. It is ‘the North’ – the ‘City of Mists’.  We made a proposal to define Boaco 
 as a ‘multiple destination’ that offers diverse options. We proposed that Boaco be 
 marketed as the top honey-producing region in Nicaragua. ... that INTUR develop a 
 Honey Route ((Ruta de Miel). We can mix it up.  Before we used to say ‘where the rivers 
 are of milk and the rocks of cheese’ (donde los ríos son de leche y las piedras son 
 cuajadas).  But now we can say ‘-of milk and honey.’  
 
 Similarly, the Nicaraguan National Tourism Institute (INTUR), through a new Boaco 
delegation established in mid-2009, has established in the Boaco department a Ruta de la 
Hacienda (Farmstead Route) as part of its regional tourism development program.  Like so much 
else in Boaco, the program has been mired by parochial political conflicts and financial 
insecurity.  The Boaco INTUR representative Fátima commented:  
 Boaco is characterized as an agricultural and ranching region.  There is good potential in 
 those as something we can highlight as specific to the Department of Boaco. ... Tourism 
 is not the property of only a few regions, but rather an important economic activity that 
 can be developed such that all Nicaraguan departments can be highlighted for national 
 and international tourism. ... [INTUR promotes] tourism with a human face.  ... The 
 government now thinks that the tourism dividend that comes to Nicaragua should serve 
 as a revolving fund to support projects with a social focus. ...  
 
Later, Fátima added:  
 
 What I want is [for INTUR] to be a focal point for coming together so people say ‘look at 
 Boaco, all working together, moving their territory forward – that there are no ‘masters’, 
 that we are all working together. That is a problem that we have to solve in Boaco.  I 
 have lived in other municipalities and have heard experiences of colleagues where there 
 is some friction between ideas because they want to say ‘I’.  There is a lot of 
 individualism and this does not help. ... They always say ‘that one took the idea from me’ 
 and ‘I am the one that should be over there’, ‘this is my flag, my logo, my organization’ – 
 the lack of concerted effort sets us back.  
 
 Despite these limited efforts to establish a broader sense of Boaco regional identity, the 
dominant pattern I observed in Boaco suggests that most informants carry on their daily lives 
within a political-economic and mental space centered on the limited cultural milieu provided by 
small-town life.  The historic political economy of cattle production appears to have persisted 
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throughout the 20th century and the Contra conflict relatively unscathed to maintain deep 
ideological and political resistance to both the Nicaraguan government and any regional 
imagination as forms of external interference.  These deep-seated cultural intersections with the 
reconstruction of political-economic life have had important effects on the ways that 
transnational reconstruction networks and, in particular, grounded reconstruction sector 
organizations, have operated and guided the reconstruction process in Boaco for the past two 
decades.  
 
6.6  PERFORMING A LOCAL POST-CONFLICT POLITICAL ECONOMY IN BOACO 
 
 The transnational reconstruction sector operating in Boaco operates in a cultural context 
shaped by the prolonged historical tensions between Conservative, Liberal, and radical FSLN 
political forces in the past century.  The reconstruction of neoliberal political economy on the 
ground has taken shape through competing imaginaries on the proper role of both state and non-
state institutions in post-conflict everyday life.  The contingent terms of neoliberal reconstruction 
observed in Boaco bring to light the challenge of building a coherent political-economic regime 
through the complicated landscape of daily practices forged in Boaco.   
 A deeply entrenched mistrust of major political and economic institutions, including 
Nicaraguan and municipal government, transnational NGOs, grassroots cooperatives, 
associations, and labor unions came through many informant interviews.  This general hostility 
has focused particularly on a widespread antagonism towards progressive societal institutions 
and cooperation among the municipal population.  The persistent ideological and political 
divisions recounted in chapter five have played a key role in maintaining hostile social attitudes 
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towards many political institutions that continue to struggle for influence over the reconstruction 
process.  As Boaco Cattlemen’s Association representative Rodrigo commented:  
   [Nicaragua] is a rich country. If the people would be allowed to work, it would be 
 different.  And if there were better support for small business, for people who wanted to 
 work, this would all be different. The government right now is only looking out for its 
 own political supporters. As we say colloquially, one mule does not pull another (una 
 mula no jala otra). 
 
 This fiercely independent attitude has been integral to the contingent reconstruction of 
neoliberal political economy centered on the beef and dairy cattle production that dominates 
Boaco life.  The iconic imagination of the independent rancher fighting for economic and 
political sovereignty free from government and social institutions certainly came through my 
conversations with informants (Figure 6.3).  Many informants recounted the visceral reaction 
against institutions and practices that countered this dominant political-economic vision of 
Boaco’s pastoral life.   
 Consequently, the reconstruction of a neoliberal political economy from below has failed 
to come together around any dominant grassroots institution capable of superceding the 
politically charged social attitudes and practices that penetrate throughout Boaco civil society 
and shape everyday conduct among my informants.  Many informants tended to view any form 
of cooperation as left-leaning progressive politics opposed to the market-centered political 
economy championed throughout the reconstruction period. In this vein, Boaco Cattlemen’s 
Association representative Rodrigo, added: 
 Cooperatives – how do I say this – the word ‘association’ connotes a group of people 
 that deal with one another.  On the other hand, the word ‘cooperative’ is understood to be 
 a group that gets together to look for funds, to commercialize their products.  
 Associations are the same.  The only difference is the name.  ... Cooperatives are a 
 Sandinista thing.  Look here in Boaco, COCABO is the only coffee cooperative made up 
 of democrats, Liberals.  The Association is democrats. [The cooperatives] San Felipe, 
 Tierra Nueva, San Isidro are all Sandinistas, they are communist, they are closed. 
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Figure 6.3. Dairy cattle ranchers ride into Boaco daily to bring canisters of milk to market 
(photo by author) 
 
 
 The right-wing political-economic discourse I encountered among most Boaco’s 
conservative and liberal ‘democratic’ forces finds its opposite among the debilitated trade 
unions, producer cooperatives, and small agricultural producers in municipal Boaco.  The Unión 
Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos (UNAG) trade union, from its central offices near the 
Boaco cathedral, carries out a range of economic evaluation and social development programs 
for its members, including recent efforts as a secondary implementing agent for the Finnish 
government FOMEVIDAS financial support detailed below.  The formally non-partisan UNAG 
remains mired by its historic FSLN affiliations and socially progressive politics that have cast an 
ideological shadow across its work throughout Boaco.  The municipal UNAG representative 
Mateo demonstrated the complex balance that most institutions have struck in their efforts to 
reconstruct place-specific terms of neoliberal political economy from below.  Bound to market 
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forces, UNAG has sought a middle ground that uses market relations to provide for social well-
being in the region.   
 We fell into the 1990s. We fell into peace. With all the bad that happened in the 1990s, 
 at least we lived in peace. ... Cooperatives and that form of coming together to work 
 transformed into a business.  And businesses are there to exploit us.  Businesses think 
 with their head, not their heart. Even though they are thinking about improving the 
 quality and quantity of production, they still have established themselves as una empresa 
 cooperativa.  So, they require a series of legal requirements ... UNAG - one of its 
 principal activities is to organize people in cooperatives so that producers benefit more. ... 
 I am more or less support them because we have to recognize the economic realities since 
 the 1990s is that we have to continue earning money and the best form to do that is 
 through empresas cooperativas.   
 
 Most Boaco cooperatives have struggled with partisan perceptions that complicate their 
governance role in reconstructing a market-based political economy in Boaco.  The partisan 
efforts to frame organizations and actors through a Left-Right political lens has weighed heavily 
on the generally small and financially challenged coffee, dairy and beef cattle ranching, and 
horticultural producer cooperatives that exist in Boaco.  Major financial organizations like 
Fundación Prodesa, regional development NGOs like ASPRODIC, and even producer 
cooperatives themselves recognized their political weakness and public perceptions that painted 
all cooperatives as tainted, leftist institutions. As Cooperativa Santiago dairy cattle rancher 
Ignacio commented:  
 This region is dominated by ranching.  You could describe us as very extremist, but very 
 individualist.  ‘Look at my pig, look at my chicken, look at my wife.’  Also, individuals 
 sometimes break this framework through a form of group production, but even then each 
 producer has his own farm, his pig, his chicken. ... [The cooperative has] had setbacks.  
 We are very small. The cooperative perhaps has not put up with some things. We have a 
 governing board. I am the president and I am accountable. We have an account that takes 
 care of the finances with the foundational view that we do not give anything to anybody. 
 We are a solvent cooperative.  We do not give anything to anybody. ... To ranchers here, 
 the behavior that exists among cooperatives and their members is totally contrary to 
 ranching -  [ranchers think that cooperatives] do not care about ranching. They are afraid 
 of [cooperatives]. They have a fear of the word ‘cooperative’ – horror – I am talking 
 about now.  It is that legacy from the 1980s. ...  
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 Most producer cooperatives I encountered, from both the left and right, have had to 
negotiate the proper balance between the complex neoliberal and progressive political currents 
always found just below the surface in Boaco daily life.  The governance roles that producer 
organizations have adopted reflect the grounded practices that have built up over recent decades 
to define political-economic conditions in Boaco through three decades of war and 
reconstruction.  For example, the Liberal-leaning coffee cooperative Cooperativa de Cafeteleros 
de Boaco (COCABO) representative Lucas explained:  
 COCABO was born out of necessity, as a response to the challenges that the agricultural 
 sector in the central Nicaragua region [in 1979).  Also, there was a need to have an 
 organization supported by the law and controlled by producers before the aggressive 
 advances being shown by the government towards producers. So, there also was a 
 political necessity to bring together our properties as a united group. ... We saw the 
 cooperative as a ‘third way’ between the two large blocs advocating the politics of either 
 capitalism or communism-socialism.  We could not avoid the reality in Nicaragua and the 
 world.  So, we lived through a ‘third way’.  We implemented democracy – one person, 
 one vote – there was equity in how much you produced and how much you received.  
 [We promoted] equality. 
 
 In similar fashion, Tierra Nueva, the federation of coffee and honey cooperatives 
mentioned above, bore the harshest critique among informants who called it a Sandinista 
organization and dismissed its role within the neoliberal political-economic reconstruction 
process in post-war Boaco.  However, Tierra Nueva representative Francisca laughed 
sardonically when I discussed these popular accusations.  According to her, the Tierra Nueva 
board of directors was evenly split with four Liberal members and four FSLN members.  The 
Tierra Nueva program, in Francisca’s own words, involved:  
 [The 1990s-era cooperatives] arose from a sentiment that came from within, rather than 
 being imposed.  We say here that we are now a cooperative business (una empresa 
 cooperativa).  Everything we do comes from an entrepreneurial point-of-view to continue 
 developing and growing. ... We are an empresa cooperativa with a  commitment to social 
 responsibility. We maintain and preserve the values of cooperativism. But we maintain an 
 entrepreneurial vision to move away from the notion that everything is handed out and to 
 guarantee the economic sustainability. 
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 Undoubtedly, some of the commercial associations, producer cooperatives, and related 
organizations in Boaco do maintain strong political tendencies shaped by the predominantly 
FSLN membership.  The general resistance among liberal social forces to cooperative 
institutions and progressive politics becomes, in effect, a self-fulfilling prophecy as left-leaning 
actors gravitate towards the political space provided by trade unions, cooperatives, and other 
organizations as a coping mechanism among the predominant neoliberal currents that have 
organized Boaco since the Contra conflict.  Nevertheless, the partisan political tendencies among 
even these organizations struggle to balance liberal and progressive ideologies within the 
contingently neoliberal political-economic space forged in Boaco.  The Cooperativa San Isidro 
representatives Lázaro and Vidal, for example, found my ‘partisanship’ questions openly 
amusing as Lázaro noted that San Isidro remained officially non-partisan, before adding that:24 
 Cooperatives are businesses with an entrepreneurial vision. ... There are various political 
 tendencies. But what matters to us is the development of the cooperative as such.  Our 
 motivating force is work, production, commercialization – it does not matter whether 
 your allegiance is Sandinista, Conservative. We don’t take that into account. The 
 governing board members are Sandinistas, but we do not talk about it.   
 
I asked Lázaro and Vidal their thoughts on why so many Boaco informants forcefully dismiss 
cooperatives such as theirs as Sandinista organizations. Vidal replied:  
 The idea is this: In the 1980s, people formed cooperatives. The logic is sound. The [Law 
 on Cooperatives] does not establish that cooperatives are only for people who directly 
 adhere to a particular ideology, religion, or belief. Cooperatives are gender neutral, with 
 no political colors or [other discrimination]. ... [Yet] the people logically maintain that 
 the word ‘cooperative’ is completely political.  The people do not look directly now at 
 what we do, they just say ‘eh, eh, eh’.  But it is not that way.  
 
                                                
24 Anecdotally, Cooperativa San Isidro representatives Lázaro and Vidal noted, after some 
debate, that 90% of the cooperative members were FSLN supporters, and they both adopted the 
FSLN tradition of referring to one another as ‘comrade’ (compañero) in casual conversation. 
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 These stories of skepticism, cooperation, political tension, and progressive political 
institutions tell us something about how Boaqueños are performing neoliberal political economy 
within the predominantly local political-economic space that defines post-conflict Boaco life.  
The dominant political discourse that paints trade unions, cooperative organizations, and 
professional associations as politically charged, leftist political forces has fueled the place-based, 
individualist terms of neoliberal political-economic reconstruction in Boaco municipality.  In the 
final section, we can turn attention to the contingent manifestations of neoliberal political 
economy that are playing out on the ground as individual Boaqueños negotiate the complicated 
institutional and governance geographies that have come to define post-conflict political 
economy in the Boaco municipality, the Boaco department, and beyond.  
 
6.7  CONTINGENT RECONSTRUCTIONS OF NEOLIBERAL POLITICAL ECONOMY  
       IN BOACO 
  
 The deep-seated historical patterns of cultural politics that have shaped Boaco and the 
central Nicaraguan highlands from the U.S. protectorate period to the present day are made 
manifest among the fractured political institutions and endemic political tensions that frame the 
mélange of everyday practices among the Boaqueño population.  How the Boaco population has 
negotiated the reconstruction period arrival of transnational reconstruction networks and the at-
times heavy-handed presence of the internationally funded, place-based reconstruction sector 
powerfully reflects the playing out of these historic tensions over the political-economic and 
cultural identity of the Boaco region. 
 Boaqueños continue to negotiate a political-economic landscape filled with longstanding 
unresolved political tensions between the patriarchal, staunchly individualist, place-centered 
cultural traditions of the cattle-producing region and the late 20th century rise of a more socially 
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progressive, regional vision for reconstructing political, economic, and social conditions in 
Boaco.  Everyday life becomes a social performance that constitutes the contingent, highly 
localized reconstruction of neoliberal political economy on the ground.  The varied ways that my 
Boaco informants have made sense of the broader patterns of neoliberal reconstruction during 
the past two decades reflects the unfinished, actively contested process of building contingent 
patterns of political-economic regulation and discipline that fit within the distinct cultural milieu 
of Boaco daily life. 
 Through the 20th century, the historic internecine Conservative tensions between 
traditionalists and agro-export elites and the broader Conservative-Liberal tensions slowly 
resolved themselves in favor of a conservative agro-export culture that incorporated core liberal 
political and economic values along the way (Walker 2003).  This historic evolution of the 
conservative Boaco culture remains visible in the staunch Boaco support for orthodox market 
principles and practices that have been developing from the 1920s onward – a commitment to 
neoliberal political economy before post-conflict reconstruction, before political-economic 
reform, before neoliberalism became a formal discourse.  For these Boaqueños, daily life entails 
‘staying the course’ with a focus on place-based economic development, distaste for progressive 
political and social development programs, and a celebration of the individualism that defines 
Boaco in so many ways.  The prominent conservative Boaco patriarch Abelardo embodies this 
perspective, commenting:  
 Do not believe that the countryside is Sandinista – that is pure propaganda. Schools, 
 health, roads – none of that. When the [1990s transition came], farmers thought only 
 about improving themselves. They did not say ‘Ay! This offers us an opportunity. They 
 will give us things.’  No – the countryside realized that it had to work, that every person 
 had to get ahead on his own merits. They were not waiting for handouts from the  
 government, but rather said ‘give me an opportunity to work and get ahead.’  That is the 
 rural mentality, at least for farmers in this department. ... The national problem, that there 
 is no work, no work, no work.  That is not a problem in Boaco. One way or another, 
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 people work. There is not employment, but there is work. ... Boaco has a conviction that 
 only Boaco can solve its problems.  Here in Boaco, no one has given us anything. The 
 only thing we have been given is the hospital, and that was the Japanese. Beyond that, 
 nothing – not the government – nothing.  We have done everything on our own. ... We 
 bought with our own money German motors and we had electric lights, with no 
 government help. Then we decided to get potable water. We rounded up the money, 
 found a company and we had water. We built a park when no government would help us.  
 We decided to build a hospital and we did it. ... We are egotistical, but we are not stingy.  
 
 This historical development of Boaco cultural politics, particularly honed by the 
FSLN/Contra period, has set in stone an ideological commitment within most of the Boaco 
population to the entrenched, hierarchical capitalist political economy of cattle production and 
cattle farm relations that dominate both the municipality and the broader department.  Informants 
frequently resorted to descriptions of both FSLN and Liberal deprivations during the Contra 
conflict to justify maintaining Boaco political-economic sovereignty apart from neighboring 
communities and from national control in Managua.25  The local business entrepreneur Julieta 
exemplifies this dominant trend in political thought on the street:26  
 The population in Boaco are mostly Liberals, and the do not ask for handouts.  They want 
 to live off their own means and to be able to say ‘this is mine. I made this, and I took care 
 of myself.’ So people do not mobilize or organize for anything.  They see any efforts like 
 that as Sandinista.  The notion of going and asking for handouts from other people is 
 ugly. 
 
 The strong commitment to a market-based rationality guiding political and social life 
appears even among many of the economically most precarious Boaco residents I encountered.  
One micro-enterprise cafe owner, Berta, recounted (but would not permit an audio recording of) 
her own family’s recent experience of FSLN-inspired political repression involving a local 
                                                
25 The left-leaning ASPRODIC representative Dolores also echoed the view that Boaco suffered 
from a culture of political tension that set it apart from regional cooperation and national 
Nicaraguan government involvement, even within the same political party.  Correspondence 
from August 2009.  
26 This quote is provided from written notes, since Julieta spoke with me during a time in which 
she could not be digitally recorded.  
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Sandinista Council of Citizen’s Power (CPC) that had prevented her family farm access to 
government-managed economic assistance programs to poor farmers due to their Liberal 
political affiliation.  For Berta, Leftist politics were an impediment to the market-based 
economic progress her poor family sought to develop.        
 The frequent stories of Boaco’s independent spirit and readiness to stand against all 
manner of FSLN progressive politics locally, regionally, and nationally gave a voice to the place-
based, market-centered political economy readily apparent throughout the Boaco social 
landscape.  From the relative lack of FSLN or Liberal political graffiti on walls, to the lone dairy 
ranchers scrabbling through the bricked streets on their horses, and the Boaco Cattlemen’s 
Association representative’s unsympathetic ‘a dollar is a dollar’ when talking about ranchers’ 
struggles to afford association membership, Boaco reflected a predominant everyday space 
where a host of daily, calculative practices reproduced a powerfully market-centered neoliberal 
political economy on the ground (Sparke 2006). 
 The Boaco commitment to capitalist political economy is not hegemonic, however.  The 
historic subordination that the working classes, FSLN militants, and economically disadvantaged 
Liberal and Conservative Boaco residents have experienced for decades within the overarching 
conservative political-economic structure of the region has translated into a far more entrenched 
ideological and political divide between the dominant elite classes and the urban and rural 
masses that comprise most of the support for the FSLN and other left-wing political 
organizations.  The FSLN militants in contemporary Boaco – mainly in the lower portion of the 
city at the foot of the hills – have attempted to perform their counter-hegemonic practices 
through a range of public acts (frequent parades, periodic rallies, the red-and-black flags placed 
on walls and street lights) and a very modest effort to promote producer organizations and civil 
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society organizations that blend bipartisan membership (where possible) with a broader social 
development agenda.   
 These informants frequently contrasted the place-centered conditions in Boaco to 
neighboring cattle production-dominated municipalities’ experiences of cooperation and 
progressive politics as an alternative model for reconstructing Boaco through their everyday 
practices.  Many informants I encountered drew inspiration from the robust state of coffee, dairy, 
and agricultural producer cooperatives and associations in municipalities like Camoapa, 
Teustepe, and Santa Lucía as a model for charting a middle ground between market-centered 
practices and the desire to establish a more progressive society focused on social well-being.   
 The precarious producer cooperatives communities in Boaco have not achieved the same 
balance of economic, political, and social development practices as their far more developed 
counterparts in Jinotega.  Nevertheless, the larger cooperatives-based organizations like Tierra 
Nueva, Cooperativa San Isidro, and Cooperativa Miel de Bosque are some of the only organized 
pathways for individuals to renegotiate the terms of neoliberal political economy through 
market-based efforts to provide for social welfare and human capital development in Boaco.  For 
example, the Unión de Cooperativas Tierra Nueva has capitalized upon its preeminent position 
among Boaco-based cooperative organizations to establish extensive political and social 
development programs for its member cooperatives’ associates and their families.  Tierra Nueva 
representatives’ everyday practices discursively approach political-economic reconstruction 
through market tropes, describing their business model as ‘a cooperative business’ (‘una 
empresa cooperativa’) focused on ‘commercialization’ and ‘creative marketing’ for their 
member cooperatives.  At the same time, Tierra Nueva representative Francisca championed the 
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cooperatives-sector balance of market and social development, highlighting the clinics, schools, 
scholarships, and other services that Tierra Nueva provides to its member cooperatives. 
Through these grounded practices, cooperatives-based organizations occupy a key governance 
niche within the broader transnational structure of the post-conflict political economy taking 
shape in Boaco.  Though few in numbers, Tierra Nueva and similar cooperatives-based 
organizations has provided an opportunity to parlay their modest market presence into a new 
political role as intermediary between the state (both national and local) and the needs of the 
Boaco community.  As Tierra Nueva representative Francisca added:  
 There are many aspects that should be subsidized by the government that the 
 cooperatives are handling now.  For example, access to credit. The cooperatives are 
 occupying that political space. Technical assistance should be handled by the Ministry of 
 Agriculture and Animal Husbandry.  So, the cooperatives have to meet that demand 
 alongside capacity development in those sectors.  It is cooperatives that are providing 
 those services. I think that if the government were intelligent, they would design a 
 strategy to strengthen [cooperatives-based organizations[ because we are doing a great 
 deal of the work.  
 
 For Tierra Nueva, these governance practices have involved a program to provide three public 
meeting halls in Boaco and neighboring municipalities to foster a democratic, civic space for 
public use.  In a similar vein, the Cooperativa San Isidro members have worked to translate their 
enhanced market presence into multiple social programs for both their members and the broader 
Boaco community. As Cooperativa San Isidro representative Vidal commented, their balanced 
economic and social development agenda remains firmly grounded to a visión empresarial, or 
entrepreneurial, market-based vision that took hold during the reconstruction period.  
 Despite this neoliberal market-centered rhetoric, the progressive Boaco coffee, dairy 
cattle, agricultural, and honey producers (among others) I encountered reflected a commonly 
tense and uneasy relationship with the post-conflict terms of market-centered political economy 
in Nicaragua.  The ‘middle ground’ between orthodox neoliberalism and a more contingent, 
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grounded vision for neoliberal political-economic imagination remains hotly contested even as 
individual Boaco residents from across the political spectrum converge towards a dominant 
market rationality.      
 From above, post-conflict reconstruction and development programs that connect 
international state and non-state donors with regional and municipal actors continue to heavily 
influence the daily political-economic imaginations and practices that take hold on the ground.  
Most prominently, the Government of Finland established in 2004 the Program to Strengthen 
Rural Development and Reduce Poverty in Boaco and Chontales (FOMEVIDAS) in cooperation 
with the Nicaraguan Institute for Rural Development (IDR) to promote Nicaraguan institutional 
capacity for advancing rural socio-economic development.  Through FOMEVIDAS, Finland has 
required the Nicaraguan government to provide 10% matching funds (Finland has granted US$ 
2.5 - 4.5 million annually) for its market-centered rural development efforts (Kääriä et al. 2008; 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2004).  More direct pressures from international NGO 
donors further discipline place-based actors towards the contingent forms of neoliberal market 
political economy that can be observed on the ground.  For example, Boaco coffee producer 
Cooperativa San Isidro has adopted Germany-based Fair Trade Labeling Organizations 
International (FLO) standards with a social reinvestment fund program that directs US$10 from 
every 100-pound bag of coffee sold (i.e., a quintal) towards regional road and infrastructure 
development, and producer needs including funeral expenses, surviving family benefits, family 
member education benefits, and athletic development.  
 Despite these overarching pressures that continue to influence the reconstruction of 
neoliberal political economies on the ground, individual Boaco informants remain seemingly 
more ambivalent about how best to reorganize their economic, political, and social life among 
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the unresolved political tensions that permeate Boaco everyday life.  The honey producers’ 
Cooperativa Miel del Bosque (a member cooperative within Tierra Nueva) representative 
Aznaro forcefully expressed this situation, commenting: 
 The [neoliberal] model is supremely antagonistic. In the 1990s, the inspiration for the 
 model was to socialize everyone to hard struggle, to focus on communism as something 
 diabolical and unethical. To the poor who consume the communications media, they were 
 told they had to leave the [1980s Sandinista] model and that they preferred being a 
 peasant well paid by the patrón instead of being their own patrón.  ...   When we talk 
 about the 1990s to now, the battle has been hard to change the conception, the spirit and 
 the sentiment among the poor.  We are living in a false happiness. ... What good is a nice 
 salary? What good is a free market if we cannot buy the things we need? The basic 
 goods, at least.  
 
The neoliberal political-economic visions that frame the everyday, calculative practices 
performed by informants like Aznaro  spotlight the contingent conditions through which the 
reconstruction of a neoliberal political economy has been contested and negotiated on the ground 
in Boaco.  Again, Aznaro: 
 [The neoliberal] model has brought on a loss of ideology and that cooperative spirit.  
 Cooperatives members were conscious of that spirit, they were conscious of their social 
 responsibility.  But acting within a neoliberal manner – I am not criticizing neoliberalism, 
 I am not criticizing our economic model, but I am aware of what I consider to have been 
 the biggest effects.  ... Now we talk about entrepreneurial visions of cooperativism (una 
 visión empresarial cooperativista). We can no longer talk about a cooperative mission, 
 but instead about being competitive in order to modernize. We cannot stop in the street 
 and say ‘hey, comrade’.  Cooperativism is about competition, success, gaining strength – 
 deep in your gut, you have something corrupting you, a cancer.  Cooperatives are the 
 antithesis of competition.  However, that is all now part of our language – The 
 entrepreneurial focus, competitiveness, all those things you can imagine form part of the 
 toolkit for struggle. 
 
 What this means for the contingent neoliberal patterns of post-conflict political economy 
in Boaco remains uncertain.  On one hand, an orthodox neoliberal political economy centered on 
place and individual market actors holds great influence among the Boaco population.  In this 
imagination, a clear line has been drawn that defines and sets economic life apart from social and 
political concerns.  On the other hand, this orthodox neoliberal imagination rests alongside a 
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restive counter-imagination that strikes a tenuous balance between market-centered and more 
progressive development concerns.  For some Boaqueños, this tension has taken shape through 
practices that attempt to negotiate a contingent form of neoliberal political economy in which 
market rationality blends with social and political welfare concerns to define the nature of 
reconstruction.  For other Boaqueños, the social and spatial reconstruction of political economy 
wrestles with how to balance these neoliberal and progressive imaginations for reorganizing 
post-conflict life in Boaco.  The complex tangle of narratives, practices, and institutions that 
arise on the ground reflect these unresolved tensions as Boaco struggles to define the terms of 
neoliberal political economy ands its place within the transnational capitalist political and 
economic order that arrived on its doorstep when peace came to Nicaragua in 1990.  
 
6.8  CONCLUDING REMARKS: RECONSTRUCTING POLITICAL ECONOMY FROM 
BELOW  
 
 The culturally informed political economy perspective adopted throughout this chapter 
provides a lens for understanding the grounded intersections of political and economic rhetoric, 
practices, and institutions that constitute the contingent patterns of post-conflict reconstruction 
encountered in both Jinotega and Boaco.  Jessop and Sum (2007) provide a framework for 
reconstructing political economy through a process of variation, selection, and retention of 
particular societal frameworks from within the bounded possibilities afforded by an overarching 
capitalist structure.  The focus on everyday practices in Jinotega and Boaco highlights the 
argument that the broader transnational structure of post-conflict political economy not only 
informs how reconstruction has developed in Nicaragua from above.  Rather, post-conflict 
reconstruction simultaneously takes contingent forms as an effect of those same everyday 
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conditions that define, put into practice, and institutionalize particular articulations of political 
economy from below.   
 Nicaraguan post-conflict reconstruction can be seen as a prolonged, negotiated process of 
defining and consolidating a cultural political-economic order through the geographically distinct 
institutional and governance relations forged on the ground.  Reconstruction policy has taken a 
generally market-centered, neoliberal approach globally and nationally for twenty years.  
However, reconstruction remains a contingent process that takes shape through the grounded 
articulation of transnational forces and daily practices that help define the patterns of post-
conflict political economy as part overarching structure and part emergent, relational effect.  In 
this vein, Jinotega show signs of moving towards a progressive, market-centered form of 
neoliberal political economy (albeit certainly with its own counter-narratives).  However, Boaco 
continues to struggle to define a coherent political-economic imagination that balances orthodox 
neoliberal thought and grounded, contingent neoliberal forms appropriate to the post-conflict 
milieu that has taken root in this central Nicaraguan region.   
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CHAPTER 7 
 
IS RECONSTRUCTION DOING MORE HARM THAN GOOD? SOME FINAL 
THOUGHTS 
 
 
 
7.1  CONFLICT, RECONSTRUCTION, AND ... NOW WHAT? 
 The future of Nicaraguan post-conflict reconstruction has reached a pivotal moment at 
the time of writing.  In November 2011, Nicaraguans held general elections for the National 
Assembly and the presidency.  These elections returned FSLN head Daniel Ortega Saavedra to 
the presidential Casa Rosa for a third consecutive presidential administration.  Since the FSLN 
returned to the Presidential Palace in November 2006, critics from across the political spectrum 
have noted growing concern with the consolidation of political control by President Ortega and 
his loyal group of Orteguistas over key state institutions, municipal governments, 
communications media, and the electoral process (Carter Center 2011; Envío 2011).  The 
constitutional legality questions surrounding a third consecutive Ortega administration and 
widespread election fraud allegations have stoked the fires of partisan animosity throughout 
Nicaragua (EEAS 2011 ; OAS 2011). 
 The inflammatory rhetoric of dictatorship, revolution, and treason has been part of 
political leaders’ and everyday citizens’ repertoire with alarming frequency in the prolonged 
political period leading to November 2011. Formally, political leaders, media outlets, and 
watchdog organizations have ranged from early 2008 warnings that Nicaragua hovered on the 
edge between ‘dictatorship versus democracy’ (O'Grady 2008) to the latest 2011 warnings in the 
Nicaraguan political journal Envío that “The identification of state interests with those of the 
governing party—one of the most criticized characteristics of the Ortega administration both 
now and in the eighties—is reaching a dangerous climax with this symbiosis” (Envío 2011).  
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Meanwhile, people in small towns like Jinotega and Boaco, on street corners, in homes, and 
across electronic social media have fearfully turned their thoughts towards warnings of 
rearmament, training camps in the mountains, and recent acts of paramilitary political murder 
by self-styled defenders of a democratic Nicaraguan state (Garth Medina 2011).  For many of the 
informants included in this dissertation, hope for reconstruction has given way to fear for what 
the future may bring in the coming weeks and months after the 2011 general election.27   
 The coming pivotal juncture in Nicaraguan post-conflict reconstruction returns us to the 
question that launched this study: Why have two decades of international and domestic political 
efforts to rebuild a neoliberal political, economic, and social order in Nicaragua failed to 
supercede the political divisions and tensions that led to revolution, counter-revolution, and 
conflict in the 1970s and 1980s?  From a normative, international perspective, Nicaraguan post-
conflict reconstruction has failed to consolidate a shared national vision rooted in capitalist 
market democracy in which all major stakeholders adhere to a single set of rules, institutions, 
and governance relations.  The Nicaraguan reconstruction experience seems to support the 
argument that rapid political and economic liberalization has entrenched the polarized political 
and economic relations that carried through the Contra conflict and into the post-conflict period 
(Paris 2002b, 2004).  Yet, the question of why Nicaraguan post-conflict reconstruction continues 
to struggle so intensely with ideological and political divisions carried over from the Contra 
conflict begs the question of whether the dominant approach to political-economic reconstruction 
may be part of the problem, rather than a path for superceding Nicaraguan economic, political, 
and social tensions. 
 
 
                                                
27 Informant email correspondences, October 12, 2011 and October 21, 2011. 
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7.2  WHY THE GEOGRAPHY OF RECONSTRUCTION MATTERS 
 
  This study centered on three closely related research questions to answer the central 
question of why Nicaraguan post-conflict reconstruction has produced such a mixed political 
record despite 20 years of global attention to capitalist-democratic reforms.  First, I set out to 
determine what post-conflict transnational governance looked like in Nicaragua and what role 
this governance has played in reconstructing a political-economic structure grounded in 
neoliberal discourse.  Second, I examined whether post-conflict reconstruction has taken shape 
through meaningfully different, place-specific forms of transnational governance that are 
responsive to the contingent blend of economic, political, and social conditions in different 
localities.  Third, I questioned how the place-specific, wartime political-economic conditions, 
relations, and experiences have carried into the post-conflict reconstruction period, building on 
recent critical interventions that challenge the hard epistemological divide between conflict and 
peace (Dahlman 2011; Kirsch and Flint 2011b; Megoran 2011; Moodie 2010; Richmond 2010a; 
Ross 2011).  
 The study began from the critical perspective that post-conflict reconstruction is a 
normative project that transforms the political-economic regime in war-torn states.  I borrowed 
from recent contributions in both geography and critical international relations to consider the 
role of transnational connections in setting the post-conflict agenda for how best to rebuild 
institutions and governance in the image of a neoliberal political economy.  I have drawn 
particular inspiration from recent research critically examining both the geography and political 
power relations that inform reconstructions of peace.  These contributions suggest that 
reconstruction efforts have adopted a universal model for rebuilding post-war states that is 
heavily influenced by a blend of liberal and neoliberal thought (Caplan 2005; Cousens and 
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Kumar 2001; Jacoby 2007; Ottaway 2002b, 2003b, 2003a; Paris 1997; Richmond 2004; Stanley 
and Peceny 2001).   
 Moreover, recent research highlights the geography of reconstruction as a contested 
political process that produces hybrid everyday spaces of peace and non-peace (Dahlman 2009; 
Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 2006; Jeffrey 2006; Kirsch and Flint 2011b; Megoran 2011; Richmond 
2005b, 2010b).  From this perspective, reconstruction is a relational process that combines 
economic, political, and cultural institutions and actors from multiple scales into contingent, 
place-specific patterns of post-war political economy (Flint 2011; Waizenegger and Hyndman 
2011).  Many of these works cast particular attention on the transnational connections among 
multilateral organizations, external donor states, development NGOs, and post-conflict state and 
non-state actors that produce the hybrid, contested spaces of reconstruction and post-war 
violence as part of daily life (Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 2005b; Richmond 2010b). 
 The current study has advanced the post-conflict reconstruction literature by providing 
more detail on how the place-specific reconstructions of political economy involve complicated 
negotiation of the very definitions and praxis of neoliberalism and post-neoliberal thought.  That 
is, I approached reconstruction as not solely a dominant neoliberal process imposed from above 
or a resistant anti-neoliberal process crafted from below.  Reconstruction emerged within the 
hybrid relational spaces of dominance/resistance through which the contingent political-
economic imaginations and practices that constitute reconstruction on the ground are set in 
motion (Sharp et al. 2000).  The focus I placed on reconstruction practices have set the stage for 
a more nuanced understanding of reconstruction that helps move us beyond a tendency to view 
reconstruction through the dichotomous and unidirectional lens of transnational processes and 
place-based ef
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casts greater focus on reconstruction practices among the grounded actors whose daily 
experiences and subjectivities constitute the actually lived terms of reconstruction on the ground 
(cf. Pickering 2007).   
 To answer these questions, I approached post-conflict reconstruction in the Nicaraguan 
departments and municipalities of Jinotega and Boaco using a political economy perspective.  
The recent conceptual work on the contingent intersections of culture, political economy, and 
societal modes of regulation (and more recent work on cultural political economy) has made a 
compelling argument that capitalist political economy can adopt varied social forms through a 
blend of economic and political-cultural relations and identities that draw on culturally grounded 
patterns of political, economic, and social institutions and relations (Jessop 2007; Jessop and 
Sum 2007; Jessop and Oosterlynck 2008; Jones 2008; van Heur 2010).  We can view political 
economy and regulation as contingent processes that create culturally specific ideas about 
economic and political organization, which then are put into practice, and ultimately become part 
of the institutional fabric of a society.   
 Post-conflict reconstruction reorganizes the political-economic regime and attendant 
societal modes of regulation around distinct sets of post-conflict institutions, governance 
relations, and daily practices that are always filtered through the place-specific, situated actors 
that can be encountered through field research among particular localities.  The political 
economy perspective has provided a cogent rationale for examining post-conflict reconstruction 
through the lens of place-specific cultural and economic politics around which contingent forms 
of neoliberal political economy and regulation have taken hold among Nicaraguan localities 
particularly since the 1990 transition from FSLN revolutionary rule. 
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 At its roots, political economy deals with the culturally specific origins of political and 
economic structure.  The Nicaraguan case suggests that the intersection of culture and political 
economy is a recursive process filled with starts, stops, reversals, and setbacks in the effort to 
reorganize the political-economic structure.  The prolonged competition among different 
political organizations reflects a fluid, place-specific set of political patterns among Nicaraguan 
localities.  The at times contentious political relationships that form around cultural norms, 
societal institutions, divergent governance patterns, and variable daily practices both between 
and within particular places defy a simple evolutionary progression from conflict towards a 
reconstructed neoliberal political economy. 
 I adopted an extended case method ethnographic research protocol to best capture the 
ways that neoliberal political economy and cultural politics have come together to define the 
place-specific forms of post-conflict reconstruction taking shape in Nicaraguan localities.  A 
hallmark of extended case method ethnography, as I discussed in Chapter 4, is the ability to 
redefine our theoretical concepts through case studies that are simultaneously grounded in and 
force us to constantly modify our theoretical points of view in light of research findings 
(Burawoy 2009; Hart 2004).  The extended case ethnographic method provides an essential look 
into reconstruction of neoliberal political economy from a uniquely situated perspective that 
nicely complements the dominant institutional and governance perspectives.   
 This ethnographic perspective – what Pickering (2007) calls a view of reconstruction 
‘from the ground floor’ – has allowed us to see how post-conflict reconstruction has established 
contingent forms of neoliberal regulation through the everyday practices and experiences 
encountered among informants in Jinotega and Boaco.  It bears mention that the relationship 
between reconstruction and political economy is a two-way street.  Informants’ daily practices 
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and subjectivities have formed through their embeddedness within the reconstruction of societal 
institutions and governance relations.  At the same time, these same practices and subjectivities 
redefine from within what a post-conflict political-economic order look like, how it operates, and 
what it means. 
 The results of this study are not complete without a brief consideration of the particular 
limitations and challenges that come with studying reconstruction from a culturally grounded 
political economy perspective and using an ethnographic extended case method.  This particular 
ethnographic method has been subject to criticism for its inherent risk of developing unreliable, 
unverifiable results due to sampling biases, researcher subjectivities, and the inability to wholly 
overcome the research position as an outsider to the cultural milieu under study (Hammersley 
1992).  The extended case method ethnographic approach to this study undoubtedly did permit 
me to make sense of the recursive interplay between political-economic structure and the daily 
practices and subjectivities that reproduce and transform that structure within the distinct cultural 
contexts of Jinotega and Boaco.  However, the question of whether the Nicaraguan 
reconstruction story I have told approximates a reliable representation of post-conflict life in my 
field sites. 
 I approached this study knowing that studying Nicaraguan post-conflict reconstruction 
posed unique challenges that are the result of the distinct manner in which Nicaragua transitioned 
from conflict to post-conflict processes with the 1990 election, rather than through formal peace 
accords.  In Chapter One, I discussed the imperfect fit between the ‘reconstruction’ period 
initiated in 1990 and the neoliberal reforms initiated in the late 1980s.  However, the exceptional 
nature of Nicaraguan reconstruction is, I believe, a strength of this study.  Ethnographic extended 
case method relies on an ability to find the anomalies within existing theories and then refine 
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theory based on new research.  That being the case, Nicaragua provided a clear reminder that 
both reconstruction and neoliberalization are political processes only contingently bound 
together in time and space.  The fundamental issues involved – political-economic reforms, 
persistent political tensions, place-specific institutions and governance relations, transnational 
connections – continued to be salient elements of the research agenda. 
 Reconstruction and political economy formation are both prolonged social processes 
spanning years and even decades (Junne and Verkoren 2005a).   The ethnographic research I 
conducted for two months from early July-early September 2009, along with prior visits for two 
weeks in 2008, raises a valid question of whether the amount of time I spent in the field provided 
sufficient contact with research informants and immersion within the daily rhythms of Jinotega 
and Boaco life to provide a robust understanding of the political-economic reconstruction 
process.  Michael Burawoy offers only vague guidance with his call for ‘extended periods of 
time following their subjects around, living their lives, learning their ways and wants’ (Burawoy 
2000: 27).  Ethnographic research is always an historical and geographic cross-section limited in 
scope.  Part of the research process is to extend that ethnographic moment both backwards in 
time and outwards in space to situate the research within a larger historical and geographic 
context (Burawoy 2009; Gille 2001).  Thus, the not-so-simple answer is that the right amount of 
time is however long is necessary to confidently gain an understanding on the processes and 
practices that have conditioned and continue to shape the reconstruction of the political-
economic structure in each field site.  
 With the limited time frame, my research focused heavily on themes of dominance and 
governance with a large number of informants culled from among NGOs, political organizations, 
civil society organizations, and community activists.  While my research did include some 
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connection with the subaltern voices of farmers, street vendors, and more disadvantaged sectors 
of Jinotega and Boaco society, the general silencing of these voices in the current study is a clear 
limitation and opportunity for future research. Undoubtedly, more research time in Jinotega and 
Boaco would have permitted me to collect a more robust understanding of both the context for 
and daily, lived experiences of political-economic reconstruction among a broader set of social 
positions.  These challenges have been mitigated to a large extent by the limited scope of this 
study with its focus on small Nicaraguan localities rather than major urban centers like Managua 
or León.  The more intimate settings in Jinotega and Boaco enhanced my ability both to gain 
formal access to particular informants and to develop more personal, informal relationships 
within the communities within the limited time spent in the field.  These connections proved to 
be essential for the study to develop an understanding of how people have defined and negotiated 
the neoliberal political-economic reconstruction process through the place-based institutions and 
governance systems that frame daily life. 
 The field sites I selected for this study provided both strengths and weaknesses that came 
to light through the research process.  I approached case selection within an epistemological 
view of the structured totality advocated by ethnographic extended case method advocate 
Michael Burawoy (Burawoy 2009).  I chose to conduct the study in Jinotega and Boaco as two 
field sites from which I expected to gain two distinct, partial visions of how the macro-scale 
processes of reconstruction and neoliberal political-economic reform operated together to 
produce post-conflict space and practices. I intended for the similarities between Jinotega and 
Boaco to limit the meaningful variations that could complicate my ability to interpret and 
analyze my research findings (see Chapter Four).  Jinotega and Boaco shared similar population 
size, similar political heterogeneity (in terms of election returns), and a similar peripheral 
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position within the Nicaraguan political economy accompanied by a large NGO and 
microfinance institution presence readily visible on the ground.  The remaining variation in 
historical experiences of conflict, production base, and regional political economy provided an 
intriguing set of conditions through which I could analyze reconstruction. 
 While the study benefited from the careful field site selection process, the actual research 
equally challenged me to recognize and work through the place-specific cultural differences and 
my own researcher biases that formed in the field.  The majority of my research results 
developed from unstructured interviews I conducted with the informants.  I relied heavily on a 
‘snowball sampling’ technique that took me from one informant to the next through a nebulous 
process of intuition, social observation, referrals, and, in some cases, serendipity (Atkinson and 
Flint 2001; Biernacki and Waldorf 1981).  This chain referral process opened many doors 
(literally) and facilitated my access to informants in both field sites.  Moreover, I did form more 
personal relationships with several research informants that permitted more informal 
conversations both during my time in the field and through extensive electronic correspondence 
during the intervening period since I returned to my U.S. office.   
 However, my relationship with research informants in Jinotega and Boaco varied 
considerably.  For example, I generally found the Jinotega-based NGOs, government agencies, 
private sector organizations, and individuals I encountered to be more willing to engage in 
prolonged, thoughtful conversation on my research than I experienced in Boaco.  The greater 
rapport I enjoyed with Jinotegano informants translated into friendships and a generally more 
informal atmosphere for informant conversations that I had difficulty achieving in Boaco. In the 
latter case, the social distance remained more rigid between my informants and me, complicating 
my efforts to parse rhetoric from reality.  These challenges beg the question of whether these 
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variable field experiences have in some way undermined the validity of what I have reported in 
this study.  Moreover, the constant risk that I, as the researcher, have imprinted my own 
subjective biases too heavily upon what I encountered in the field further deepens the possibility 
that the limited perspectives I am reporting are not capturing a central feature of the 
reconstruction process in my field locations.  
 The short response to these concerns is that this study provides an informed analysis of 
the multi-scalar reconstruction processes that benefit from the political economy perspective and 
ethnographic method adopted.  The research findings are unavoidably partial, shaped by the 
choices I have made as a researcher, the voices heard and the voices unheard, and my 
interpretation of informants’ words, actions, and settings.  Despite the limitations, the study 
grants new insights into the tangled connections between reconstruction policy and contingent 
neoliberal political-economic reforms that develop and become the daily norm in particular 
places (Jones 2008).   
Moreover, the place-based Nicaraguan reconstruction processes detailed in this study provide 
further insights into the international reconstruction project that has developed since 1990.  
Rather than providing a direct comparative framework for additional studies, the reconstruction 
findings in this study provide an opportunity for a conversation with the broader body of work on 
reconstruction in other countries.  Reconstruction in Jinotega is distinct from reconstruction in 
Boaco, other Nicaraguan localities, and certainly reconstruction in locations outside of 
Nicaragua.  Nevertheless, the contingent reconstruction conditions that have come together in my 
field sites are part of a global reconstruction mosaic.  How contingent reconstructions of 
neoliberal political economy have taken shape in Jinotega and Boaco can be used to generate 
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new thinking on the broader definition and implications of post-conflict reconstruction as a 
global political process. 
 Finally, I want to call attention to one additional limitation of the current study that 
presents an opportunity for future research on reconstruction in Nicaragua and other post-conflict 
states.  Throughout this study, my contingent, relational approach to Nicaraguan reconstruction 
was centered on the place-specific patterns of neoliberal reform in Jinotega and Boaco.  
However, a point I raised in Chapter 3 bears being repeated.  The post-Cold War international 
reconstruction regime cannot be reified as a single, trans-historical force.  Reconstruction is a 
contingent and contested concept at all geographic scales.  International reconstruction efforts 
develop among a host of different organizations, institutions, and agencies whose goals and 
commitments vary both ideologically and geographically.  Future research on Nicaraguan 
reconstruction will shift attention onto this international reconstruction regime to better examine 
the contingent construction of reconstruction policies and programs both within particular 
organizations and across organizations separated both by geographic space and by differential 
structural positions within the global political economy.  This call to study international 
reconstruction actors from a strategic-relational perspective would provide a more robust view of 
the historical and geographic conditions for Nicaraguan reconstruction.  
 
 
7.3  RECONSTRUCTION FROM WITHIN: TRANSNATIONALISM, PLACE, AND THE 
 COMPREHENSIVE RECONSTRUCTION OF POST-CONFLICT LIFE  
 
 The results of the current study support the critical view that post-conflict reconstruction 
has reorganized the Nicaraguan political economy through the development of transnational, 
neoliberal forms of societal regulation (Babb 2001; Everingham 1998; Pastor 2002; Robinson 
1996). The predominant transnational governance structure in Jinotega and Boaco has played a 
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key role in advancing the general neoliberal discourse that has informed many of the societal 
institutions, practices, and political subjectivities that have emerged during the post-conflict 
period.  At the same time, this study supports my central thesis that reconstruction has forged 
contingent forms of neoliberal political economy within different Nicaraguan localities that 
challenge our attempts to portray post-conflict reconstruction as a top-down, hegemonic project.    
 Transnational financial connections have permitted international donors and NGOs to 
instill neoliberal market discipline through the penetration of loan-centered financial 
relationships connecting international, national, and municipal actors on the ground.  The 
neoliberal discourse through which international donor state agencies, transnational NGOs, and 
internationally financed micro-credit finance lending institutions have gradually shifted from a 
grants-based to a loans-based political economy in both Jinotega and Boaco has been key to the 
neoliberal form of reconstruction taking shape in Nicaragua.   
 The transnational connections that establish what I have called the ‘reconstruction sector’ 
have supported a small elite of urban professionals who have become the bearers of a neoliberal 
political-economic imagination in Jinotega and Boaco.  These political actors are well positioned 
within many (though not all) of the place-based NGOs, private sector organizations, and civil 
society organizations that guide the reconstruction of a broadly neoliberal post-conflict political 
economy.  These actors have become the ‘gatekeepers’ guiding how political-economic 
reconstruction has taken shape, even as they remain firmly embedded within the same neoliberal 
discourse they promote.  The conversations I had with a range of NGO and civil society 
organization representatives during my field research demonstrated quite clearly that many of 
these actors understood their integral role in the gradual transformation towards neoliberal 
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political practices and political thought based on a discourse of personal responsibility and 
market-based political and social development in their respective regions.    
 The sum result of reconstruction has been a spatial reorganization of post-war political 
and economic life that binds post-conflict states, societies, and communities to the transnational 
political-economic orientation, financial largesse, and program development efforts of 
international donors and their proxies on the ground.  The research in Jinotega and Boaco 
suggests that reconstruction processes may reinforce the ‘project society’ conditions that 
characterize the transnational, neoliberal direction of post-conflict political economy (Sampson 
2003: 329).  As discussed in Chapter Two, the project society argument suggests that 
international reconstruction efforts have failed to develop indigenous societal institutions 
necessary for a secure, stable capitalist-democratic regime (de Zeeuw 2005).  At the same time, 
post-conflict societies are left with an inchoate, internationally supported mix of financial 
assistance and structural development programs that fail to adequately establish long-term 
conditions for autochthonous reconstruction and development (Sampson 2003).  
 The transnational political-economic structure taking shape in Jinotega and Boaco has 
undermined efforts to produce a shared national vision for economic, political, and social 
development.  The vertical, ‘upwards and outwards’ focus among most reconstruction sector 
actors and the general population focused on deepening the connections between their localities 
and the global capitalist political economy as a key to post-conflict development for their 
communities.  This transnational reconstruction shift has occurred at the expense of building a 
shared horizontal space for political participation and democratic governance that can bridge the 
ideological divisions inherited from the Contra conflict.  As Coyne (2005, 325) suggests:  
 Without these preconditions to serve as a foundation, reconstructed liberal orders will 
 fail to be self-sustaining over time. It is argued that the viability of a shared ideology and 
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 ethic, and hence success, is directly dependent on the extent of horizontal ties in the post-
 conflict country. The main conclusion is that societies lacking adequate horizontal ties 
 will require a high level of continual intervention and reconstruction efforts will have a 
 lower probability of success. 
 
 The continued political tensions that have disrupted the consolidation of hegemonic 
economic, political, and social institutions in Jinotega and Boaco are both cause and outcome of 
this transnational reconstruction of a neoliberal political economy.  Societal institutions, 
governance relations, and daily life in both localities reflect the high degree of ideological and 
political divisions that characterize political and civil society.  The consequent fragmentation of a 
universal, shared space for citizen participation has left many informants I encountered feeling 
that they had nowhere else to turn except to the transnational reconstruction sector community 
for their post-war societal development needs.  
 At the same time, the transnational orientation of post-conflict life has reinforced a 
political condition in which there is no real motivation nor need for domestic political 
organizations to find a common ‘middle ground’ centered on a shared reconstruction vision 
among the political elites (Hindess 2002; Thaa 2001).  The entrenched distributional politics 
inherited from the Contra conflict has perpetuated a winner-take-all political system in which 
Liberal and FSLN political organizations and their militant supporters in Jinotega and Boaco 
prioritize political ideology over cooperation and compromise.  Informants’ depictions of post-
conflict political life paints a stark picture of reconstruction that remains mired in the politics of 
the past, from political struggles for control over the legal-institutional space for citizen 
participation and credible reports of election fraud in Jinotega, to ‘defenders of democracy’ 
narratives, accusations of partisan allocation of Nicaraguan government social benefits, and the 
contentious street violence that has erupted in Boaco in recent years.      
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 Notwithstanding these general reconstruction patterns, conceptualizing the Nicaraguan 
post-conflict reconstruction experience as a universal shift towards a transnational political 
economy based on dominant modes of neoliberal political thought is insufficient to explain the 
diverse reconstruction conditions I encountered in Jinotega and Boaco.  This study shows that 
the reconstruction of neoliberal political economy in Jinotega and Boaco has adapted, both in 
meaning and content, to the place-specific blend of economic, political, and social institutions, 
relations, and identities through which individuals order their daily lives.  The societal regulation 
approach I have adopted requires that we look beyond top-heavy transnational political-
economic institutions and governance relations to examine the more diffuse set of everyday, 
calculative practices that construct and reproduce place-specific forms of political-economic 
reconstruction (Sparke 2006).  
 The findings of this study suggest that reconstruction has established distinct neoliberal 
forms of political-economic regulation in Jinotega and Boaco that draw from the grounded 
cultural milieu within which broader capitalist-democratic processes are received.  These 
grounded reconstruction experiences have produced forms of post-conflict political economy that 
still fall within the broad framework of neoliberal political-economic regulation established since 
the end of the Contra conflict, yet demonstrate very distinct socio-spatial patterns of daily 
practice and political subject formation on the ground.  
 The transnational connections shaping the post-conflict reconstruction of neoliberal 
political-economic regulation in Jinotega and Boaco operate in subtle ways not entirely captured 
by current theories on transnational and neoliberal governance (Larner and LeHeron 2003; 
Larner and Walters 2004, cf. Robinson 1996, 2003).  The reconstruction of neoliberal political 
economy has taken hold in an  uncoordinated, at times almost accidental, fashion through a 
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relatively incoherent, grounded set of actors and political projects.  The reconstruction sector in 
Nicaragua, as elsewhere, consists of countless international donor agencies, NGOs, and domestic 
organizations with varied inter-connections, different economic perspectives, and variable 
attention to broader theoretical implications of their long-term reconstruction programs.   
 The reconstruction of neoliberal political economy is better viewed as a process that 
translates the generally neoliberal perspectives shared by transnational governance actors into the 
daily practices and political subjectivities that develop on the ground to perform and reproduce 
the post-conflict reconstruction process (Larner and LeHeron 2003).  To a considerable extent, 
daily life in Jinotega and Boaco does reflect the neoliberal disciplinary practices put in place, in 
part, through the transnational reconstruction sector.  My informants in Jinotega and Boaco 
carried on their everyday affairs within a social milieu centered on market-based solutions to the 
political and social challenges that the Nicaraguan people confront on a daily basis.  The brass 
ring for political and economic success rests in individual connection to international finance, 
inclusion within NGO projects, and access to micro-credit financial support.  It bears mention 
that these neoliberal boundaries on daily practice shaped many informants’ actions and 
perspectives both among reconstruction sector actors (e.g., NGO representatives) and among 
other individuals involved in small business, agriculture, services, and even informal sector 
activities. 
 However, reconstruction in Jinotega and Boaco suggests that post-conflict political 
economy has not come solely from above, nor even from below, but from within through the 
grounded political articulation of institutions, relations, and actors from a range of geographic 
locations that make up the social fabric of place.  Two decades of global attention to 
reconstructing neoliberal political economy in Nicaragua has produced a complex mosaic of 
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political-economic institutions, relations, and daily practices grounded in the contingent 
articulation of economic and identity politics that constitute and become ‘visible’ in particular 
places.  Jinotega and Boaco have had strikingly distinct Contra conflict experiences, from the 
direct conditions of war and social dislocation that Jinotega endured to the more indirect ‘war at 
a distance’ and perceived depravity of the FSLN revolutionary government experienced in 
Boaco.  These political histories have recursively become bound up with the distinct political 
economy of production and attendant differences in everyday life-worlds that exist in Jinotega 
and Boaco.  The prevalent small-scale coffee production and agricultural farmers that define 
everyday life in Jinotega are a world apart from the prevalent beef and dairy cattle ranchers that 
dominate everyday life in Boaco.   
 The reconstruction of neoliberal political-economic conditions has drawn from these 
distinct regional and place-specific historical and geographic contexts to develop very distinct 
perspectives on political rapprochement, capitalist economy, and political and social 
development in Jinotega and Boaco.  This study suggests that the ideological and political 
divisions that remain strong for militants and political elites in Jinotega have been moderated 
among much – perhaps even most – of the general population.  The post-conflict rise of coffee 
production cooperatives as a predominant social institution in the region and throughout northern 
Nicaragua has played a key role in this shift from partisan politics to a neoliberal future focused 
on capitalist production that transcends political allegiances.  My informants were clear in their 
view that economic success trumps partisanship within the daily practices that occupy most 
Jinotega residents.  This view does not detract from the continued political need for a shared 
political space for citizen participation, but does suggest that Jinoteganos have swapped political 
engagement with economic participation in a neoliberal market economy to a remarkable extent.   
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 In contrast, this study suggests that Boaco is a place where ideological and political 
divisions have continued to run deep within the general population and have conditioned the 
particular institutional, governance, and daily patterns that constitute the contingent form of 
neoliberal political-economic reconstruction I encountered.  The transnational reconstruction 
sector in Boaco, dominated by a small set of internationally funded NGOs, has been able to 
introduce orthodox neoliberal discipline with little resistance or even an institutional counterpart.  
The partisan divisions that continue to divide the main civil society organizations, labor 
movements, and poorly developed producer cooperatives in Boaco have supported the 
emergence of a post-conflict political economy in which daily practices reinforce longstanding 
class-based political and economic cleavages inherited from the Contra conflict.   
 These contingent neoliberal forms of political-economic reconstruction in Jinotega and 
Boaco have developed around distinct socio-spatial imaginations that define the scope of 
neoliberal institutional, governance, and daily practice reforms in each place, as well.  The 
Northern regional spatial imagination that has taken hold in Jinotega has produced a political-
economic space through which the distinct Jinotega brand of neoliberal reconstruction has 
developed.  This regional imagination has supported the neoliberal focus on private sector 
economic success as the key to political and social development with a regional political identity 
discourse that connects local coffee producers and the general population into broader regional 
and global patterns of neoliberal market economy.  The reconstruction of a neoliberal political 
economy has brought forth a comprehensive definition of the economy that blurs the lines 
between economic, political, and social development within this view of Northern regional 
development through neoliberal private sector market participation. 
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 By comparison, the contingent neoliberal form of reconstruction that has emerged in 
Boaco has recursively developed within a highly local spatial imagination that draws a hard line 
between individual, private sector economic success and the broader political and social 
development needs of the Boaco municipal and departmental population.  This local imagination 
is both cause and consequence of the distinct cultural milieu in which Boaco-based informants 
have experienced conflict, post-conflict economic production, and the transnational connections 
that rest at the heart of the neoliberal reconstruction process on the ground.  Reconstruction has 
reinforced neoliberal market practices and subjects who view individual, private enterprise in the 
dominant cattle production complex as sacrosanct; and, hence, represent more collaborative 
forms of economic, political, and social development through producer cooperativism and 
regional cooperation as anti-democratic and counter to the cultural-political identities that define 
Boaco.   
 Ultimately, the contingent neoliberal patterns of post-conflict reconstruction that have 
played out in Jinotega and Boaco have established in different ways the socio-spatial terms of 
neoliberal daily practice and political subject formation.  This study reminds us that transnational 
institutions and transnational governance do not always work solely through domination, but also 
through more subtle processes that develop in the everyday spaces of post-conflict life (Allen 
2003).  Neoliberal forms of post-conflict reconstruction provide a range of distinct narratives and 
practices through which individuals come to understand their place in the post-conflict political 
economy.  Scholars’ recent focus on the contingency of neoliberalism – or neoliberalizing 
processes – should be a warning that attempts to define the normative success of reconstruction 
through adherence to a single model are destined to fail more often than not (Larner and 
LeHeron 2003; Wilson 2004)  
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 The distinct reconstruction(s) of neoliberal political subjectivity that I observed in 
Jinotega and Boaco reflect the broader institutional and governance patterns that have developed 
both over and through daily practices by the general population.  While certainly not the only 
perspective I encountered, many Jinotegano informants shared a generally neoliberal self-
understanding centered on their role in promoting economic development as a vehicle for the 
broader realization of political and social development for themselves and their community.  The 
commonly heard distaste for partisan politics and the angst-ridden comments about the futility of 
the Contra conflict revealed a neoliberal sense of self that informed many Jinoteganos’ everyday 
focus on economic production as a corrective to the violence and confrontation of the past.     
 In Boaco, the neoliberal reconstruction of political subjects has involved not so much a 
transformation as an entrenchment of long-standing cultural-political identities centered on 
Boaqueños’ self-described political-economic position as defenders of democracy through 
neoliberal market-centered practices and imaginations.  For many Boaco informants, the daily 
economic, political, and social practices reflected a more fundamental plebiscite on their 
personal, internalized convictions for post-conflict political economy in which neoliberal norms 
of personal responsibility and private sector economic development provided the foundation for 
post-conflict life in their community.   
 For both Jinotega and Boaco, the connection between the reconstruction of political 
economy and reconstruction of selfhood that came through in this study highlights the 
contingent, albeit strong, relationship between post-conflict reconstruction, neoliberal discourse, 
everyday practice, and political subject formation.  The multiple possible reconstruction 
outcomes that fall within the broad category of neoliberal political-economic processes leave the 
door open for a richly diverse – albeit not unlimited – set of policy experiments and policy 
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experiences on the ground.  Where we draw the line between contingent versus post-neoliberal 
forms of reconstruction is open for debate (Macdonald and Ruckert 2009).  Whatever 
terminology is adopted, this study demonstrates that reconstruction is a political concept that is 
both richer and more varied than contemporary policy-oriented scholars have recognized in their 
recent works.   
 We can find a moment for cautious optimism within the otherwise rather pessimistic 
portrait that this study of Nicaraguan post-conflict reconstruction has offered, with the 
recognition that the political will for getting past three decades of partisan rhetoric and empty 
political promises does exist and may yet be given expression.  The views that one Jinotega-
based coffee producer organization representative expressed in 2009 capture this hopeful view of 
reconstruction not wholly constrained by the weight of transnational, neoliberal political 
economy from above nor the wedge of ideological divisions from within:  
 There is a tendency to maintain the [old] patronage system. I see the tendency when I see 
 many  people  resigned to the idea that poverty is inescapable, and it takes considerable 
 effort to bring  people  together. There is an individualism that is hard to break. ... We still 
 lack the concept – we still think we are ‘Jinotega’ [the city] – no, we are a  Department 
 and we all have to operate in that mind-set -- whomever we are, be it the mayor, the 
 president – we have to see ourselves as a [collective]. Soppexcca has been able to 
 develop well not only with the economic part, but in terms of human capital. Our human 
 capital has been strengthened, because without knowledge capital dries up. It is 
 something we can do even without a single dollar. 
 
7.4  RETHINKING RECONSTRUCTION 
 To conclude this study, I pose the question of what these research findings on the 
complex contingencies of post-conflict reconstruction in Nicaragua can tell about the broader 
efforts to reconstruct war-torn states and societies worldwide.  Foremost, this study suggests that 
the tendency among both policy stakeholders and intellectuals to view post-conflict 
reconstruction foremost as a set of formal institutional and governance reforms introduced from 
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above onto the post-conflict population is a partial, limited view of reconstruction.  The binary 
distinction between international and domestic reconstruction stakeholders unintentionally 
reproduces the global structure of political inequality that has so often led to conflict in the first 
place.  International reconstruction stakeholders’ liberal discourse is portrayed in overly 
benevolent, disinterested terms that shift the blame for the failures of reconstruction onto 
‘flawed’ domestic post-conflict institutions and actors unable to effectively make the rapid 
transition to a post-conflict liberal capitalist-democratic order (Jeong 2005; Junne and Verkoren 
2005b; Paris 2004).   
 This study compels us to ask whether the dominant international post-conflict 
reconstruction framework built around neoliberal market-democratic institutions and 
governance, may be doing more harm than good for efforts to build substantive post-conflict 
peace in war-torn states.  The principal challenge for reconstruction is determining how to make 
the transition away from the patriarchal terms of transnational governance that drive neoliberal 
modes of political-economic reconstruction through donor finance and development assistance 
(de Zeeuw 2005).  The international donor support for reconstruction projects is often vital to 
sustain the transition from wartime political and economic conditions towards a post-conflict 
future.  However, the Nicaraguan study suggests that post-conflict reconstruction can be a 
double-edged sword that simultaneously may help constructed shared opportunities for 
reconciliation and development, but also may inhibit development of a shared post-conflict 
vision for political cooperation that can supercede the entrenched political tensions inherited 
from the past.  The transnational connections that guide reconstruction have the potential to 
reproduce the patriarchal state model so common to Latin America and other regions (Badie 
2000) with the international donor state and NGOs as benefactors driving a clientelistic political-
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economic structure at the expense of horizontal connections among civil society and grassroots 
actors. 
 This study demonstrated that post-conflict reconstruction may produce multiple, distinct 
political-economic institutions, relations, practices, and subjects that fall within the rubric of the 
international reconstruction discourse.  The recent recognition that reconstruction produces 
place-specific societal institutions and practices through a relational process has been a welcome 
advance in reconstruction studies (Flint 2011).  The merger of cultural and political-economic 
perspectives takes this recent reconstruction work one step further.  Seeing reconstruction as 
culturally informed political economy formation emphasizes more clearly the role of cultural 
conditions and relations in setting the boundaries for how reconstruction reorganizes the post-
conflict political economy within the broad terms of neoliberal thought.  In particular, this study 
suggests that reconstruction studies may benefit from closer attention to the mutual production of 
culturally grounded neoliberal post-conflict institutions and neoliberal political subject formation 
that is rendered visible through daily practices. 
 Post-conflict reconstruction in the final analysis reflects the political ideals and power 
structure from which it forms.  As a starting point, we must critically reconsider the content of 
the peace that reconstruction seeks to build and ask for whom reconstruction improves or not the 
positive conditions of a stable, prosperous life.  Reconstruction, we may find, requires a new 
social definition of ‘success’ that grants greater attention to the grounded knowledge and 
silenced voices that can recognize the challenge of reducing the root causes of conflict.  The 
reconstruction of a more just political-economic peace must begin from within the culturally 
grounded spaces that offer the best opportunity for getting past the tensions of peace and war to 
build a more humane post-conflict future. 
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 The tragic irony of Nicaraguan post-conflict reconstruction is that Nicaraguans from the 
left and the right generally diagnose the same disease – the inability to develop a homegrown 
vision for a just Nicaraguan future shared by all Nicaraguans to replace the political tensions 
carried over from a century of war, dictatorship, and revolution.  The international community is 
vitally important to Nicaragua today.  Yet, in the end the international community will not decide 
the future of Nicaraguan political-economic peace.  The Nicaraguan people are who must find 
the shared political space for reconstruction that has eluded them for too many decades.  Through 
this research process, I have come to share in Nicaraguans’ fears, and their friendships as they 
struggle to build that shared future and avoid falling back into the abyss.  It is my hope that the 
current study may become a step in this long road: That we may begin to listen to what they are 
telling us about their reconstruction experience, that their hopes for the future may be given a 
voice. 
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